Issue for October - December 2011 - National Institute of Rural ...

434 S.Mohanakumar, R.VipinkumarIntroductionAfter a series of attempts to decentralisepower, functions and devolve fund to localbodies in India since Independence, thedecentralisation drive did succeed only withthe 73 rd and 74 th Constitutional AmendmentActs in 1992. The State of Kerala stands uniqueamong other states in India not only withrespect to the scale and extent of devolutionof powers and funds but also the mode ofimplementing the very decentralisationprocess. Local Self-Government Institutions(LSGIs) in the State, after the introduction ofKerala Panchayat Raj and Kerala MunicipalityActs in 1994, have been placed as vitalinstitutions in charge of rejuvenatingparticularly the stagnated material productionsector in the State. This is in contradiction tothe recent debate on development theory andpractice, which have emphasised more onlocal level social development over the holisticgeneral economic development of thenational economy. The shift in developmentparadigm has received its ideological inputfrom two major strands of thought, viz., neoliberalismand post-Marxism. These two strandsof thoughts share the view that the conceptof interventionist state virtually place barriersto development and in its place local actorsand institutions of the civil society can ensuresocial and economic development. Thedecentralisation drive attempted in India in theearly 1990s, to a great extent, is rooted to neoliberaland post-marxist ideological upheavalsin the 1980s. In sharp contrast to it,decentralised planning process tried out inKerala, following the 73 rd and 74 thConstitutional Amendment Acts, 1992emphasised the development thinking in theclassical tradition of giving added vigour to theState’s role in development practice (Mohanand Kristian 2000). Further, the assigned roleto LSGIs is at variance with the role historicallyperceived and performed by local bodies asservice providers in India (Isaac and Franke2000). The newly elected government, on itsassumption to power in 1996, devolved 35 percent of the State plan fund to LSGIs forformulation of development plans ensuringtotal support and involvement of the localpeople residing within the area of the localbody during the Ninth Five Year Plan.The objective of the present study is toanalyse the impact of the market interveningmechanism tried out in the agricultural sectorat Velland Gram Panchayat (VGP),Thiruvananthapuram in Kerala underdecentralised planning. The study is based ona primary survey of farmer members of theorganisation, who have been associating withit from its very inception in 2004. A totalsample size of 30 member farmers of differenttypes were selected out of a total 300registered members of the organisation in2010. The primary survey was conducted inMarch 2010.Characteristic Features of DecentralisedPlanning in KeralaThe material production sector of theState economy has stagnated for a long timesince early 1980s, which in turn hasconsiderably weakened the State’s financialviability, posing serious challenge to itsspending on the social sector or the verysustainability of the much acclaimed Keralamodel of development (Kannan andPushpangatan 1988). Although, cutting downthe expenditure on social sector isunacceptable to any democratic government,especially in a left lenient State like Kerala,the political leadership could also not ignorethe alarming sign raised from concernedquarters on the sustainability of a welfareeconomy-Kerala model of development builton a fragile material production base. However,strengthening of the material production basein a regional economy like Kerala requiredhuge public investment, which was muchJournal of Rural Development, Vol. 30, No. 4, October - December : 2011