ISSUE 150 : Sep/Oct - 2001 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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38AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 150 SEPTEMBER / OCTOBER 2001What is the region? The region is definedin ASP 97, as “the countries of East Asia,Southeast Asia, the South Pacific, the UnitedStates, and, perhaps increasingly in the future,South Asia.” This littoral region is vast andcomprises an enormous diversity of culturesand nationalities and is spread across severaltime zones and climates. It is the fastestgrowing region in the world and is theinterface between burgeoning industrial andcommercial development and old establishedcultures. Clearly, as the region continues toexpand and economies grow, there will beincreasing pressure on diminishing resources,which will increase the risk of friction betweencompetitors, at either the national or locallevel. Other pressures within the regioninclude the establishment of democracy andindependence in a number of countries.According to ASP 97:The dynamism of the Asia Pacificregion makes our task more complexthan it has been in the past. The paceof economic growth in our regionpresents a combination of opportunitiesand challenges. Our national approachto the region must therefore have anumber of elements which allow us bothto exploit the opportunities and managethe risks presented to us.An indication of the rate of growth that hasoccurred in the region in recent years isreflected in the modernisation of a number ofregional military forces into well-equipped andbalanced conventional forces, able to “monitorand protect offshore resources and interests”(ibid). The purchase of an Aircraft Carrier(Chakri Naruebet) by Thailand and the currentbuilding of three Amphibious Ships (LPD) bySingapore also represent a significant increaseto capability.ASP 97 noted that this strong rate ofgrowth in defence spending was expected tocontinue over the coming decades whichwould “increase the capability of regionaldefence forces.” Whilst both ASP 97 and theprevious ADO strategic policy acknowledgedthat there was no obvious or immediate threatto Australia or its dependencies, clearly there isconsiderable potential for a conflict to arisewithin the region and at relatively short notice.National sovereignty issues, racial andreligious disharmony, increased wealth and theemergence of democracy are all catalysts forconflict. Indonesia, Malaysia and PNG are butthree of a number of countries within theregion where such catalysts exist. Furtherafield, Burma, Cambodia, Korea, Taiwan andthe South China Sea are all areas of potentialconcern.As General Krulak, previous CommandantUSMC noted:In the future, the United States is likelyto face a number of very differentthreats to its security interests. Manyof these will be associated with thelittorals, those areas where land and seameet. The great coastal cities, wellpopulatedcoasts, and the intersection oftrade routes represent a relatively smallportion of the worlds surface, yetprovide homes to over three-quarters ofthe world’s population, locations forover 80 per cent of the worlds politicalcapitals, and nearly all of the primarymarketplaces for international trade.Because of this, the littorals are also theplace where most of the world’simportant conflicts are likely to occur.Geographic proximity with the littoralsis one of the few things that futureconflicts are likely to have in common.In all other respects - goals,organisations, armaments and tactics -the warfare of the next 20 years will bedistinguished by its great variety. Forthat reason, it is imperative that theCorps resist the temptation to preparefor only one type of conflict.
(Operational Manoeuvre from the Sea:Building a Marine Corps for the 21stCentury by General Charles C. Krulak).This message is equally applicable to theADF. In preparing to respond adequately toany one or more of the broad range ofpotential scenarios within the region, the ADFshould now re-assess how it is configured andorganised. The great imponderable in thiscritical self-assessment of defence capabilityare the judgements based on intelligence andother factors that identify the threat or threatsto Australia and its interests. A greatdifficulty for the ADF, in the post-VietnamWar era, has been to identify such threats anddevelop capabilities to counter them.Consequently, the ADF has continued togenerally develop capabilities that reflect singleService perceptions of what is important to thedefence of Australia. The result has been thedevelopment of a broad range of disparateplatform centric capabilities, not necessarilyintegrated to meet future ADF requirementsand not reflecting a Total Force concept.The Way AheadAs we begin to implement the guidancecontained in Defence 2000, it is opportune toconsider a better way of doing business andadopt a more holistic approach to thedevelopment of defence capabilities. A keyfactor in this process is to acknowledge thatwhilst Australia does not currently face anobvious threat, Defence 2000 demands that weare prepared to deal effectively with any one ormore of a range of potential threats emergingwithin the region, or beyond. This requires ahigh order of flexibility throughout the ADF inboth the organisation, the command chain andin the planning process in order that anappropriate force can be assembled quicklyand prepared for deployment to meet anygiven situation. The second key factorconcerns Australia’s unique geo-strategicsituation within the region and its vasthinterland, with limited infrastructure.A FORCE FOR ALL SEASONS ... and all the right reasons 39Equally vast is the regional littoral area intowhich the ADF may be required to operate.The tyranny of distance between and withinthese vast areas requires a high level ofmobility at both the strategic and tactical levelacross the ADF.A key factor in this development is thatDefence 2000 recognises Australia’s geostrategicsituation as an island continent, set ina predominantly maritime environment, andthat the development of future ADFcapabilities will be very much centred upon aMaritime Strategy. This is a significantchange from the Continental Defence posturethat has dominated Australian defencedevelopment in the 20th century. The adoptionof a Maritime Strategy does not place Navy ina pre-eminent position over the other twoServices but does recognise the extensivemaritime nature of our surroundings and theneed to develop a Total Force capability.Stewart Fraser, in an article on Littoral Warfareand Joint Maritime Operations, noted that:Maritime Strategy flows directly from astate’s geo-strategic environment, and isformulated at national and grandstrategic levels. At its broadest, it maybe defined as the utilisation of nationalmaritime-based power – military andcivil – to meet political and economicobjectives:Maritime strategy is specificallyconcerned with the exercise ofmaritime power, as opposed tonaval power. The difference issignificant. Maritime power isinherently joint in nature. Itemanates from forces drawn fromall three Services, both land andsea-based, supported by nationaland commercial resources,exercising influence over sea, landand air environments. 1The reality of deploying and operating inthis environment, in a flexible and mobilemanner, needs to be fully examined and all
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ISSUE 150 : Sep/Oct - 2001 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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