ISSUE 150 : Sep/Oct - 2001 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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6AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 150 SEPTEMBER / OCTOBER 2001with the “enduring characteristics of war”. 2These characteristics include weather, climateand terrain (the physical environment), theenemy, and uncertainty, friction, chaos anddanger, (which arguably are a consequenceof the physical and enemy environment).To conduct an analysis of this breadth, anumber of assumptions must be made. Asmuch as possible we have made theseassumptions about the friendly environmentas this is considered the most predictable ofthe factors; some generalisations are madeabout the physical environment, but as fewconstraints as possible are applied to theenemy. Consequently this article is relevantto sensor technologies, and the tactical levelof land operations in Australia and herregion of interest. As such, the conclusionsmay not be directly relevant to theoperational or strategic levels of war or themaritime and air environments.Friendly Environment… an age where firepower can be projectedfrom afar with great selectivity.Francois Heisbourg, quoted in LWD 1The Australian Army’s present strategicenvironment can be summarised as “anelement of a joint force conductingoperations to defend Australia’s interestswithin a maritime strategy”. Within thisstrategy there are two primary modes ofemploying land forces: as the “back stop” onmainland Australia for combined air andmaritime forces attempting to close the airseagap to the north of Australia, or as amanoeuvre force within the maritimeapproaches (the “inner arc”, see Figure 1 onpage 9). 3 Since 1940 the Australian Army hasoperated mainly within our region, forexample, the South West Pacific in 1941-45,Korea, Malaya, Borneo, Vietnam, Cambodia,Bougainville, Papua New Guinea and EastTimor, and throughout the spectrum ofconflict from general war to peacekeepingoperations and humanitarian assistance. Thequestion this raises is: what are thecapabilities required for operations within theregion throughout the spectrum of conflict,including peace, asymmetric andconventional operations?Australia’s current strategy reflects anenduring preference to prevent the conditionsunder which a direct threat to the mainlandcould develop. Now, as previously, Australiawill seek a decision in its northernapproaches, before a threat reaches thecontinent. These regions will remainstrategically important to Australia because,for the foreseeable future, any sustained andsubstantial threat to Australia’s physicalintegrity must arise from or move throughthis area. For this reason, Australia willcontinue to work cooperatively with regionalstates, to prevent or defeat the emergence ofsecurity threats that may have a destabilisingeffect on the near region.The Australian Army’s philosophy onwarfighting can be broadly summarised aswinning the land battle through close combat,manoeuvre and the indirect approach withcombined arms teams using their initiativeand teamwork. 4,5 Command is exercised byapplying a doctrine that seeks to influence theflow of action rather than to control eachevent (Directive Control). 6 While fighting waris conducted through many mediums (e.g.electronic or psychological warfare), closecombat will remain a key component of theland battle but “the knowledge edge” is seenas a major force multiplier.The knowledge edge is usually described asa system, made up of command and control,communications, computers, intelligence,surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR)integrated with weapon systems and logisticsupport. The weapon systems are characterisedby improved precision, accuracy anddiscrimination, especially in open terrain(author’s italics). Knowledge is an importantaspect of the Army’s “fighting smart” conceptand is to be gained from, and disseminated
AUSTRALIA’S REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT BLUNTING THE KNOWLEDGE EDGE? 7through, the C4ISR system, informationoperations and professional mastery.Information operations include the protectionof our information systems and the penetrationof the enemy’s. Professional mastery is thecomposite of training and experience thatallows commanders and staff to quicklyprocess information, weigh up risks, then makeand implement operational decisions.Enemy Environment… the enemy has three courses open to him,and of these three he will adopt the fourth.Attributed to Von Molke (the Elder)Broadly there are only three legitimateassumptions that can be made about anenemy, especially when dealing with futurescenarios. The first is that the enemy will studyour methods of fighting, seek weaknesses andtry to exploit them, the second is that they areintelligent and will learn from experience, andfinally they will attempt to deceive us. Basedon these assumptions, assessing what theenemy is likely to do becomes a game of“Catch 22”, subject to significant uncertainty.A means of reducing this uncertainty is toconduct a rigorous analysis of our owncapabilities to establish our strengths andtherefore determine what courses we canrealistically deny the enemy (and which aretherefore the enemy’s least likely courses). Forexample, with a defence force based on air andmaritime superiority (through the possession offighters, strike aircraft, submarines and ships)Australia claims the ability to close the air-seagap in the Timor and Arafura Seas. 7Therefore, an enemy may conclude that, if theyare to strike at Australia, they should avoidconventional approaches and may attempt“asymmetric crossings” to minimise combatlosses. 8 When likely scenarios are viewed fromthis enemy perspective, possible threatsbecome less ambiguous and risks can beproperly assessed (for probability andimportance) and mitigated. The assessments ofthe enemy courses of action then becomematters for risk evaluation and management.It is reasonable to conclude that in defenceof the Australian mainland, the currentprogram of investment in air and maritimeplatforms and C4ISR systems may force anenemy into an asymmetric approach forattacks on the Australian mainland andAustralia’s vital interests. This means that theArmy may fight campaigns anywhere withinAustralia against coercive threats by terrorists(a prospect not considered further in thisarticle) or, against threats of insurgency orraider operations by enemy special forces innorthern Australia.In the defence of Australia’s regionalinterest, that is operations in the littoral ormaritime approaches, Australia is likely tohave to project her influence offshore and theland component is a key element in thisstrategy. The land force must seize theinitiative in order to achieve national goalswithin the constraints of time and limitedresources. The ADF may be required to allocateforces to physically protect assets whilesimultaneously seeking out the enemy. Theenemy may have the initial advantage of alocal knowledge of the physical environment.The likely enemy can be bounded; bymassed conventional forces with some hightechnology inserts at the upper end, and bydispersed infantry forces (again with hightechnology inserts) at the lower. 9 Massedconventional forces are optimised for relativelyopen country and are susceptible to longrangedetection and fires, particularly whenmoving. Leading edge technologies in sensors,information management and transportationare making this type of battlefield more andmore lethal. However ground forcescontinually seek to shroud themselves interrain or civilian populations to minimise theeffectiveness of long-range precisionengagements. Probably more difficult isdispersed infantry concentrating for specificactions and dispersing again. They may be
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ISSUE 150 : Sep/Oct - 2001 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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