ISSUE 150 : Sep/Oct - 2001 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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52AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 150 SEPTEMBER / OCTOBER 2001success of subsequent missions. Hence thesuccess of UNTAC contributed to the success ofINTERFET, which in turn is contributing to thesuccess of UNTAET. The experience gainedover time had made each successive operationbetter than those before it. Many Asia Pacificnations have participated in these operations,increasing their own national experience ofoperations in a multi-national context.The analysis in this section demonstratesthat while UNTAC was a UN-sponsoredcoalition, run and led by the UN, andINTERFET was a UN-sanctioned coalition, runand led by Australia under UN authority, bothwere very successful. This indicates that bothforms of coalition possible under the UN modelcan be successful in the Asia Pacific region. Asdiscussed in the first paragraph of this section,the main distinction between the two types ofcoalition was the speed at which they wereable to build up to the force structure of a fullyeffective coalition. This distinction mayinfluence which type of coalition is moreappropriate in any given future situation.Future Ad Hoc CoalitionsThere have been a large number of lessonslearned from UNTAC and INTERFET that canbe better incorporated in planning. The desiredoutcome is a situation where a robust coalitionforce can be created that can reach fullcapacity in minimum timeframe, and withsufficient capability to achieve the missionobjective. Unlike the NATO situation, the AsiaPacific region includes a number of individualmilitary forces without a common doctrinalframework or mandated training andinteroperability standards. The UNTAC andINTERFET operations demonstrated that this isnot a major impediment to the conduct ofrelatively successful operations. The challengeis to create an acceptable means to addressselected strategic level lessons in peacetime,and provide an awareness of the operationaland tactical level lessons that can only beeffectively resolved in a specific coalitionsituation.The approach used within the AustralianDefence Force to consider the strategic levelcoalition building lessons learned fromINTERFET may be suitable for this purpose. Itcan provide the means to sort the variouslessons of the past and to identify those thatcan be addressed now, and those that are bestleft to those planning future ad hoc coalitions.The model was developed to address therequirements of future warfare by the Office ofthe RMA within the Defence Headquarters andintroduces seven components of warfareconcepts that integrate to define a campaignstrategy. Using these categories it is possible toidentify where major deficiencies exist that canbe addressed either by individual regionalnations or in a corporate way by those nationswho have cooperated together in previousoperations and may do so in the future.The warfare concept categories are:• command and control;• intelligence, surveillance andreconnaissance;• tailored effects;• force projection;• force protection;• force sustainment; and• force generation.The approach provides a way in which theconstants, trends and shifts of the uniquestrategic context in the Asia Pacific region canbe merged with the components of future adhoc coalition campaigns. It can identify theways of achieving the objective of an effectivecoalition and the means through training,doctrine and policy to improve the ability tooperate in coalition in these areas. The key isfor regional nations that can anticipateoperating in coalition together in the future toprepare them for this eventuality. The basicpremise is that the more negotiating that isdone in advance and the more understandings
eached beforehand; the easier it will be toconduct a coalition operation. Those thingsthat take time, things that are common to allcoalition operations or can be identified asnecessary sufficiently far in advance can beaddressed. This will leave those things thatvary or that are not easily predicted to be dealtwith on a case-by-case basis. The web ofbilateral relationships that exists in the AsiaPacific region provides an effective means forachieving this goal.Command and ControlImportance of an efficient commandstructure. Coalition participants will only joina coalition if they respect and have confidencein command structure. Command and controlcan be based on the widely accepted UN modelthat has proven successful, but it requires theappointment of a capable and crediblecoalition commander agreeable to all. Potentialcoalition participants need to be convincedthat the most direct and efficient chain ofcommand has been established and mostimportantly that it will be responsive to theirnational requirements.Importance of the national commander /force commander relationship. Theassignment of national force elements to thecoalition commander under operational controlis a key factor. This allows the coalitioncommander to use national contingents withinlimits agreed by each nation for the purpose ofthe mission, but allows each nation to retainultimate command of their own forces. In aregion such as the Asia Pacific where thediversity of interest and motivation issignificant, the use of operational control asopposed to the NATO model of forces beingunder NATO command is much moreappropriate. The use of operational controlunder the UN model allows the coalitioncommander to negotiate individually withnational component commanders regardingthe employment of their forces. This assistsnations in achieving their varying politicalUNTAC AND INTERFET - A COMPARATIVE ANALYSISobjectives in joining the coalition and allowsthe coalition commander to address constraintssuch as varying willingness to acceptcasualties.Managing national media requirements. Astrategic plan for the management of coalition,national, host nation, UN and NGO agencyaspects is a key requirement. Internationalrecognition and national prestige are primaryconsiderations for nations planning toparticipate in a coalition. Appropriate mediacoverage of all activities, including access tothe arrival/ training/ deployment/ operations isrequired. This can be provided by nationalmedia agencies, but must be supported by thecoalition leader. National requirements can bemet through a flexible approach to theprocedures for the accreditation and support tomedia representatives.Intelligence, Surveillance and ReconnaissanceInformation sharing is required.Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissancecan be facilitated by the formulation ofinformation sharing agreements betweennations. This includes the use of generalinformation to inform the decision toparticipate in the coalition and during theoperation to inform changes in the missionand the circumstances for leaving the coalition.This is a sensitive issue, but will provideparticular benefits at the strategic level ofcommand.Policies for the release of classifiedmaterial. Interaction in a coalition setting isgreatly facilitated between nations that havealready negotiated the boundaries on whatclassified information they are prepared torelease to each. In addition, the more countriesshare information on regional developments asthey arise, the better prepared they will be todeal with them should military action becomenecessary.Force ProjectionStrategic lift for deployment and redeployment.Few nations have the means to53
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ISSUE 150 : Sep/Oct - 2001 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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