44AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. <strong>150</strong> SEPTEMBER / OCTOBER <strong>2001</strong>strategic and tactical air and sea mobility isavailable with the upgraded C130(J) Fleet andthe newly redesigned LPA’s HMAS Kanimblaand HMAS Manoora in conjunction withHMAS Tobruk and the LCH’s.However, the effectiveness of these forcesdepends upon the adoption of a clearwarfighting capability established on theintegration of the capabilities to the commonpurpose of being able to provide a highlymobile and responsive force, able to operate inthe maritime environment. This not onlyrequires reorganisation to the current forcestructure but the replacement of some heavyequipment with lighter, more mobile and airseatransportable equipment. The provision ofair defence for those naval and Army unitsoperating as a joint force in the maritimeenvironment will be of paramount importance.The subsequent development of futurecapabilities across the ADF must continue toreflect the underlying requirement to develop ahighly mobile and responsive force that is ableto operate effectively throughout the region.It is possible that some significant savings incost and manpower may be achieved throughthe rationalisation of the developmentalprocess, thus offsetting some costs relating torestructuring changes.ConclusionThe ADF is confronted with the need tomake some significant decisions concerning itsstructure and modus operandi into the 21stcentury. The world has changed, and whilst anumber of countries have dramaticallyrealigned their defence forces to reflect thesechanges, the ADF has yet to change from itslong established structures. The CoalitionGovernment’s stated increased involvementwithin a region, that is both predominantlymaritime and growing in importance but alsobecoming increasingly unstable, demands thatthe ADF develop Joint Warfighting conceptsbased upon the MOLE warfighting concept.To be effective, the ADF must not onlyadapt to operating within a maritime strategybut also change its structure and modusoperandi to undertake manoeuvre warfare.Whilst the ADF has a broad range of existingcapabilities, these need to be reviewed, so thathollowness within the structure is removed andthe ADF acquires a lighter, compact and moremobile capability so that it can adapt and reactquickly to changing situations, particularlywithin the region. <strong>Force</strong> elements must becapable of coming together as part of a jointforce to meet any given task. The developmentof such a capability, demands that singleService developments reflect the requirementsof the Total <strong>Force</strong>. In addition, emphasisshould be placed on high levels of training andcross-training with other <strong>Force</strong> Elements toensure that a high level of familiarity andinteroperability is achieved across the ADF.The ability of this force to be effectivethroughout the region into the 21st centurydemands that the ADF re-evaluate its modusoperandi and adopt the concepts of manoeuvrewarfare. The development of future singleService capabilities must reflect the needs ofthe Total <strong>Force</strong> requirement, so that the ADFcan indeed become A <strong>Force</strong> For All Seasons.NOTES1. S. Fraser, (1995) “Littoral Warfare and JointMaritime Operations, UK Approaches andCapabilities”, Bailrigg Memorandum 32, CDISSLancaster University, Lancaster.2. Concept for Manoeuvre Operations in theLittoral Environment (4th Draft 04/06/01).3. Operational shock is a term derived from deepoperations theory drawn from the formerSoviet Union’s analysis of the determinants ofsuccessful manoeuvre and war termination.4. Rational dislocation is an inability to applyrational decision-making processes in a timelyand relevant manner to positively influencecircumstances in the battlespace. Emotionaldisorientation is an inability to come to termswith an unexpected loss of initiative andbattlespace control. The inability of the Frenchhigh command to respond effectively to theGerman blitzkrieg in 1940, despite the Frenchpreponderance of man, materiel and advanced
A FORCE FOR ALL SEASONS ... and all the right reasons 45technology, is an example of the effects ofemotional disorientation combined withrational dislocation. Most French seniorcommanders were emotionally disoriented bythe collapse of the key assumptionsunderpinning their pre-war planning and mostof the rationally conceived orders prepared bytheir staff were dislocated in time from eventson the ground.5. M. Hewish, J. Janssen, R. Scott, (March 1997)Janes’ International Defense Review, Coulsdon,Surrey, UK.6. op. cit.7. S. Fraser, Bailrigg Memorandum 32 quoting“Operational Maneuver from the Sea,Headquarters Marine Corps” (Washington D.C.).8. S. Fraser, Bailrigg Memorandum 32.9. Dr Michael Evans LWSC Working Paper No.101, “The Role of the Army in a MaritimeConcept of Strategy.”
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