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OF POLITICAL THEORIES. 355The idea of sovereignty further implies, and that necesThat sarily.in all affairs of the state, nothing shall be doneeither without or contrary to the will of the sovereign.Where this is not the case, he ceases to be sovereign(supremus).By this essential condition, which, indeed, results fromthe nature of the thing,we ascertain the relation in which,under constitutional monarchies, the sovereign must standtowards the people or their representatives and;we areenabled to draw the line of demarcation which must not bepassed if the issovereign to remain such.Constitutional monarchies are those in which there is apopular power^ generally called the Chambers, which represent the interests of the people in the councils of theas it isprince, without, however, opposing his interests, too customary to imagine they do the interests of bothbeing the same viz. the prosperity of the state.This power not only advises, but joins with the prince indeciding," still, however, it must be in some manner dependent upon him if he is to remain sovereign, and be aprince not in name only but in reality. Upon the relation,then, in which the prince stands to the chambers, the maintenance of the monarchical principle chiefly depends, andwe must, therefore, consider what rights ought in this respectto be secured to him.In speaking of the Chambers we here uiM?fstand thatboth, or at least one of them, is to consist of deputies chosenby the people. It is doubtless more in favour of the throne thatthe assembly should consist of two chambers, one of whichshould be composed of members not chosen by the people,but possessing their seats either by right of birth or by appointment of the sovereign; but it cannot be shown thatthis is generally necessary. Sometimes, indeed, chambersof peers are neither necessary to the throne, nor any supportto it ; nay, France has lately shown by example that a powerful opposition may be formed in them.The division into two chambers affords greater security,however, against party decisions, and makes it more difficultfor factions to be formed, and their interests preferredtothose of the state. It is necessary, however, that the twochambers should not have two interests, and that the mem-2A2