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APPENDIX.(p. 449.)An Examination of theQuestions respecting the claims of the ArmedNeutrality.THE claims of the armed neutrality embrace four questions, which mustbe kept quite distinct, if we wish to examine them properly. The firstis : Whether free ships make free cargoes ? The second is. The determination of what are called contraband or forbidden wares ?Thirdly,Whether a convoy is a protection from search ? Fourthly, When areports to be considered in a state of blockade We ? shall proceed to examine each separately.I. Whether Free Ships make free Cargoes?This celebrated maxim, which may be regarded as the basis of the newmaritime code, which the armed neutrality wished to introduce, involvestwo distinct propositions. First, that neutral ships may carry their ownwares, (provided they are not contraband, of which below,) to all ports,whether belonging to neutral or belligerent parties, provided they are notin a state of blockade. By virtue of this principle, therefore, the neutralpowers wished to have the free navigation and conveyance of their ownproducts, (with the above restrictions,) not only to the ports of all neutralstates, but also to those of France, Spain, Holland, etc. But what wasof still greater consequence, they desired also, in the second place, freepermission, not only to carry to those countries their own wares, and tobring away what they had purchased there, but also to convey, whereand how they pleased, the goods of the belligerent parties ; thus, for example, freely and at discretion to take in French wares and French property, without let or hinderance from British ships or privateers 9 andBritish wares, without let or hinderance from the enemies of England.The great practical importance of this question will become apparent atonce to all who bestow the slightest reflection upon it. Were it generallyrecognised by maritime powers, maritime wars would no longer exerciseany very considerable influence on the trade and commerce of nations.It is true, a war might, perhaps, hinder the belligerent powers from continuing their trade in native vessels, unless, indeed, sufficiently strong atsea to protect it ; but this evil would be easily remedied, as neutral vessels would naturally hasten in sufficient numbers to their ports, in orderto transport their merchandise to whatever part of the world itmight bedestined. Instead, therefore, of a maritime war being, as it is now, extremely prejudicial to neutrals, from the many annoyancesit occasionsthem, it would, in this case, be advantageous to them, as they could notfail to be employed in the transport of merchandise, and consequently todraw a large share of tne carrying-trade to themselves.From this it will readily be perceived why England, inher presentposition, was so deeply interested in withholding her assent to this principle. England is powerful enough at sea to protect her own commerce,and to carry it on > even in the midst of war, without any considerable