The Impact of Direct Democracy on Society - UniversitÃƒÂ¤t St.Gallen

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– 182 –Table A.3: Security Expenditure 1986 – 2001 with Lagged Crime Rates(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)Police Police Ordinary CriminalJudicialSecurity Defenseexpenditure force police detectivessystem<strong>Direct</strong> democracy -0.125** -0.102** -0.075** -0.228** -0.078** 0.027 -0.075**(5.61) (5.02) (3.34) (5.40) (5.69) (0.81) (4.34)Assault crime rate 0.085** 0.064** 0.038* 0.144** 0.080** 0.064(*) 0.109**(3.77) (3.69) (2.13) (3.22) (5.66) (1.89) (5.40)<strong>The</strong>ft crime rate 0.160** 0.215** 0.226** 0.141 0.150** -0.05 0.156**(3.50) (5.58) (4.60) (1.56) (4.04) (0.50) (2.67)Fiscaldecentralization -0.328(*) -0.056 -0.094 -0.017 -0.232* 0.499** -0.145(1.96) (0.36) (0.65) (0.05) (2.48) (2.61) (1.16)Tax competition -0.226** -0.004 -0.047 0.163 -0.151** 0.065 -0.159**(3.86) (0.07) (0.80) (1.35) (3.87) (0.54) (2.86)Federal transfers 0.172** 0.199** 0.138** 0.434** 0.073(*) 0.05 0.043(2.79) (3.71) (2.77) (3.67) (1.96) (0.66) (0.84)Constitutionalconstraint -0.025* -0.005 0.006 -0.031 0.004 0.023 0.039**(1.99) (0.34) (0.41) (1.08) (0.62) (1.01) (3.49)Conservativeideology 0.028 0.039 -0.093 0.541* 0.011 0.115 -0.026(0.25) (0.37) (0.87) (2.41) (0.16) (0.93) (0.33)Size <strong>of</strong> coalition 0.01 -0.029 -0.035(*) -0.033 0.026(*) -0.038 0.072**(0.42) (1.41) (1.75) (0.60) (1.82) (0.99) (3.63)Romance canton -0.302** -0.127 -0.093 -0.245 -0.196** 0.189 -0.251**(3.22) (1.59) (1.20) (1.43) (3.76) (1.37) (3.70)Urbanization 0.000 -0.002(*) -0.004** 0.005* 0.000 -0.009** 0.004**(0.06) (1.75) (3.02) (2.29) (0.16) (3.27) (3.05)National income 0.483** 0.339** 0.311* 0.543* 0.474** 0.470* 0.181(3.31) (2.88) (2.56) (2.09) (5.91) (2.24) (1.39)Cantonal population -0.032 -0.056* -0.046(*) -0.071(*) -0.009 -0.035 0.033(*)(1.24) (2.54) (1.95) (1.77) (0.62) (1.08) (1.66)Residents 0 – 14 -0.033(*) -0.066** -0.084** 0.011 -0.001 -0.022 -0.003(1.71) (3.83) (4.23) (0.42) (0.10) (0.82) (0.20)Residents 15 – 24 0.037(*) 0.029 0.006 0.090** -0.001 -0.124** 0.038(*)(1.96) (1.58) (0.29) (2.71) (0.07) (3.32) (1.93)Residents over 60 0.024(*) 0.035** 0.031* 0.050** 0.022* -0.037* 0.029**(1.96) (2.90) (2.15) (2.87) (2.55) (2.23) (3.12)Constant -5.303** -8.963** -8.156** -14.258** -4.284** -0.139 -6.193**(4.20) (8.20) (6.35) (8.72) (5.61) (0.09) (7.40)Observations 416 416 416 416 416 416 416Centered R 2 0.82 0.83 0.82 0.51 0.86 0.68 0.872SLS with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors for two lags. Absolute values <strong>of</strong> t-statisticsare in parentheses. Endogenous variable: fiscal decentralization. (*) indicates significance at the 10%, * at the 5%, and** at the 1% level. Year fixed effects are included but not reported. Crime rates are lagged by two periods.
– 183 –Table A.4: Summary Statistics <strong>of</strong> Explanatory VariablesVariable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max<strong>Direct</strong> democracy 416 4.261 1.211 1.583 5.833Real welfare transfers(no log) 416 0.255 0.147 0.0488 0.866Income inequality 416 1.214 0.253 0.746 1.898National income(no log) 416 27.009 6.049 18.608 53.997Unemployment rate 416 2.243 1.907 0 7.800Closeness to border 416 0.269 0.444 0 1Interaction b. cantons 416 16.505 17.157 0.901 81.450Urbanization 416 59.142 24.041 14.063 100Population (no log) 416 266505.9 276036.3 13137 1228628Residents 0 – 14 416 18.291 2.210 11.268 23.172Residents 15 – 24 416 13.127 1.738 10.073 17.874Residents 25 – 29 416 7.533 0.861 5.161 9.495Residents over 60 416 18.366 2.888 11.584 27.073Fiscal decentralization 416 0.394 0.176 0.004 0.978Tax competition (no log) 416 0.233 0.078 0.096 0.419Federal transfers(no log) 416 302.022 115.906 150.452 914.377Constitutional constraint 416 0.339 0.863 0 3Conservative ideology 416 -0.098 0.184 -0.6 0.4Size <strong>of</strong> coalition 416 3.310 0.871 1 5Romance canton 416 0.269 0.444 0 1Severity art. 111 384 217 73.309 30.23066 0 100Severity art. 122/123 416 17.444 13.91414 0 100Severity art. 187 416 19.040 18.46005 0 100Severity art. 139 416 25.514 9.470814 0 66.7Severity art. 140 416 42.141 24.84547 0 100Severity art. 146 416 23.711 14.37432 0 100Severity art. 138 416 19.065 17.89831 0 100Criminal detectives percapita (no log) 416 0.0003689 0.0001769 0.0000484 0.0010211Ordinary policemen percapita (no log) 416 0.0015139 0.0005898 0.0005924 0.0039329217 In two cantons, the severity <strong>of</strong> punishment variable is missing. For this reason, in the homicide regressionsonly 384 observations are used.
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The Impact
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- 3 -DanksagungDie Arbeit an der vo
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- 81 -democracy. Hence, the majorit
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- 99 -significant impact on persona
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- 113 -Chapter IV:Income Redistribu
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- 115 -The latter
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- 117 -coalition because they can e
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- 119 -wing parties. If additional
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Page 204 and 205: - 204 -1 IntroductionDirect
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- 232 -appears to be influential in
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- 262 -11 Appendix: Descriptive Sta
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- 264 -Selective schoolRegular test
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- 266 -Table 11.2: Indices
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- 268 -Table 11.4: Descriptive Stat
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- 270 -Chapter VII:Conclusion
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- 272 -should lead, on average, to
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- 274 -References
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- 276 -ARTALE, A. and H.-P. GRÜNER
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- 278 -CARD, D. and A. PAYNE (2002)
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- 280 -EASTERLIN, R.A. (1974), Does
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- 282 -FELD, L.P. and J.G. MATSUSAK
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- 284 -FREY, B.S. and A. STUTZER (2
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- 286 -HANUSHEK, E.A. (1986), <stro
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- 288 -KESSLER, A. (2003), Represen
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- 290 -LEHMAN, D.R., R.O. LEMPERT a
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- 292 -MORGAN, M.C. and M. HENRION
Page 294 and 295:
- 294 -PROKHOROV, A.V., C. WARNEKE,
Page 296 and 297:
- 296 -SCHALTEGGER, CH. and L.P: FE
Page 298 and 299:
- 298 -TRECHSEL, A. and U. SERDÜLT
Page 300:
- 300 -Curriculum VitaeBorn on the
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