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The Commission evaluates the impacts of the different options according to a comparative staticmodel focused on the impact of price changes on the aggregate EU market for mobile roamingservices.No policy change (the so called “zero option”): according to the IA, this option does notcontribute to strengthen the Internal Market and would not have a beneficial impact oncompetitiveness.Self regulation option: the Commission considers this option difficult to apply and not ableto solve the problem: on one hand a self-regulation agreement may reflect the position of thelarger operators that will continue to maintain a competitive advantage on the smallest ones;on the other hand it may not solve the problem of the different approaches that the NRAscould adopt with respect to the roaming market. Moreover it does not guarantee significantprice reductions across all consumers segment. Furthermore the complexity of the roamingcharge makes difficult to assure a high rate of compliance to the self-regulation.Co-regulation option: it is considered not able to reach the objective of reducing highroaming charges: the cross-border nature of the roaming services require an uniformapplication of the rules in the Single Market.Soft law option: it is considered to add only additional burden without provide certainty ofoutcome.Price regulation only in the wholesale market: it represents the approach shared by theERG. It foresees a price regulation in wholesale market and the imposition ofmoretransparency in the retail tariffs. A price regulation in retail market has to be imposed only ifthe retail roaming charges does not show sufficient reduction after the wholesale reductionof charges (the so-called sunrise mechanism) 67 . For the Commission “the main disadvantageof this option is the risk of negligible pass through of price reductions from wholesale level67 European Regulatory Group, ERG common position on the coordinated analysis of the markets for wholesaleinternational roaming, ERG (05) 20Rev170
to retail level… past evidence and economic reasoning based on rational behavior of profitmaximisingfirms raises serious doubts about significant reductions in retail prices as aresult of implementing this option” 68 . In the Commission analysis retail regulation couldhave positive impacts for competition and consumers only in the short term, while in thelong term it can lead to a restriction on competition, with the smaller operator not able tocompete with the biggest one, because they are not able to negotiate lower wholesale rates.As consequence, the consumers can obtain a reduction of the roaming charges only in theshort period.For the reason above, the Commission believes that the only way to reach the objective ofreducing the roaming tariff is to regulate both wholesale and retail markets.Once the preferred option was identified, the problem is not yet solved: how does the marketregulate? Three different options are taken into account by the Commission:1. Visited country approach: the customer has to be treated in the same way as one on thevisited network;2. Home pricing principle: it equates the calls go back home to international call. Under thisprinciple the wholesale regulation would be based on cost-orientation/capping in order toassure that the service are not offered above costs.3. European home market approach: it foresee the use of safeguard capping mechanismboth at wholesale and retail level.This last approach is the preferred approach: according to the IA it is able to guarantee the doubleadvantage of price reductions for all consumers segment, including business and a relative easyimplementation and monitoring.1.3 The Dynamic Impact of the Regulation: Why are Commission missing to analyze it?68 European Commission, Impact Assessment of policy options in relation to a Commission proposal for a regulation ofthe European Parliament and of the Council on roaming on public mobile networks within the community, 12 July 200671
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LUISS GUIDO CARLIDOTTORATO DI RICER
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a form-based approach 4 . In partic
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Guidance Paper is the result of a r
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In the following section are analyz
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The rebate schemes were individuali
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The analysis takes into considerati
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documents or data that the dominant
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Page 46 and 47: IntroductionRegulatory Impact Asses
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