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The Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance - Statoil

The Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance - Statoil

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• does not have any cross-relationships with executive personnel, othermembers <strong>of</strong> the board <strong>of</strong> directors or other shareholder elected representatives• has not at any time in the last three years been a partner or employee <strong>of</strong>the accounting firm that currently audits the company.<strong>The</strong> criteria listed above may also be relevant to determining whether a member<strong>of</strong> the board <strong>of</strong> directors is independent <strong>of</strong> the company’s main shareholder(s).Such evaluation should then be carried out on the basis <strong>of</strong> the board member’srelationship with the main shareholder(s) not the company. <strong>The</strong> rationale<strong>for</strong> placing such emphasis on the independence <strong>of</strong> the board <strong>of</strong> directors is toensure that the interests <strong>of</strong> shareholders in general are properly represented.Where a company’s ownership is widely held, the independence <strong>of</strong> the boardis principally intended to ensure that the executive personnel do not play toodominant a role relative to the interests <strong>of</strong> shareholders. Where a company hascontrolling shareholders, the independence <strong>of</strong> the board is principally intendedto protect minority shareholders.Membership <strong>of</strong> the board <strong>of</strong> directors by the chief executive<strong>The</strong> Public Companies Act stipulates that the chief executive cannot be amember <strong>of</strong> the board <strong>of</strong> directors. This <strong>Code</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Practice</strong> recommends thatneither the chief executive nor any other executive personnel should be amember <strong>of</strong> the board.Term <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice and length <strong>of</strong> serviceWhile the legislation permits a term <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>for</strong> members <strong>of</strong> the board <strong>of</strong>directors <strong>of</strong> up to four years, this <strong>Code</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Practice</strong> recommends that theterm <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice should not exceed two years. <strong>The</strong> situation in respect <strong>of</strong> boththe company’s requirements and the demands <strong>of</strong> independence can changeover the course <strong>of</strong> a two-year period. Shareholders (and the corporateassembly where appropriate) should there<strong>for</strong>e be given the opportunity tore-evaluate each shareholder-elected member <strong>of</strong> the board at least everysecond year. When considering whether to re-elect members <strong>of</strong> the board,the value <strong>of</strong> continuity should be balanced against the need <strong>for</strong> renewal andindependence. Where a member <strong>of</strong> the board has served <strong>for</strong> a prolongedcontinuous period, consideration should be given to whether the individualin question is still considered to be independent <strong>of</strong> the company’s executivepersonnel. Recruitment <strong>of</strong> members <strong>of</strong> the board should be phased so thatthe entire board is not replaced at the same time.34 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

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