1.3. The <strong>Security</strong> EnvironmentThe conflict <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> has changed from a predom<strong>in</strong>antlySunni-led <strong>in</strong>surgency aga<strong>in</strong>stforeign occupation to a struggle for the divisionof political <strong>and</strong> economic <strong>in</strong>fluenceamong sectarian groups <strong>and</strong> organized crim<strong>in</strong>alactivity. As described <strong>in</strong> the January 2007National Intelligence Estimate, the term “civilwar” does not adequately capture the complexityof the conflict <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, which <strong>in</strong>cludesextensive Shi’a-on-Shi’a violence, al-Qaida<strong>and</strong> Sunni <strong>in</strong>surgent attacks on Coalitionforces, <strong>and</strong> widespread crim<strong>in</strong>ally motivatedviolence. Some elements of the situation <strong>in</strong><strong>Iraq</strong> are properly descriptive of a “civil war,”<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the harden<strong>in</strong>g of ethno-sectarianidentities <strong>and</strong> mobilization, the chang<strong>in</strong>gcharacter of the violence, <strong>and</strong> populationdisplacements. 6 Illegally armed groups areengaged <strong>in</strong> a self-susta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g cycle of sectarian<strong>and</strong> politically motivated violence, us<strong>in</strong>gtactics that <strong>in</strong>clude <strong>in</strong>discrim<strong>in</strong>ate bomb<strong>in</strong>g,murder, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>direct fire to <strong>in</strong>timidate people<strong>and</strong> stoke sectarian conflict. Much of thepresent violence is focused on local issues,such as sectarian, political, <strong>and</strong> economiccontrol of Baghdad; Kurdish, Arab, <strong>and</strong>Turkomen aspirations for Kirkuk; <strong>and</strong> thepolitical <strong>and</strong> economic control of Shi’aregions <strong>in</strong> the south. Although most attackscont<strong>in</strong>ue to be directed aga<strong>in</strong>st Coalitionforces, <strong>Iraq</strong>i civilians suffer the vast majorityof casualties. Given the concentration ofpolitical power <strong>and</strong> population <strong>in</strong> Baghdad<strong>and</strong> the city’s ethnic <strong>and</strong> sectarian diversity,Baghdad security rema<strong>in</strong>s the key to stability<strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. An <strong>Iraq</strong>i-conceived <strong>and</strong> -led Baghdad<strong>Security</strong> Plan is the centerpiece for address<strong>in</strong>gthe escalat<strong>in</strong>g violence.1.3.1. Overall Assessment of the <strong>Security</strong>EnvironmentThe level of violence <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ued to risedur<strong>in</strong>g this report<strong>in</strong>g period as ethnic, tribal,sectarian, <strong>and</strong> political factions seek powerover political <strong>and</strong> economic resources. Consistentwith previous reports, more than 80%of the violence <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> is limited to four prov<strong>in</strong>cescentered around Baghdad, although italso exists <strong>in</strong> other population centers, suchas Kirkuk, Mosul, <strong>and</strong> Basrah. Sectarian violence<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>surgent attacks still <strong>in</strong>volve avery small portion of the population, butpublic perception of violence is a significantfactor <strong>in</strong> prevent<strong>in</strong>g reconciliation on keyissues. The conflict <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> rema<strong>in</strong>s a mosaic<strong>and</strong> requires maximum flexibility on the partof the Coalition <strong>and</strong> the GOI to uproot thema<strong>in</strong> drivers of violence <strong>in</strong> different areas ofthe country.• The conflict <strong>in</strong> the north is characterizedby sectarian tensions, <strong>in</strong>surgents <strong>and</strong>extremist attacks, <strong>and</strong> competition amongethnic groups (Kurd, Arab, Turkomen) forpolitical <strong>and</strong> economic dom<strong>in</strong>ance,<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g control of the oilfields centeredaround Kirkuk. Violence rema<strong>in</strong>edfocused primarily <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> around thenorthern cities of Kirkuk, Mosul, <strong>and</strong>Tal’Afar, where ethnic competition forpower is exacerbated by violence fromSunni extremists.• Violence <strong>in</strong> Anbar is characterized bySunni <strong>in</strong>surgents <strong>and</strong> AQI attacks aga<strong>in</strong>stCoalition forces. AQI <strong>and</strong> affiliated Sunniextremists are attempt<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>in</strong>timidate thelocal population <strong>in</strong>to support<strong>in</strong>g the creationof an Islamic state. However, <strong>in</strong> apositive development, these efforts areprovok<strong>in</strong>g a backlash among some tribalfigures <strong>and</strong> Sunni <strong>in</strong>surgent leaders, whoare encourag<strong>in</strong>g local opposition to AQI,particularly <strong>in</strong> ar-Ramadi. Local Sunnisheikhs are lead<strong>in</strong>g this opposition <strong>and</strong>have strengthened recruit<strong>in</strong>g efforts forlocal police forces.• Violence <strong>in</strong> Baghdad, Diyala, <strong>and</strong> Balad ischaracterized by sectarian competition forpower <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>fluence between AQI <strong>and</strong>JAM, pr<strong>in</strong>cipally through murders, executions,<strong>and</strong> high-profile bomb<strong>in</strong>gs. AQI <strong>and</strong>JAM elements rarely clash directly; most14March 2, 2007
Total Attacks by Prov<strong>in</strong>ceNovember 11, 2006 – February 9, 2007Number of Attacks per Day5045403530252015105These four prov<strong>in</strong>ces have approximately 37% ofthe population but account for 80% of attacks.0BaghdadAnbarSalah ad D<strong>in</strong>DiyalaN<strong>in</strong>ewahBasrahTamimBabilWasitQadisiyahDhi QarKarbalaMaysanMuthannaDahukNajafIrbilSulaymaniyahPopulationweighted mapSource: MNC-Iof their reciprocal violence is aga<strong>in</strong>st Shi’a<strong>and</strong> Sunni civilians through high-profilebomb<strong>in</strong>gs or campaigns of sectariancleans<strong>in</strong>g.• The conflict <strong>in</strong> the southern prov<strong>in</strong>ces ischaracterized by tribal rivalry; factionalviolence among the Supreme Council forthe Islamic Revolution <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> (SCIRI)/Badr Organization, the Office of theMartyr Sadr/JAM, <strong>and</strong> smaller militias forpolitical power; <strong>and</strong> attacks on Coalitionforces.1.3.2. Recent Developments <strong>in</strong> the<strong>Security</strong> EnvironmentAs described above, the new way forward <strong>in</strong><strong>Iraq</strong> focuses on security where violence ishighest—<strong>in</strong> Baghdad <strong>and</strong> Anbar. While theoverarch<strong>in</strong>g strategic goals rema<strong>in</strong>unchanged, secur<strong>in</strong>g the population willassume a top priority to help set conditionsfor political <strong>and</strong> economic progress. We will<strong>in</strong>crease our forces <strong>in</strong> Baghdad by 21,500personnel to give our comm<strong>and</strong>ers anenhanced ability to hold previously clearedneighborhoods. The ISF are also re<strong>in</strong>forc<strong>in</strong>gthe capital with three additional brigades.Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Maliki has established aBaghdad <strong>Security</strong> Comm<strong>and</strong> with 10 <strong>Security</strong>Framework Districts, with an <strong>Iraq</strong>i brigade,partnered with a U.S. battalion, permanentlylocated <strong>in</strong> each. More than 40 Jo<strong>in</strong>t <strong>Security</strong>Stations will be established to facilitate cooperationbetween Coalition <strong>and</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>i forces<strong>and</strong> to build trust <strong>and</strong> confidence with thelocal population. In Anbar, U.S. Mar<strong>in</strong>es willbe added to provide more forces to consolidaterecent ga<strong>in</strong>s aga<strong>in</strong>st AQI networks.Throughout <strong>Iraq</strong>, our embedded teamsadvis<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Iraq</strong> units are be<strong>in</strong>g substantially<strong>in</strong>creased <strong>in</strong> size to improve ISF operationalcapabilities more rapidly. As securityimproves, economic reconstruction programs15March 2, 2007