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Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq - United States Department ...

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Current Mann<strong>in</strong>g InitiativesThe generation of the Objective Counter-Insurgency <strong>and</strong> Civil <strong>Security</strong> Forces is complete.The GOI, with Coalition support, isnow execut<strong>in</strong>g several mann<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>itiatives toreplenish the force to allow units to be temporarilyrelieved to refit <strong>and</strong> retra<strong>in</strong>, <strong>and</strong> to<strong>in</strong>crease present-for-duty levels <strong>in</strong> combatunits. These <strong>in</strong>itiatives will add more than60,000 personnel to the ISF dur<strong>in</strong>g 2007.MNF-I estimates that the MOI will require32,000 new police annually to replenish theranks. Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g bases are established <strong>and</strong>fully function<strong>in</strong>g to achieve these replenishmentgoals.• Replenishment of 30,000. MNSTC-I isfund<strong>in</strong>g the tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipp<strong>in</strong>g of30,000 soldiers to replace personnel losses<strong>and</strong> to <strong>in</strong>crease the mann<strong>in</strong>g of combatunits to 110% to improve present-for-dutystrength.• Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister’s Army ExpansionInitiative. In consultation with the U.S.Government, the GOI decided to <strong>in</strong>creasethe size of the Army by approximately24,000 soldiers. The additional forces will<strong>in</strong>crease the MOD’s ability to comm<strong>and</strong><strong>and</strong> control its forces, enhance its operational<strong>and</strong> tactical flexibility, <strong>and</strong> allowbattle-weary units to be pulled off-l<strong>in</strong>e toretra<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> refit. This GOI <strong>in</strong>itiative alsocame with fiscal resources from the MODbudget.• Replenishment of National PoliceBrigades. The Civilian Police AssistanceTransition Team (CPATT) is work<strong>in</strong>g toreplenish all National Police units withpersonnel <strong>and</strong> key pac<strong>in</strong>g items of equipment<strong>in</strong> support of the Baghdad <strong>Security</strong>Plan <strong>and</strong> Phase II tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g at Numaniyah.• Expansion of National Police to 10Brigades. The CPATT is support<strong>in</strong>g theprime m<strong>in</strong>ister’s <strong>in</strong>itiative to build a multicomponent(<strong>Iraq</strong>i Army <strong>and</strong> NationalPolice) division-sized force to protect theSamarra Shr<strong>in</strong>e reconstruction project. Theteam is generat<strong>in</strong>g a 10th National PoliceBrigade <strong>in</strong> support of this effort.• Establishment of Three EmergencyResponse Unit Battalions <strong>in</strong> Anbar. TheCPATT, <strong>in</strong> cooperation with the MOI <strong>and</strong>prov<strong>in</strong>cial authorities, is assist<strong>in</strong>g with thetra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> equipp<strong>in</strong>g of three battalionsof auxiliary policemen, to assist the <strong>Iraq</strong>iPolice Service primarily <strong>in</strong> the greaterRamadi area. This is a very positive <strong>in</strong>itiativeto take advantage of <strong>in</strong>creased Sunniparticipation <strong>in</strong> the police forces of AnbarProv<strong>in</strong>ce.Complexity of Personnel Management <strong>in</strong>Matur<strong>in</strong>g M<strong>in</strong>istriesThe security m<strong>in</strong>istries cont<strong>in</strong>ue to strugglewith immature personnel management practices.Personnel strength report<strong>in</strong>g by <strong>Iraq</strong>imilitary <strong>and</strong> police units is assessed as weak.The primary shortfalls <strong>in</strong> the personnel managementsystem are as follows.• Lack of Confidence <strong>in</strong> Retirement <strong>and</strong>Death Benefit Payments. The GOI isformulat<strong>in</strong>g a Retirement/Pensions Law.Until this legislation is <strong>in</strong> place <strong>and</strong> effective,the security m<strong>in</strong>istries will cont<strong>in</strong>ueto pay pensions <strong>and</strong> martyr pay. The currentsystem is based on an upfront lumpsum payment <strong>and</strong> a pension of 80% of thetotal basic pay <strong>and</strong> allowances. This providedadequate f<strong>in</strong>ancial support to families.These benefits have received significantattention from the MOI, <strong>and</strong> potentialchanges that would have underm<strong>in</strong>ed these<strong>in</strong>itiatives have been strongly resisted.This effectively means that the MOI’semployment rolls are enlarged; this iscurrently seen as be<strong>in</strong>g the most effectivemeans of “look<strong>in</strong>g after their own.”• Wounded Rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g on the Rolls. TheMOI <strong>and</strong> the MOD are <strong>in</strong> the process ofdevelop<strong>in</strong>g an effective system to care forseverely wounded soldiers <strong>and</strong> policemen.27March 2, 2007

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