Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq - United States Department ...

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provincial governor, assisted by representativesof the Iraqi Ministries of Interior andDefense and U.S. and United KingdomEmbassies, conduct monthly assessments ofprovinces and provincial capitals. Once adecision is made to transfer security responsibilities,the JCTSR provides transitiondirectives, develops a public affairs plan, andarranges a post-transfer security agreementbetween MNF-I and provincial governors.In December 2006, responsibility for securityin An Najaf Province was transferred fromMNF-I to the provincial government andcivilian-controlled Iraqi Police. An Najaf isthe third of Iraq’s 18 provinces to be designatedfor transition to PIC. The joint decisionof the GOI and MNF-I to hand over securityresponsibility is the result of the An Najafcivilian authorities’ demonstrated ability tomanage their own security and governanceduties at the provincial level.Events in January 2007 validated the posttransfersecurity concept. When the local AnNajaf police were unexpectedly fired upon,they assessed the situation to be beyond theirmeans to control. The provincial governorthen requested assistance from the NationalCommand Center (NCC), which alerted anddeployed additional units from outside theprovince. Once those units arrived, an additionalcall for support was sent. The NCCrequested helicopter and airplane supportfrom Coalition forces, which also sent aQuick Reaction Force to assist. The outcomewas a decisive victory by the ISF.On December 17, 2006, the Prime Ministerand the Ministerial Committee for NationalSecurity approved the transfer of securityresponsibility for Dahuk, Irbil, andSulaymaniyah to the Kurdistan RegionalGovernment (KRG). These provinces willtransition to PIC on completion of negotiationsbetween the GOI and the KRG toresolve a national budgetary issue concerningthe defense budget. These three provincesand three others—Qadisiyah, Maysan, andNinewah—are expected to transition to PICby the spring of 2007. The remaining provincesare expected to achieve PIC in 2007except for Anbar, which is projected to transferto PIC in early 2008.1.4.3. MNF-I Basing ConstructMNF-I is consolidating its locations in Iraq toreduce its temporary basing requirementsusing a “bottom-up” conditions-based processto synchronize basing requirements withCoalition forces requirements and theprojected command-and-control structure.The timeline for this process is being adjustedto support the short-term surge for theBaghdad Security Plan. However, MNF-I hasalready reduced its presence in major citieswhile developing the flexibility and maintainingthe force level required to support otherelements in Iraq, including Coalition partners,Provincial Reconstruction Teams, TransitionTeams, other supporting entities, and theDepartment of State. This process will maximizesupport through a minimum number ofstrategically located forward operating basesand convoy support centers. Because most ofthe ISF have been strategically based onformer Coalition bases, MNF-I is activelyengaging the Ministry of Finance and otherentities in the GOI in order to identify futuretenants to take possession of the remainingbases.24March 2, 2007
2. Iraqi Security Forces Training and PerformanceBy the end of 2006, the United States and itsCoalition partners met their force generationtargets, while continuing their efforts toexpand the size and capability of the ISF tomeet emergent requirements. As of February19, 2007, approximately 328,700 forces(not including replenishments) have beentrained. The actual number of present-fordutysoldiers is about one-half to two-thirdsof the total due to scheduled leave, absencewithout leave, and attrition. The police havealso experienced significant attrition ofpersonnel who have been through Coalitiontraining, but provincial and localgovernments have hired additional policeoutside the train-and-equip program. Both theMOD and the MOI have assumed control ofmost force generation tasks and havedeveloped a plan to continue routinereplenishment of the force. The table on thispage depicts the number of ISF trained byCoalition forces since 2003.2.1. Assessed CapabilitiesAs of February 19, 2007, there were 112 IraqiArmy combat battalions. One hundred threeare conducting operations at varying levels ofcapability; an additional nine battalions arebeing generated. There are two SpecialOperations Battalions, both conductingoperations. Of the 17 planned Strategic InfrastructureBattalions (SIBs), 14 are assessed asconducting operations at various levels. Ofthe 103 Iraqi Army combat battalions conductingoperations, 93 have the lead incounter-insurgency operations in their areasof responsibility. Additionally, 27 NationalPolice battalions are operational, with 6 in thelead. All but one of the National Policebrigades are currently conducting securityoperations in Baghdad. A brigade-sizedoperational reserve consisting of amechanized battalion from the Army, aCurrent Number of Trained* Iraqi Security ForcesComponent # TrainedMinistry of Interior ForcesPolice ~135,000National Police ~24,400Border Enforcement ~28,400Dignitary Protection ~500MOI Forensics Unit ~4,000Total MOI ~192,300Ministry of Defense ForcesArmy ~120,000Support Forces ~12,800Special Operations ~1,500Air Force ~900Navy ~1,100Total MOD ~136,400Total Trained ISF ~328,700* These numbers are not the same as those present forduty and do not include troops trained as individualreplacements.Data of as February 19, 2007National Police battalion, and a SpecialForces company has been establishedLogistics and Sustainment of Ministry ofDefense and Ministry of Interior ForcesThe most significant shortcoming in bothMOD and MOI forces’ capabilities is inplanning and executing logistics and sustainmentrequirements. Factors underlying thisdeficiency include inadequate levels of sustainmentstocks and limited capacity of theMOD and the MOI to execute the planning/acquisition/sustainment cycle. 19 DoD isaddressing the challenges to reduce Iraqireliance on U.S. support. For example, the13th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary)is partnered with Iraqi logistics units to assistin the development of Iraqi Army divisionalsupport capabilities. Embedded civilianadvisors are assisting senior MOD and MOIofficials in developing their capacity toorganize, train, equip, sustain, and upgradetheir forces.25March 2, 2007
Page 1 and 2: Measuring Stability andSecurity in
Page 3 and 4: IntroductionThis report to Congress
Page 5 and 6: 1. Stability and Security in Iraq1.
Page 7 and 8: 1.1.4. Rule of LawStability and sec
Page 9 and 10: CourtsAs of January 2007, Iraq had
Page 11 and 12: To address procurement problems, th
Page 13 and 14: Oil Production, Distribution, and E
Page 15 and 16: Water and SanitationAs of December
Page 17 and 18: Total Attacks by ProvinceNovember 1
Page 19 and 20: 1400Sectarian Murders* and Incident
Page 21 and 22: 12001000Attacks Targeting Iraqi Civ
Page 23 and 24: Many Iraqis feel more positive at t
Page 25: quarters, and 93 Iraqi Army battali
Page 29 and 30: Current Manning InitiativesThe gene
Page 31 and 32: 2.2. Ministry of InteriorMOI forces
Page 33 and 34: formalized a professional developme
Page 35 and 36: Iraqi Police Service EquipmentFor B
Page 37 and 38: Administration Directorate develope
Page 39 and 40: 2.3. Ministry of DefenseThe Iraqi M
Page 41 and 42: Force GenerationForce generation of
Page 43 and 44: make-up of Iraq generally. The even
Page 45 and 46: Annex A. List of Acronyms and Abbre
Page 47: 20 This report and future reports w

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