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enabled by Iraqi and Coalition funding andexpanded Provincial Reconstruction Teamswill move in to assist with basic services andimproving economic opportunities for Iraqicitizens.As of the end of 2006, the primary endingpoint of data collection for this report, Shi’amilitias and Sunni insurgent groups wereengaged in sectarian cleansing in Baghdadneighborhoods and forcibly displacing bothSunni and Shi’a Baghdad residents. The newapproach is designed to help the Iraqis endthis trend. In January 2007, Prime MinisterMaliki announced that the ISF would renewtheir efforts to lead operations to secureBaghdad from insurgents and militias.Demonstrating support for the PrimeMinister’s efforts, the CoR voted to supportthe principles of his Baghdad Security Planon January 25, 2007. This newfound GOIwillingness to challenge the militias, especiallyJAM, and the announcement that theISF would pursue all illegally armed groups,regardless of affiliation, is a positive development—thoughultimate success will requiresustained and consistent commitments toaction and even-handed application of therule of law by all Iraqi leaders.GroupSunni InsurgentsAQIJAM1.3.3. The Nature of the ConflictViolent opposition to the GOI and Coalitionforces comes from a variety of groups withpolitical, religious, ethnic, or criminal objectives.Some groups receive support fromoutside Iraq. Although much of the violenceis attributable to sectarian friction, each of theviolent factions is driven by its own politicalpower relationships, and the factions areoften hostile to one another. Shi’a sectarianmilitias have differing objectives, whichoccasionally lead to violence. JAM, which isassociated with Muqtada al-Sadr, conductsattacks and provides services in support ofSadr’s efforts to dominate the Shi’a areas ofBaghdad and the south. The Badr Organizationoften works against JAM and in supportof SCIRI and its political agenda ofautonomy in the south. AQI and associatedforeign fighters attack Coalition and GOItargets and both Shiites and Sunnis to furtherAQI’s goal of establishing an Islamic state inIraq and to build a sanctuary to supportoperations against targets outside Iraq, whileSunni insurgents attack Coalition forces andthe Shi’a-dominated GOI to promote apredominantly secular Sunni Arab agenda.This rivalry will be most evident duringcoming months as Maysan, Qadisiyah, andWassit provinces assume Provincial IraqiControl (PIC).Goals of Key Destabilizing Elements in Iraq 7Goals• Expel U.S. and Coalition forces from Iraq• Topple the “unity” government• Re-establish Sunni governance in Anbar and Diyala• Force Coalition forces withdrawal• Gain territory to export conflict• Provoke clash between Islam and others• Establish caliphate with Shari’a governance• Force Coalition forces withdrawal• Consolidate control over Baghdad and the GOI• Exert control over security institutions• Implement Shari’a governance16March 2, 2007
1400Sectarian Murders* and IncidentsJanuary 2006 – January 2007120010008006004002000JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JANSectarian IncidentsSectarian Murders*Sectarian incidents and murders as recorded in MNC-I Significant Activities Database. Sectarian incidents are threats andviolence with apparent sectarian motivations. Multiple casualties can result for a single incident. Sectarian murders aremurders with distinct characteristics, and are a subset of total civilian casualties (not depicted in this chart).Source: MNF-IIranian Support. Iranian lethal support forselect groups of Shi’a militants intensifies theconflict in Iraq. Consistent with the NationalIntelligence Estimate, Iranian support to Shi’amilitias, such as JAM and the BadrOrganization, includes providing lethalweapons, training, financing, and technicalsupport. 8 This includes supplying some Shi’aextremist groups with explosively formedprojectiles (EFPs), the most effective of theroadside bombs. Shi’a extremist groups havebeen implicated in direct attacks againstCoalition forces, including with EFPtechnology. EFPs require advancedmanufacturing processes and training foremployment that clearly place them outsidethe category of “improvised explosivedevices.”Syrian Support. Although Iraq resumed diplomaticrelations with Syria in November2006, Damascus appears unwilling to cooperatefully with the GOI on bilateral securityinitiatives. Syria continues to provide safehaven, border transit, and limited logisticalsupport to some Iraqi insurgents, especiallyformer Saddam-era Iraqi Ba’ath Party elements.Syria also permits former regime elementsto engage in organizational activities,such that Syria has emerged as an importantorganizational and coordination hub for elementsof the former Iraqi regime. AlthoughSyrian security and intelligence servicescontinue to detain and deport Iraq-boundfighters, Syria remains the primary foreignfighter gateway into Iraq. Despite its heightenedscrutiny of extremists and suspectedinsurgents, Damascus appears to want toappease Islamist extremist groups. Damascusalso recognizes that Islamist extremists andelements of the former Iraqi regime shareSyria’s desire to undermine Coalition effortsin Iraq.17March 2, 2007
Page 1 and 2: Measuring Stability andSecurity in
Page 3 and 4: IntroductionThis report to Congress
Page 5 and 6: 1. Stability and Security in Iraq1.
Page 7 and 8: 1.1.4. Rule of LawStability and sec
Page 9 and 10: CourtsAs of January 2007, Iraq had
Page 11 and 12: To address procurement problems, th
Page 13 and 14: Oil Production, Distribution, and E
Page 15 and 16: Water and SanitationAs of December
Page 17: Total Attacks by ProvinceNovember 1
Page 21 and 22: 12001000Attacks Targeting Iraqi Civ
Page 23 and 24: Many Iraqis feel more positive at t
Page 25 and 26: quarters, and 93 Iraqi Army battali
Page 27 and 28: 2. Iraqi Security Forces Training a
Page 29 and 30: Current Manning InitiativesThe gene
Page 31 and 32: 2.2. Ministry of InteriorMOI forces
Page 33 and 34: formalized a professional developme
Page 35 and 36: Iraqi Police Service EquipmentFor B
Page 37 and 38: Administration Directorate develope
Page 39 and 40: 2.3. Ministry of DefenseThe Iraqi M
Page 41 and 42: Force GenerationForce generation of
Page 43 and 44: make-up of Iraq generally. The even
Page 45 and 46: Annex A. List of Acronyms and Abbre
Page 47: 20 This report and future reports w

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