Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq - United States Department ...

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1 The information in this report has been made available with the assistance of many departments and agencies ofthe U.S. Government, the U.S. Embassy in Iraq, and the Government of Iraq. The report complements other reportsand information about Iraq provided to Congress, and is not intended as a single source of all information about thecombined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its Coalition partners, or Iraq.2 In early November 2006, Prime Minister Maliki scolded lawmakers in a closed session of the Council ofRepresentatives and promised sweeping reforms of his cabinet. He also renounced militias on national television,saying, “There cannot be a government and militias together. One of the two should rule. I personally will not be ina government based on militias.”3 Ibid.4 National Intelligence Estimate: Prospects for Iraq’s Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead, January 2007, NationalIntelligence Council. www.dni.gov.5 As of October 2006, of the 999 known MOI detention centers, 794 were reporting data on prisoners. On average,the reporting facilities were at 79% capacity. However, 51 of these jails were overcrowded, with the Attica jail inQadisiyah being the most overcrowded, housing more than three detainees for every one bed it was designed tohold.6 National Intelligence Estimate, January 2007.7 Extracted from Davis, Jacquelyn K., Radical Islamist Ideologies and the Long War: Implications for U.S. StrategicPlanning and U.S. Central Command’s Operations, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Washington, D.C. January2007.8 National Intelligence Estimate, January 2007.9 Nationwide poll, December 2006: “Agree or disagree, violence is never justified even if the government does notmeet your needs.” 81% agree and 11% disagree. Sample size: ~5,000. Margin of error: < 1.5%.10 Nationwide poll, December 2006: “Agree or disagree, it is wrong to kill women and children even in jihad.” 94%agree and 3% disagree. Sample size: ~5,000. Margin of error: < 1.5%.11 Nationwide poll, December 2006: “Do you think the government of Iraq’s current policies to improve the securitysituation in Iraq are a step in the right or wrong direction?” Right direction: 44% Wrong direction: 42%. Samplesize: ~5,000. Margin of error:
20 This report and future reports will not discuss the Center for Dignitary Protection. MNSTC-I has completed itstraining goal and no longer has visibility on whether these personnel are serving. MNSTC-I continues to assist intraining bodyguards for high-ranking GOI personnel.21 This estimate is based on worldwide averages for police attrition with adjustment factors for conditions in Iraq. Asdescribed in the section on personnel accountability, no reliable data currently exist to validate present-for-dutystrength.22 This includes the approximately 137,000 authorization for the Objective Counter-Insurgency Force, approximately12,000 authorization for the 10% manning increase for the Iraqi Army, and approximately 26,000 for theprime minister’s initiative to expand the military with new units.23 This is based on a total authorization support personnel of 14,673. Special Inspector General for IraqReconstruction report SIGIR-06-032, ISF: Review of Plans to Implement Logistics Capabilities notes that, “ . . . wecalculated that between 37,800 and 44,500 personnel will be required for the total number of logistics units requiredby the Concept to support the Iraqi Army . . . . After reviewing a draft of this report, MNSTC-I officials providedinformation documenting that, as of September 30, 2006, a total of 42,900 ‘support forces’ have been trained since2004. This total includes not only logistics personnel but also military police and communications andadministrative personnel.”Endnotes 2March 2, 2007
Page 1 and 2: Measuring Stability andSecurity in
Page 3 and 4: IntroductionThis report to Congress
Page 5 and 6: 1. Stability and Security in Iraq1.
Page 7 and 8: 1.1.4. Rule of LawStability and sec
Page 9 and 10: CourtsAs of January 2007, Iraq had
Page 11 and 12: To address procurement problems, th
Page 13 and 14: Oil Production, Distribution, and E
Page 15 and 16: Water and SanitationAs of December
Page 17 and 18: Total Attacks by ProvinceNovember 1
Page 19 and 20: 1400Sectarian Murders* and Incident
Page 21 and 22: 12001000Attacks Targeting Iraqi Civ
Page 23 and 24: Many Iraqis feel more positive at t
Page 25 and 26: quarters, and 93 Iraqi Army battali
Page 27 and 28: 2. Iraqi Security Forces Training a
Page 29 and 30: Current Manning InitiativesThe gene
Page 31 and 32: 2.2. Ministry of InteriorMOI forces
Page 33 and 34: formalized a professional developme
Page 35 and 36: Iraqi Police Service EquipmentFor B
Page 37 and 38: Administration Directorate develope
Page 39 and 40: 2.3. Ministry of DefenseThe Iraqi M
Page 41 and 42: Force GenerationForce generation of
Page 43 and 44: make-up of Iraq generally. The even
Page 45: Annex A. List of Acronyms and Abbre

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