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Personnel Management. The MOI does notyet have accurate personnel accountabilityand reporting procedures, and it is unknownhow many of the more than 306,000employees on the ministry’s payroll arepresent for duty on a given day. MNSTC-Iestimates that, on an average day, less than70% of MOI personnel are present for duty.This is a combination of authorized absences(leave, school, sickness) and unauthorizedabsences. The problem of personnel accountabilityis being addressed through the purchaseof an automated human resources andpayroll system. The equipment and softwarefor this system were installed in January2007, and training has begun. Full deploymentof the system is expected to take 18months. Once complete, the personnel managementsystem will be integrated fully withemployee biometrics, improving the accuracyof employment rosters and facilitatingemployee criminal background screening.Equipment Accountability. Due to decentralizedcontrol and funding of elements thatcomprise the MOI, there is no standardizedunit equipment accountability procedure. Theresponsibility for proper equipment accountabilityis delegated to the subordinate organizations,with most elements maintainingequipment accountability through the use ofhand receipts and manual ledgers.Financial Accountability. Certain functionalareas of the MOI operate under an assortmentof financial authorities intended for a command-and-controlstructure that no longerexists. In this uncertain regulatory environment,proper financial reporting is inconsistentand results in difficulty for the MOI tobudget centrally and execute fundseffectively and transparently. Nevertheless,budget execution under Minister of InteriorJawad al-Bolani is improving and the ForeignMilitary Sales program will mitigate some ofthe risk of mismanagement in this area.Command and Control. The MOI TransitionTeam is focusing on developing the minister’sability to delineate authority,responsibility, and accountability clearlythroughout the MOI. The chain of commandis relatively clear and effective for NationalPolice and Border Forces. However, commandand control for the provincial police isunclear. The decentralized nature of the IraqiPolice Service often results in conflictingguidance and directives coming simultaneouslyfrom the central ministry and the provincialgovernment.Internal Audit FunctionsThe Audit Department within the MOI fallsunder the Inspector General’s (IG) office. PerCoalition Provisional Authority Order 57, theAudit Department is responsible for audits ofthe economy, efficiency, and effectiveness ofthe ministry’s operations and facilities.Currently, audit functions conducted for theIraqi Police Service and the National Policeare done via a separate audit element thatreports directly to the Minister of Interior.The Office of the Director General for Auditsprovides a person to fill the audit functionwith that element.During the fourth quarter of 2006, the MOIIG focused on improving MOI’s internalcapacity to identify, deter, and prevent corruption.Recent funding approval by theMinistry of Finance for increased force structureenabled the IG to embark on planningefforts to increase the number of employeesby 1,000 individuals during 2007. Theseresources will significantly improve the IG’sability to evaluate and report independentlyon the performance of MOI programs andoperations throughout Iraq. For the first time,the IG has developed an Annual InspectionPlan aimed at formalizing the use of IGspecial inspection committees to conductinspections of pre-selected MOI organizationsthroughout Iraq based on approvedinspection checklists. Additionally, the IG30March 2, 2007
formalized a professional developmentprogram for serving IG employees andexpanded the core Program of Instruction forbasic training of IGs. During this period, theIG increased its number of trained investigatorsfrom 81 to 125, to include employeesserving in outlying provinces.From January 1, 2006, through December 31,2006, MOI Internal Affairs opened 3,403corruption-related investigations. Of these,775 (22%) resulted in disciplinary punishment,312 (9%) were forwarded to the Commissionof Public Integrity or to a court forsubsequent adjudication, 49 (1.5%) wereclosed because of insufficient evidence, and106 (3%) were handled as internal MOIdiscipline. The other 2,161 (63%) remainopen pending judicial review, ministerialreview, or the completion of further investigationby Internal Affairs.The Internal Affairs Directorate conducted249 human rights-related investigations. Ofthese, 76 (30%) resulted in disciplinary punishmentand 10 (4%) were closed because ofinsufficient evidence. The other 163 (65%)remain open pending judicial review, ministerialreview, or further investigation. In 2006,Internal Affairs initiated a specialized trainingcurriculum tailored to the needs of theInternal Affairs investigators. ThroughDecember 31, 2006, 915 of 1,250 full-timeemployees (73%) had received specializedtraining. Training will continue until allInternal Affairs Officers have graduated fromthis training course. Additionally, the AutomatedFingerprint Identification Projectidentified 3,371 cases of employees making afalse application for employment to the MOIor having a criminal history. This resulted in1,383 dismissals during 2006.2006 MOI Internal Affairs Investigations by Outcome100%90%49 1080%70%60%50%40%30%20%10%2,16131277510616376No Guilt EstablishedRemain OpenInternal MOI DisciplineForw arded for Judicial ActionDisciplinary Punishment0%Corruption-RelatedInvestigationsHuman Rights-RelatedInvestigationsSource: Iraqi Ministry of the Interior31March 2, 2007
Page 1 and 2: Measuring Stability andSecurity in
Page 3 and 4: IntroductionThis report to Congress
Page 5 and 6: 1. Stability and Security in Iraq1.
Page 7 and 8: 1.1.4. Rule of LawStability and sec
Page 9 and 10: CourtsAs of January 2007, Iraq had
Page 11 and 12: To address procurement problems, th
Page 13 and 14: Oil Production, Distribution, and E
Page 15 and 16: Water and SanitationAs of December
Page 17 and 18: Total Attacks by ProvinceNovember 1
Page 19 and 20: 1400Sectarian Murders* and Incident
Page 21 and 22: 12001000Attacks Targeting Iraqi Civ
Page 23 and 24: Many Iraqis feel more positive at t
Page 25 and 26: quarters, and 93 Iraqi Army battali
Page 27 and 28: 2. Iraqi Security Forces Training a
Page 29 and 30: Current Manning InitiativesThe gene
Page 31: 2.2. Ministry of InteriorMOI forces
Page 35 and 36: Iraqi Police Service EquipmentFor B
Page 37 and 38: Administration Directorate develope
Page 39 and 40: 2.3. Ministry of DefenseThe Iraqi M
Page 41 and 42: Force GenerationForce generation of
Page 43 and 44: make-up of Iraq generally. The even
Page 45 and 46: Annex A. List of Acronyms and Abbre
Page 47: 20 This report and future reports w

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