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PRIVATIZATION Privatization in Malaysia, Regulation, rent-seeking and policy failure

PRIVATIZATION Privatization in Malaysia, Regulation, rent-seeking and policy failure

PRIVATIZATION Privatization in Malaysia, Regulation, rent-seeking and policy failure

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Kuala Lumpur Light Rail Transit 107a moral hazard. However, as ex ante mistakes are <strong>in</strong>evitable because of<strong>in</strong>formation <strong>and</strong> political constra<strong>in</strong>ts, it was more important for the governmentto be able to implement ex post measures to ensure the project’scommercial viability by promot<strong>in</strong>g system <strong>in</strong>tegration necessary to <strong>in</strong>creasepassenger numbers. Here, the <strong>failure</strong> of privatization was ultimately due tothe government’s ex post political <strong>failure</strong>. The government was unable toforce the concessionaires <strong>and</strong> private developers to accept route alignment<strong>and</strong> the physical <strong>in</strong>tegration of stations necessary for system <strong>in</strong>tegration; itcould not streaml<strong>in</strong>e bus operations <strong>and</strong> prevent private bus operators fromply<strong>in</strong>g LRT routes; it failed to restrict park<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the city <strong>and</strong> regulate park<strong>in</strong>gcharges; <strong>and</strong> it failed to restrict private cars <strong>in</strong> the city centre. In short,the government lacked the <strong>in</strong>stitutional <strong>and</strong> political capacity to plan <strong>and</strong>coord<strong>in</strong>ate a successful urban rail system, need<strong>in</strong>g to renationalize the LRT<strong>in</strong> order to make the necessary changes to better <strong>in</strong>tegrate the system.The experiences of the UK, S<strong>in</strong>gapore <strong>and</strong> Bangkok demonstrate thatsuccessful (urban) rail provision depends on effective regulation <strong>and</strong> governmentcoord<strong>in</strong>ation of <strong>in</strong>vestment <strong>and</strong> policies to <strong>in</strong>tegrate diffe<strong>rent</strong> modes oftransport. This requires the <strong>in</strong>stitutional capacity to identify an appropriatelevel of subsidy, <strong>and</strong> political capacity to enforce cost reductions <strong>and</strong> capital<strong>in</strong>vestment with<strong>in</strong> this subsidy level. More crucially, hav<strong>in</strong>g committed towhat was arguably a commercially unviable privatization, the governmentneeded to implement measures to at least ensure a second-best outcome. Thiswill depend on its political capacity to enforce the regulation, coord<strong>in</strong>ate the<strong>in</strong>vestment <strong>and</strong> implement the policies necessary. It is not the privatization<strong>in</strong> itself that will lead to success but rather the effective <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>sulated <strong>in</strong>terventionof the state <strong>in</strong> f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> coord<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g these processes <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>monitor<strong>in</strong>g performance.This chapter is structured as follows. The next section exam<strong>in</strong>es thechallenges faced by the privatization of urban rail systems. This is followedby a background to the privatization <strong>and</strong> subsequent renationalization ofthe Kuala Lumpur LRT. We then evaluate the performance of the three LRTsystems <strong>in</strong> terms of f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g, delivery, f<strong>in</strong>ancial performance <strong>and</strong> impact ontraffic volume (congestion). The follow<strong>in</strong>g section exam<strong>in</strong>es the government’sex ante <strong>and</strong> ex post <strong>failure</strong>s which affected performance, look<strong>in</strong>g at <strong>in</strong>formation,<strong>in</strong>stitutional <strong>and</strong> political <strong>failure</strong>. We conclude by summariz<strong>in</strong>g thema<strong>in</strong> causes of the LRT’s <strong>failure</strong> <strong>and</strong> important conditions for successfulprivatization.ChallengesRail privatization is argued to f<strong>in</strong>ance capital <strong>in</strong>vestment <strong>and</strong> provide <strong>in</strong>centivesto improve efficiency. Evidence however shows that the private sectorhas had difficulty f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g (urban) rail systems <strong>and</strong> improv<strong>in</strong>g efficiency.This is because the rail <strong>in</strong>dustry is characterized by high capital costs <strong>and</strong> lowfarebox ratios (the ratio of fares to operat<strong>in</strong>g costs) which are compounded

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