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PRIVATIZATION Privatization in Malaysia, Regulation, rent-seeking and policy failure

PRIVATIZATION Privatization in Malaysia, Regulation, rent-seeking and policy failure

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Kuala Lumpur Light Rail Transit 121Table 5.05 Kuala Lumpur LRT: Projected <strong>and</strong> actual daily ridershipOperator Projected Actual (year)STAR 80,000–170,000(projection <strong>in</strong> 1997)165,000–170,000(projected for 1999)PUTRA 360,000(projection <strong>in</strong> 1997)KL Monorail 60,000–80,000(projection <strong>in</strong> 2000)85,900(projection for 2002)181,200(projection for 2008)46,500 (1997)65,000 (end 1997)65,000 (1999)80,000–92,000 (2003)12,000 (1999)125,000 (2000)150,000–160,000 (2003)11,000 (2003)39,000 (2004)Source: Adapted from The Edge (26 August 1996, 12 May 1997, 13 July 1998, 19 July 1999,6 December 2000, 15 January 2001, 20 September 2004); New Straits Times (1 January 1997;31 December 1997, 2 July 1999); Malay Mail (20 December 1997).<strong>and</strong> actual ridership, these overoptimistic estimates may still have been<strong>in</strong>sufficient for a viable <strong>in</strong>ternal f<strong>in</strong>ancial rate of return (Table 5.06).The <strong>in</strong>ternal rate of return was 14–16 per cent for STAR <strong>and</strong> 11 per centfor PUTRA. However, STAR’s high debt–equity ratio of 4.8:1 <strong>and</strong> lowfarebox ratio of 0.44 meant that it was unable to service its loan <strong>and</strong> meetoperat<strong>in</strong>g expenditure (Halcrow Consultants 1999; The Edge, 19 July 1999).The company began los<strong>in</strong>g money upon commenc<strong>in</strong>g commercial operations<strong>in</strong> December 1996, <strong>and</strong> was unable to repay the <strong>in</strong>terest on its RM2.1 billion<strong>in</strong> bank loans <strong>and</strong> RM685 million <strong>in</strong> government support loans s<strong>in</strong>ce itstarted operations 20 (The Edge, 17 April 2001) (see Table 5.07). Three monthsafter the start of Phase 1, STAR looked <strong>in</strong>to restructur<strong>in</strong>g its debt <strong>and</strong> subsequentlyrequested assistance from the state Corporate Debt Restructur<strong>in</strong>gCommittee (CDRC). STAR was taken over by Danaharta (the state assetmanagement company) on 1 January 2002, <strong>and</strong> issued a court order to w<strong>in</strong>dTable 5.06 Kuala Lumpur LRT: Daily ridership estimates <strong>and</strong> actual numbers neededOperator (year) Estimated Needed ShortageSTAR (2000) 200,507 356,185 155,678STAR (2010) 255,108 482,666 227,558PUTRA (2000) 162,126 374,533 212,407PUTRA (2010) 227,625 554,557 326,932KL Monorail (2000) 99,555 102,545 2,990KL Monorail (2010) 195,011 200,862 5,851Source: Adapted from JICA 1998b.

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