13.07.2015 Views

PRIVATIZATION Privatization in Malaysia, Regulation, rent-seeking and policy failure

PRIVATIZATION Privatization in Malaysia, Regulation, rent-seeking and policy failure

PRIVATIZATION Privatization in Malaysia, Regulation, rent-seeking and policy failure

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

2 <strong>Privatization</strong>, <strong>rent</strong>s <strong>and</strong><strong>rent</strong>-seek<strong>in</strong>g<strong>Privatization</strong> is argued to provide better <strong>in</strong>centives <strong>and</strong> monitor<strong>in</strong>g throughthe clear designation of property rights, while also reduc<strong>in</strong>g damag<strong>in</strong>g state<strong>in</strong>terventions. Improved efficiency as a result is then seen to encourage theprivate owner or operator to undertake much-needed capital <strong>in</strong>vestment.However, privatization does not necessarily lead to the clear designation ofproperty rights, reduce state <strong>in</strong>tervention or enhance the private f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>gof capital <strong>in</strong>vestment. This is because the private sector is often unable or unwill<strong>in</strong>gon its own to meet the high cost of capital <strong>in</strong>vestment associated withtypical privatizations (e.g. sewerage <strong>and</strong> water services). This is especiallyso <strong>in</strong> develop<strong>in</strong>g countries where there is <strong>in</strong> addition a shortage of entrepreneurialcapacity. Furthermore, the ability of the private sector to meetcapital <strong>in</strong>vestment targets will <strong>in</strong> part also depend on projected revenuesbased on cost-cover<strong>in</strong>g tariffs. However, cost-cover<strong>in</strong>g tariffs are usuallypolitically unfeasible for many critical services. High capital costs <strong>and</strong> the<strong>in</strong>ability of tariffs to cover high operational costs will then require statesubsidies which <strong>in</strong> turn dilute <strong>in</strong>centives associated with private ownershipunless they are comb<strong>in</strong>ed with additional <strong>and</strong> credible <strong>in</strong>centives <strong>and</strong>sanctions.In addition, governments <strong>in</strong> develop<strong>in</strong>g countries will often be attempt<strong>in</strong>gto create domestic capitalists due to a shortage of entrepreneurial capacitybut also because of political pressure from groups contest<strong>in</strong>g for resources.This will require additional subsidies for learn<strong>in</strong>g (also known as ‘<strong>rent</strong>s forlearn<strong>in</strong>g’) <strong>in</strong> order to develop entrepreneurial capacity, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> the long term,promote efficiency <strong>and</strong> technological ‘catch<strong>in</strong>g up’. The processes <strong>in</strong>volvedhere have elements similar to the process of (primitive) capital accumulation<strong>in</strong> early capitalism (e.g. see Marx 1979) <strong>in</strong> addition to the regulatory issuesraised <strong>in</strong> the privatization of public sector enterprises <strong>in</strong> advanced countries.As such, privatization will often be closely tied <strong>in</strong> with state motivations <strong>and</strong>the political forces beh<strong>in</strong>d this. Here, the ma<strong>in</strong>stream literature on privatizationsuffers from several shortcom<strong>in</strong>gs when attempt<strong>in</strong>g to expla<strong>in</strong> the <strong>failure</strong>of privatization <strong>in</strong> develop<strong>in</strong>g countries because it tends to largely ignore thepolitical context <strong>and</strong> hence political motivations which often drive privatization.These can affect both the character of privatization (what is privatized,

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!