JOURNAL OF THE IRISH LABOUR HISTORY SOCIETY

52 SAOTHAR 13of Ireland' and vice versa, served to conflate two analytically distinct problems, namely the struggleto establish nation states, one of the historical bourgeois tasks of the epoch of capitalism, and thestruggle to establish international socialism. True, Connolly developed this schema ina creativeattempt to deal with what he understood to be the global changes in capitalist society and the newrealities this created for socialists in Ireland. However, this theory had the potential to surrenderworking class independence of nationalism in any joint struggle with nationalists against colonialoppression by an imperial power. .He believed that the 'thoughtful patriot' would see the necessity for socialism, but he explicitlyexcluded the Irish bourgeois nationalist reformers from this category, believing in his first Irish periodthat theirs was, after Parnell, a 'dissolving view'. When the Home Rule movement gained a newascendancy, in his second Irish period from 1910 till after the Lockout in 1914, Connolly' s perspecti veleft him tactically disarmed on the burning question of the day and the initiative on national independenceremained in the hands of the native capitalist class organised behind Redmond' s banner. He wasequally disarmed in his tactics when initiative passed to the conspiracy by revolutionary nationalistswhose bourgeois class character was covered over, in Connolly's historiography. Connolly believedthat their willingness to struggle automatically placed militant nationalists in the historic camp of thetoiling masses. 3Connolly's adaptation to nationalism thus dates not to 1914 but from his early ISRP period, whenhe equated the struggle for the Irish nation with the struggle of 'Labour' in Irish history and placed thenational question in the 'maximum' programme as against the orthodoxy of the International which putit in the 'minimum' programme of tasks achievable under capitalism. Indeed, his action after1914might even be construed as something of a turn in the opposite direction. After all, Connolly did notcollapse into social chauvinism in August 1914 as did Hyndman in Britain and Karl Kautsky, etc.,internationally. This is the reason why Greaves argues that Connolly was as close to Lenin as one couldget. But, of course, it is not quite that simple either.Connolly's schema for the Irish Revolution was operative in the 1914-16 period. This time,however, it led Connolly to subordinate politically the strategic aim of independent and class-widemobilisation of workers (in strike action against the war) to a national rebellion. While Morgan selects'Germanophile' references from Connolly during this period, he overlooks the context and alsoConnolly's theoretical position on Imperialism. For Connolly, the European War was about England's·control of the seas, not an inter-imperialist war in which the German, French, Russian and Austrianempires were attempting to redivide the globe. Therefore, Connolly identified the defeat of Englandas the only hope for post-war expansion, industrialisation and the rebirth of the socialist movementinternationally. This strategic consideration became dominant only after he saw the major collapse ofSocial Democracy into imperial chauvinism. .It was Connolly's tragedy that the working class had been badly mauled in the 1913-14 Lockout,with the resultant sharp fall in ITGWU membership. He was faced with the further blow of economicconscription draining workers away to the war. Theonly aUies hecould identify were the IRB elementsof the Irish Volunteers, though he was ready to go it alone with the Citizen Army into open Rebellionagainst England if all else failed.Connolly's role from 1914 to 1916 was geared increasingly towards insurrection, the focus of hisplans being the Citizen Army. Although he worked to rebuild the ITGWU he was concerned by whatappeared to be a receding opportunity to deal a blow to British Imperialism. This contrasted withLenin's view of the war which, he correctly estimated, would eventually overcome the initiallyheightened chauvinist illusions of workers and peasants and change the mood of the masses in adirection favourable to his policy of 'defeatism' towards their own imperialist ruling class. ConnoUy,by contrast held the view expressed in the International which believed an all-out strike in all belligerentcountries could prevent the war from being undertaken - that the declaration of war should have beenthe tocsin for the workers' revolution. This view was proven to be abstract and inoperable, thoughConnolly does not exactly admit this when he refocuses his politics after the collapse of the