Talking to Groups that Use Terror.pdf - United States Institute of Peace

Peacemaker’s Toolkitdecision not to talk may keep the terrorists confined to the outer marginsof mainstream political discourse, but it may also ensure that terroristviolence and the wider conflict endure for another generation.In this first step, mediators must seek to determine the potentialbenefits and risks of talking; the nature of the terrorist group and thegroups attitude toward talking; whether the timing is propitious for talks;and the likely impact of talking on other parties (including public opinion,moderates, and international actors).Consider the Potential Benefits of EngagingAlthough the mantric assertion of governments across the world—“We don’t negotiate with terrorists”—suggests otherwise, there can be awide variety of advantages, both direct and indirect, to talking toproscribed groups.Making the Terrorists Part of the SolutionThe most obvious and profound benefit of talking to groups that use terroris to hasten an end to the violence and produce a sustainable peace. Thisinvolves the mediator turning the terrorists from being part of the probleminto being part of the solution by involving them in the peace process. It isextremely hard to bring any peace process to a successful and sustainableconclusion without securing the participation of hard-liners—especiallyhard-liners with no compunction about using violence—in that process. Notall hard-liners need to be brought into the process, but those who have thepower to derail any negotiated agreement need to be made part of thedialogue if their opposition cannot be neutralized in some other fashion.Weakening Support for Violence and Boosting ModeratesA second direct benefit is that the offer of talks may weaken support forviolence not only within the PAG but also within its wider constituency(i.e., the ethnic, religious, political, or social group for whose benefit thePAG claims to be fighting). The prospect of negotiations may inspiremoderates within the PAG to assert themselves and push the organizationtoward the bargaining table. And if negotiations actually prove rewardingfor the moderates (e.g., if the PAG secures concrete concessions, such asthe release of its fighters held by the government), they may be able to16