Talking to Groups that Use Terror.pdf - United States Institute of Peace

Peacemaker’s ToolkitDon’t Blame the Negotiators for the Actionsof SpoilersAn engaged movement itself may reject violence, but new groups mayform from rejectionist remnants. Such fringe players may actually increasetheir use of violence, escalating in order to derail promising peace talks.The IRA’s acceptance of the terms of the Good Friday Agreement led to theemergence to two splinter groups, the Continuity IRA and the Real IRA, whoopposed any deal with the Unionists. Palestinian attempts to form a unitedfront in negotiations with Israel have long been undone by the readiness offactions to splinter off from the main movement to protest what they see asunacceptable concessions. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine(PFLP), for instance, withdrew from the executive committee of the PLO in1974 because it felt that the PLO had abandoned its goal of destroying Israel.In the five preceding years, the PFLP itself had suffered no fewer than threebreakaway groups.Even if splinters do not emerge as rival movements, spoilers within thegroup are a constant problem for any attempt to end a conflict. Terroristgroups are particularly likely to produce “total spoilers”—factions thatseek total power and cannot be swayed by limited concessions. 40 Aterrorist leadership faces a dilemma when it cannot completely control itsown members, even if the leadership itself has genuinely embraced peace.Admitting a lack of control weakens the leaders’ internal credibility anddiscredits them as a negotiating partner because they cannot claim to endthe violence. Pretending continued control leaves them open to chargesthat they deliberately incited the violence.The mediator or negotiator should be sensitive to this dilemma andseek not to embarrass the terrorist negotiator by insisting it halt violencethat it cannot control. But the mediator must not excuse a PAG that may,in fact, have at least some responsibility for the violence. The question ofguilt by association is a tricky one, because the lines separating politicalwings from military wings, splinter groups, and spoilers are typically veryblurred, and may be entirely fictitious. Consequently, the mediator shouldseek to carefully distinguish between attacks launched by the PAG itselfand by splinter groups or spoilers, but also press the terrorist negotiator toapologize for the former and repudiate the latter. Condemnation of spoilerviolence as “illegitimate” by the PAG does make a difference, especially if88