Talking to Groups that Use Terror.pdf - United States Institute of Peace

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Step 4: Foster Commitment to the Process➤➤Persuade international actors that provide support (moral, political,diplomatic, and especially financial and materiel) to the PAG topromise to increase that support if the talks make progress, and tothreaten to reduce or terminate their assistance if the PAG obstructs ordelays the talks.Enlist the Support of PrisonersImprisoned terrorist fighters can be powerful advocates for peace.Prisoners play an important role in the politics of most terroristmovements and are seen by many in their communities as heroes whofought to defend a way of life and an oppressed people. Yet time in jailsometimes gives a prisoner a reason or an opportunity to contemplate anegotiated settlement to the conflict. While in jail for political violence, anumber of Egyptian Islamists had the time to explore other ways of pursuingtheir goals, and came to see the advantages of entering negotiations. 24 Aletter written in the summer of 2004 by six leading members of ETA, all ofwhom were serving prison sentences, acknowledged that ETA had beendefeated by the Spanish government’s strategies and demanded that theorganization abandon terrorism. The six were expelled from ETA, but theletter was filtered to the media and encouraged hopes that ETA would haveto enter negotiations. In July 2005, the Spanish congress approved aresolution asking the government to enter into dialogue with ETA if theorganization demonstrated “a clear willingness to end the violence.” 25Mediators and government negotiators should thus consider engagingprisoners who have or who may call for an end to violence, sounding outtheir views and, if they are helpful for the peace process, publicizing them.Prisoners may also be directly involved in the negotiations. Their authoritywith their own constituents—and thus their effectiveness as negotiators—depends, however, on their being seen as unapologetic fighters for thecause. Nelson Mandela led the ANC into successful negotiations for theintroduction of multiparty democracy after serving twenty-seven years inprison. He was released from prison in 1990 specifically to conduct thenegotiations. On the day of his release, he declared his commitment to peaceand reconciliation but he did not condemn or renounce the use of violenceby the ANC.Former terrorists who embrace the call for peace are well placed to facedown those within a terrorist group who claim that negotiation is not only59
Peacemaker’s Toolkitpointless but also cowardly. Former Protestant terrorists in NorthernIreland were able to ridicule assertions from some quarters of the Protestantnationalist movement that to contemplate negotiations was to sell out theProtestant cause. The former terrorists had already served prison time andotherwise demonstrated their bona fides, and thus could not easily becaricatured as traitors to Ulster’s cause.Against the benefits of engaging prisoners, the mediator or negotiatormust also weigh the impact on the wider public of being seen talking toprisoners who are in jail for violent crimes. Their victims are likely toresent and publicly protest such engagement. A mediator or negotiatormay be able to mitigate the consequences in terms of public reaction byengaging in very low-profile talks, avoiding talking to terrorists convictedof particularly heinous crimes, or linking talks with prisoners to visitingvictims as well. But complaints are sure to be made, unless engagementwith prisoners is kept secret, in which case its impact on the terrorists’constituency—which is usually a major part of the raison d’etre ofengagement—will be undermined. When Ehud Barak sought toreinvigorate the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the initiative almostimmediately foundered because the Palestinians insisted on the release of allpolitical prisoners held by the Israelis, no matter why they were being held.The Israeli public, however, could not tolerate the release of Palestinians whohad killed Israelis. In short, there are no cost-free options, and theadvantages and disadvantages need to be carefully weighed in advance. Inthe absence of subjective and objective indicators of conflict ripeness (seepages 28–30), the disadvantages of talking with prisoners convicted ofviolent crimes are likely to outweigh the advantages.Strengthen Moderates in the MovementBy making violence seem less effective a strategy than talking, the mediatorwill also help the cause of the moderate negotiating faction within the PAG,which needs to show other factions that it is not selling out but rather isseizing the occasion to achieve some goals. Rewarding moderates for theirconstructive participation in talks with a series of increasingly significantconfidence-building measures—such as the creation of an independentcommission to review highly contentious and highly symbolic issues—willnot only foster the moderate’s commitment to the process but also give themoderate faction something to show to their skeptical comrades.60
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Talking to GroupsThat UseTERROREdit
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Peacemaker’s ToolkitAmerica, medi
Page 11 and 12: Peacemaker’s Toolkitagainst civil
Page 13 and 14: Peacemaker’s Toolkitencourage the
Page 15 and 16: Peacemaker’s Toolkitdeter externa
Page 18 and 19: Step 1Assess the Potential for Talk
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Page 39 and 40: Peacemaker’s ToolkitBy contrast,
Page 41 and 42: Peacemaker’s Toolkitthese may be
Page 43 and 44: Peacemaker’s Toolkitpreconditions
Page 45 and 46: Peacemaker’s Toolkitduring, if no
Page 47 and 48: Peacemaker’s ToolkitDecide How to
Page 49 and 50: Peacemaker’s ToolkitThis chapter
Page 51 and 52: Peacemaker’s Toolkitmilitary stru
Page 53 and 54: Peacemaker’s ToolkitWhen such a b
Page 55 and 56: Peacemaker’s Toolkit➤➤➤➤
Page 57 and 58: Peacemaker’s Toolkitgovernments i
Page 60 and 61: Step 4Foster Commitment to theProce
Page 64 and 65: Step 4: Foster Commitment to the Pr
Page 70: Step 4: Foster Commitment to the Pr
Page 73 and 74: Peacemaker’s Toolkitsovereignty.
Page 75 and 76: Peacemaker’s Toolkitconscious of
Page 77 and 78: Peacemaker’s Toolkit➤➤➤➤P
Page 79 and 80: Peacemaker’s Toolkit➤➤➤➤
Page 81 and 82: Peacemaker’s ToolkitSome PR techn
Page 83 and 84: Peacemaker’s ToolkitA deadline fo
Page 85 and 86: Peacemaker’s Toolkitnegotiations
Page 88 and 89: Step 6Protect the Process from theE
Page 90 and 91: Step 6: Protect the Process from th
Page 92 and 93: Step 6: Protect the Process from th
Page 94 and 95: ConclusionThis handbook has focused
Page 96 and 97: Conclusionbetween PAGs and governme
Page 98 and 99: Notes12. Dudouet, Mediating Peace w
Page 100 and 101: AcknowledgmentsThe editors are grat
Page 102 and 103: Peacemaker’s ToolkitClingendael.
Page 104 and 105: Peacemaker’s ToolkitNancy Zirkin,
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