A-dictionary-of-greek-and-roman-antiquities-william-smith

UNIVERSITAS. UNIVERSITAS. 1215
material things which form the ideal unit of his
property.
In this way we arrive at the correct notion of universitas of persons, which is the notion of a
as a thing in itself, tlmt is, the whole is viewed
pro diviso ; for division in this case is the same as
making many wholes out of one whole. It is
here assumed that the thing is in its nature di
visible ; as a piece of land which is capable of
being divided into parts.
But there are parts of things corporeal which
are essential to the constitution of the whole, so that
the whole cannot be divided into parts without
the destruction of its nature ; as a living animal
for instance.
Besides the corporeal parts into which a (cor
poreal) thing is divisible, we may suppose incorpo
real, ideal parts of a corporeal thing (Dig. 45. tit,
3. s. 5). These parts are assumed fractions of a
whole, not corporeal parts. If such a part is the
object of thought, the whole corporeal thing is
viewed pro indiviso : the corporeal object of the will
is the thing, and the limitation of the will to a
part, is merely intellectual. Thus several persons
may be joint owners of a piece of undivided land,
but no one can say that any particular part belongs
to him. The case just put is that of a corporeal
whole and ideal parts. But the whole may
be ideal and the parts corporeal : as when there
Is a number of independent corporeal things, not
materially connected, but they are intellectually
connected so as to form in idea a whole : thus a
flock of sheep is an ideal whole, and the several
sheep are the independent corporeal things. The
ideal whole is not composed of the several corporeal
things, for an ideal whole cannot be composed of
corporeal parts ; but the ideal whole is a notion
which is formed with reference to some particular
purpose. It is necessary that the purpose of the
several things shall not be different from and inde
pendent of the general purpose for which the notion
is formed, but subservient to it. Thus as separate
corporeal things may be often materially united to
form a new corpus ; so the several independent
things which are not capable of such material
union, may be viewed as an ideal union or as a
a universitas for some purpose ; the flock of sheep
may be viewed as a whole, as a universitas, for
the purpose of ownership. Such a universitas, as
already observed, is independent of the several cor
poreal things : it still exists if they are all changed.
Thus in a flock of sheep we have a fictitious, a
juristical whole or thing, and in the notion of
a universitas of persons we have a fictitious or ju
ristical person, which is still the same person
though all the individuals are changed. As a
number of sheep must have a name,a flock, in order
to be comprehended in one notion, so a juristical
person must have a name, as the universitas of
Fabri, or the city of Rome.
The term universitas then may have various
senses, 1. Both the universitas and the parts may
be corporeal (Dig. 50. tit 16. s. 239. § ii) : territorium
est universitas agrorum intra fines cujusquc
civitatis. 2. The universitas may be corpo
real, and the parts incorporeal, as when we imagine
fractional parts of a thing. 3. The universitas may
be incorporeal, and the parts corporeal, ns a flock
of sheep. 4. The universitas and the parts may
both be incorporeal.
The fourth is the case when the notion of a
whole and its parts is not applied to things, but to
rights : thus a man's whole property may be
viewed as a unit, or as a universitas, which compre
hends the several rights that he has to the several
fictitious person imagined for certain purposes, as
the notion of a universitas of independent material
things is the notion of a fictitious thing, imagined
for certain purposes.
A single person only can properly be viewed as
the subject of rights and duties ; but the notion of
legal capacity may by a fiction be extended to an
imaginary person, to a universitas personanim, but
the fictitious person is not a unit composed of the
real persons : it is a name in which the several
persons or a majority may act for certain permanent
purposes. The purpose itself is sometimes the
fictitious person, as when property is given for
the service of religion, whether it is administered
by one person or several persons. Such juristical
persons have certain legal capacities as individuals
have ; but their legal capacities are limited to
property as their object. It is true that the Ro
mans often considered persons as a collective unity,
simply because they all exercised the same
functions : thus they speak of the Collegium
of the consuls [Collegium], and of theTribuni
Plebis. In like manner they say that the Duum
viri of a municipum are to be viewed as one person.
(Dig. 50. tit. 1. s. 25). But these fictitious
unities have only reference to Jus Publicum, and
they have no necessary connection with juristical
persons, the essential character of which is the
capacity to have and acquire property by some
name.
Juristical persons could be subjects of owner
ship, Jura in re, obligationes, and hereditas :
they could own slaves and have the Patronatus ;
but all the relations of Familia, as the Patria Potestas
and others of a like kind, were foreign to the
notion. But though the capacity to have property
is the distinguishing characteristic of Juristical
persons viewed with relation to Jus Privatum, the
objects for which the property is had and applied
may be any ; and the capacity to have property
implies a purpose for which it is had, which is
often much more important than this mere capacity.
But the purposes for which Juristical persons have
property ore quite distinct from their capacity to
have it. This will appear from all or any of the
examples hereinafter given.
The following are Juristical persons: (1) Civitas:
(2) Municipes: this term is more common
than Municipium, and comprehends both citizens
of a Municipium and a Colony ; it is also used
when the object is to express the Municipium as
a whole opposed to the individual members of it.
(3) Respublica. In the republican period, when
used without an adjunct, Respublica expressed
Rome, but in the old jurists it signifies a Ci vitas
dependent on Rome. (4) Respublica Civitatis or
Municipii : (5) Commune, Communitas. Besides
the Civitates, component parts of the Civitates are
also Juristical persons : (1) Curiae or Decuriones ;
the word Decuriones often denotes the individuals
composing the body of Decuriones as opposed to
the Civitas (Municipes), which appears from a
passage in the Digest (4. tit 3. s. 15), where it is
stated that an action for Dolus will not lie against
the Municipes, for a fictitious person cannot be
guilty of Dolus, but such action will lie against the
individual Decuriones who administer the affairs