INQUIRY
InquiryXIX
InquiryXIX
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<strong>INQUIRY</strong> • Volume 19, 2015<br />
Contested Contexts: The Effects of Gentrification on a<br />
Public Park<br />
Emily Frank, Sociology<br />
Sponsor: Professor Ruth Horowitz, Sociology<br />
In the heart of the East Village, between Avenues A<br />
and B, lies Tompkins Square Park. As the hub of the neighborhood,<br />
it is a haven for people from all socioeconomic<br />
backgrounds and subcultures. It also provides a concrete<br />
illustration of neighborhood change, namely gentrification.<br />
To investigate the effects of gentrification on a public park,<br />
an ethnographic study was conducted by observing public<br />
behavior, how people segregate themselves, how the park is<br />
managed and how the populations themselves are managed<br />
by park staff. When possible, park-goers were interviewed<br />
about their experiences. Based on this research, it was found<br />
that the park reflects the evolution of the neighborhood’s<br />
social hierarchy. In the past, the homeless had occupied<br />
the center; they now spend their time at the edges. Twentysomethings<br />
populate the central areas instead. Longtime<br />
neighborhood residents differ in how they view this change:<br />
early gentrifiers look at the Tompkins of the past with nostalgia,<br />
while lifelong residents view the current Tompkins<br />
as an improvement from the days of “Needle Park.” In<br />
conclusion, public parks can be viewed as reflections of<br />
neighborhood change as a whole and pinpoint specific<br />
phenomena characteristic of gentrification.<br />
Stability over Starvation: Gaza, Iraq and the Domestic<br />
Political Costs of Economic Sanctions<br />
Ellis Garey, Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, Sociology<br />
Sponsor: Professor Vivek Chibber, Sociology<br />
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect<br />
economic sanctions and blockades have on domestic political<br />
stability. While conventional knowledge proposes that<br />
economic sanctions have the ability to influence the leaders<br />
they target by collectively punishing the public, who then<br />
mobilize and pressure their government to capitulate to the<br />
demands of the “sender” state, historical experience suggests<br />
otherwise. The economic blockade of Gaza initiated<br />
by Israel following the election of Hamas in 2007 and the<br />
near-total embargo imposed on Iraq following the invasion<br />
of Kuwait in 1990 by the United Nations Security Council<br />
(UNSC) both aimed to destabilize the existing governments.<br />
Yet, in both cases economic sanctions failed in bringing<br />
about regime change and were instead accompanied by<br />
consolidated political power. An analysis of food insecurity<br />
rates in Gaza and Iraq, which rises as a result of restricted<br />
food imports and difficulties faced by the agricultural sectors,<br />
illustrates the possibility that material crisis caused by<br />
an external actor can maintain the domestic political status<br />
quo instead of leading to upheaval.<br />
Patterns of Mandibular Molar Expansion in Megadont<br />
Hominins<br />
Evelyn Glaze, Anthropology<br />
Sponsor: Professor Shara Bailey, Anthropology<br />
The evolutionary relationships of the early African<br />
hominins have been disputed for the past century due in part<br />
to different interpretations of the factors that influence dental<br />
morphology. The case for a separate genus Paranthropus<br />
including the “robust” australopithecine species interprets<br />
the similar dental morphology of these species as support for<br />
the hypothesis that such traits are inherited from a common<br />
ancestor. Conversely, opponents of such groupings argue<br />
that the defining traits of the “robust” species could have<br />
evolved in parallel, forming separate East African and South<br />
African clades. This research examines one of these defining<br />
traits, lower molars that increase in size towards the back<br />
of the tooth row, to determine whether there is a common<br />
way in which teeth become bigger over evolutionary time.<br />
A sample of living primates sharing this trait were quantitatively<br />
compared to the fossil hominins in order to determine<br />
the similarity of patterns in molar length and width, relative<br />
cusp size, and the way these patterns are manifested across<br />
the molar field. Disparities both between and within the<br />
living and fossil samples demonstrate that there is more<br />
than one way for the lower molar row to become enlarged.<br />
Although this result does not preclude the common ancestor<br />
hypothesis, it does indicate that a common ancestor is not<br />
required in order for both species to have developed similar<br />
molar characteristics.<br />
Prosperity and Security: A Political Economy Model of<br />
Internet Surveillance<br />
Chun Wei Benjamin Goh, Politics<br />
Sponsor: Professor Alastair Smith, Politics<br />
This paper proposes a game-theoretic model to understand<br />
the factors that determine whether and to what extent a<br />
country’s government will employ Internet surveillance over<br />
its citizens. Surveillance is unpopular with the electorate but<br />
useful in decreasing terrorist attacks and is assumed to be<br />
partially observable. The model attempts to characterize the<br />
optimal level of surveillance as a function of the economy,<br />
level of terror aggression and cultural attitudes towards<br />
privacy and security. Contrary to popular belief, leaders<br />
perceived to be competent have an incentive to employ more<br />
surveillance. Terror paranoia also does not always lead to<br />
higher surveillance. These comparative statics are tested<br />
against data from newly published data from the Web Index<br />
and Privacy International. This model will be the first to<br />
systematically investigate the choice of surveillance policies<br />
across political institutions and contributes to the burgeoning<br />
political economy discourse on Internet surveillance.<br />
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