jul-aug2012

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50 CLOSE CALLS Taking control Name withheld by request I was flying an international heavy jet to New Chitose, Japan, also known as Sapporo. It was May 2012, and the usual threats of cold weather, snowy conditions and contaminated runways which plague the airport early in the year were fortunately not in evidence this time. Our early afternoon arrival was in clear skies, with 25km visibility reported by ATIS and ATC suggesting a visual approach. Before descent, and after the approach briefing, the captain suggested that we should have an extra stage of flap out than normally specified when abeam the threshold. The descent was normal and radar vectors were given until in sight of the aerodrome, then a visual approach clearance was issued. By late downwind, I selected autopilot off and with everything normal I turned base leg. The captain commented about the military runway at the far side of the airport which, given our position, in my judgement, was not a threat or concern. I prefer to hand-fly visual approaches, and by manipulating the controls manually, I guarantee a tighter turn than one made with the autopilot, ensuring a shallow intercept onto final. I also do this as a preventative measure against overshooting, or straying onto a parallel runway area. The gear was selected down with the final stage of flap to go, and the landing checklist to be completed. This is always a busy time. The captain, focused on the navigation display, muttered something about the geometry of the turn and not going to intercept final correctly. I was now halfway through the base turn with the runway in sight. Everything looked as it should. The vertical deviation indicator showed the profile was good and I was happy to continue, seeing no need to modify anything. I noticed the captain becoming uncomfortable, even agitated. Suddenly, forcefully, and without warning, he took control of the thrust levers and control stick, saying ‘I have control’. Immediately, I changed to pilot-monitoring duties, and acknowledged: ‘you have control as per our SOPs’. I didn’t know the reason for his decision, but at this stage of the approach there was no discussion. From my situational awareness everything was within limits and normal, nothing had been breached. It had not occurred to me before, so I asked myself ‘was there something missed, or some information the captain knew which I didn’t, or hadn’t recognised?’ I had to be open-minded. We all make mistakes, but judging by the captain’s action, this was no small error. The captain took control and stopped the base turn. I did not understand why, but I did know that unless he corrected the new flight path he had established, it would be an unstable approach. An incursion of the adjacent runway’s airspace would quickly follow, and if allowed to continue, an infringement of military restricted airspace. And this would happen in seconds. I was not thrilled about control being taken away, without knowing why. The captain began manoeuvring towards the next runway. Only a second had passed since handing over control, and I noticed him focusing on the military runway, two runways away from ours, and adjusting track to land there. From our current position it would be difficult to achieve at best, even though the military runway seemed closer to us. It is located further north than the two civil runways, but from our position northeast of the airport, its lighter-coloured tarmac made it appear more obvious. I was astonished as the situation unfolded. My next thought was to take over from the captain, as per our procedures and crew resource management (CRM) principles. But would that be the best fix, considering where we were on the approach as well as our cultural differences? What if he didn’t surrender control? I knew clearly what had to be done in a very short time frame to make this a successful approach, but that window was closing fast. This captain and first officer were thinking two very different things. One of us was right, the other was wrong. Unfortunately, the one who was wrong had assumed command of the controls, but he did not know he was wrong, making it a dangerous situation. It was now up to me to prove his error—and quickly. His situational awareness was compromised when he tried matching the picture he had developed from the navigation display with the one he could see through the window. He believed he was making a bad situation better. In fact, he was doing the opposite: turning a normal, within-limits manoeuvre into something unsafe.
Flight Safety Australia Issue 87 July–August 2012 51 military runway hand-fly visual approaches navigation display wrong situational awareness turned base leg 01R/19L 3,000m/9,843ft 01L/19R 3,000m/9,843ft 18R/36L 2,700m/8,858ft 18L/36R 3,000m/9,843ft I shouted at him very deliberately, so there would be no misunderstanding, ‘No!’, pointed to the runway at our 10 o’clock position, and said, ‘that’s our runway’. Finally, he turned the aircraft in the correct direction; I will never forget the lost and confused look on his face. He asked for landing flap and landing checklist, and we completed the landing normally within the stable approach parameters. So much went on in just a few seconds. At the time I don’t know what thinking made him arrive at his decision. But whatever the reason, he made a basic error. The situation could rapidly have escalated into something worse if I had failed to challenge him, or had passively accepted his wrong decision. To many this is obvious, but in some cultures they do not challenge and will accept a bad decision, even if they know it is wrong. Many aircraft accidents occur because of this, as we often read in FSA and other aviation magazines. A pilot taking over from a normal condition and unwittingly attempting to take it into an unsafe condition is not something you specifically train for in simulator exercises. Standard procedure is to back up the other pilot but offer assistance where necessary—that is to give a heads-up if you think an error will be made. This is part of CRM, but you have to adapt to different situations and respond accordingly: scenarios may not play out as described in quick reference handbooks, manuals, textbooks, or simulator exercises.
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Page 11 and 12: ‘They’re being used now,’ she
Page 19 and 20: Check your flight notifications The
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Page 55 and 56: If in doubt, don’t take-off ATSB
Page 57 and 58: Night flying-make sure you’re qua
Page 59 and 60: REPCON BRIEFS Australia’s volunta
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