jul-aug2012

Flight Safety Australia
Issue 87 July–August 2012
59
The single runway at Islamabad Airport is oriented 12-30.
Approach procedures are for ILS, DME, VOR and straight-in
approaches to runway 30, and a circling approach to land on
runway 12. There are two prohibited areas in the vicinity, one to
the south-west and another to the north-east, and a hilly area to
the north-east of the airport.
As the aircraft neared Islamabad, the crew realised that, after
making an instrument descent on the ILS for runway 30, they
would be required to execute a visual circling approach to
runway 12. Becoming increasingly worried about poor weather
and low cloud, the captain called Islamabad Approach to
request a right-hand, downwind visual approach to the runway.
The radar controller refused this, because of ‘procedural
limitations’.
The captain then decided to fly the circling approach in
navigation mode, and the aircraft began descending at 8.58am.
Shortly afterwards, the radar controller informed the aircraft to
‘expect arrival to ILS, runway 30, circle to land runway 12’.
The first officer then asked Approach if they could now
be cleared to a ‘right downwind runway 12 for the approach’.
This time the controller responded:
‘Right downwind runway 12 is not available at
the moment because of low clouds’.
Acknowledging, the captain responded: ‘we understand right
downwind is not available—it will be ILS down to minima and
then left downwind—OK?’ The crew then discussed a waypoint
five nm to the north-east of the runway, on a radial 026 from
the runway 12 threshold. Discussion followed on another
intended waypoint.
At 9.34am, with the A321 now down to an altitude of 4300ft, the
radar controller cleared it to descend to 3900ft in preparation for
intercepting the ILS for runway 30, to be followed by a circling
approach to land on runway 12. Two minutes later, at an altitude
of 3700ft, the aircraft became established on the ILS with both
autopilots engaged, and the crew extended the undercarriage.
Now in contact with the control tower, the crew again asked:
‘How’s the weather for a right downwind?’ The tower controller
responded that a right downwind was not available—only a left
downwind for runway 12.
It was the captain’s intention to descend to 2000ft on the ILS,
(little more than 300 feet above the runway altitude of 1688ft)
but the first officer reminded him that 2500ft was minimum
descent altitude.
The crew levelled out at 2500ft, disengaged no. 2 autopilot, and
with only no. 1 autopilot engaged, continued to fly the aircraft
on the runway heading to the VOR.
The crew’s intended break-off to the right from the ILS approach
to fly the right downwind circuit was delayed because they had
not become visual in the poor visibility. Meanwhile, the tower’s
confirmation that an aircraft of a competing airline had just landed
safely (albeit on the third attempt) put the captain under more
pressure to complete his approach and landing.
Almost immediately the aircraft broke out of cloud, and the tower
instructed the crew to report when established on a left downwind
for runway 12. Seconds later, passing over the VOR, 0.8km short
of the runway 30 threshold, the crew turned the aircraft to the right
on the autopilot, and very shortly afterwards lowered the selected
altitude to 2300ft, presumably in an effort to remain visual in the
poor conditions. The aircraft began descending again, violating the
minimum descent altitude.
The tower controller now suggested to the captain that he fly a
bad weather circuit, but the captain ignored this transmission,
commenting to the first officer: ‘Let him say whatever he wants
to say’. It was evident that the captain had already decided to fly a
‘managed approach’, using waypoints unknown to Islamabad Air
Traffic Control.
Although the captain had said he would fly the circling approach in
the navigation mode, the aircraft was still in the heading mode. The
first officer pointed this out, saying: ‘OK sir, but are you visual?’
The captain replied, ‘Visual! OK’.
While planning for his intended approach pattern, the captain told
the first officer where in the circuit he was to extend the flaps.
At 9.39am, when the aircraft was more than 3.5nm from the