jul-aug2012

More documents

Recommendations

Info

58 FEATURE Air Blue Flight 202 Pride before a Macarthur Job looks at how an A321, minutes away from touchdown, crashed into the Margalla Hills Captain Pervez Iqbal Chaudhary’s last day on earth did not begin well. The investigation report published after his death noted that while programming the flight management system for Air Blue Flight 202, he appeared to be confusing the destination, Islamabad, with the origin, Karachi. Flight 202 took off at 7.41am on July 28 2010. The aircraft was an Airbus Industrie A321, built in 2000, with just over 16,000 hours of service. It had been serviced that day, with no defects recorded. The cockpit voice recorder, recovered scorched but intact a few days later, revealed an aggressive interrogation that continued at intervals for about an hour During climb, and contrary to company procedures, the highly experienced Captain Chaudhary chose to examine the knowledge of the comparatively junior first officer in a harsh and overbearing manner. The cockpit voice recorder, recovered scorched but intact a few days later, revealed an aggressive interrogation that continued at intervals for about an hour. First officer Muntajib Ahmed had been an F-16 pilot in the Pakistan Air Force, but under Chaudhary’s verbal assault he ‘remained subdued, appearing under-confident and submissive,’ the Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority report said. About 155nm from Islamabad, the crew selected the automatic terminal information service frequency, and learned that the duty runway was runway 12. The captain also checked the weather conditions at Peshawar and Lahore. Finding them anything but encouraging, he appeared to become apprehensive.
Flight Safety Australia Issue 87 July–August 2012 59 The single runway at Islamabad Airport is oriented 12-30. Approach procedures are for ILS, DME, VOR and straight-in approaches to runway 30, and a circling approach to land on runway 12. There are two prohibited areas in the vicinity, one to the south-west and another to the north-east, and a hilly area to the north-east of the airport. As the aircraft neared Islamabad, the crew realised that, after making an instrument descent on the ILS for runway 30, they would be required to execute a visual circling approach to runway 12. Becoming increasingly worried about poor weather and low cloud, the captain called Islamabad Approach to request a right-hand, downwind visual approach to the runway. The radar controller refused this, because of ‘procedural limitations’. The captain then decided to fly the circling approach in navigation mode, and the aircraft began descending at 8.58am. Shortly afterwards, the radar controller informed the aircraft to ‘expect arrival to ILS, runway 30, circle to land runway 12’. The first officer then asked Approach if they could now be cleared to a ‘right downwind runway 12 for the approach’. This time the controller responded: ‘Right downwind runway 12 is not available at the moment because of low clouds’. Acknowledging, the captain responded: ‘we understand right downwind is not available—it will be ILS down to minima and then left downwind—OK?’ The crew then discussed a waypoint five nm to the north-east of the runway, on a radial 026 from the runway 12 threshold. Discussion followed on another intended waypoint. At 9.34am, with the A321 now down to an altitude of 4300ft, the radar controller cleared it to descend to 3900ft in preparation for intercepting the ILS for runway 30, to be followed by a circling approach to land on runway 12. Two minutes later, at an altitude of 3700ft, the aircraft became established on the ILS with both autopilots engaged, and the crew extended the undercarriage. Now in contact with the control tower, the crew again asked: ‘How’s the weather for a right downwind?’ The tower controller responded that a right downwind was not available—only a left downwind for runway 12. It was the captain’s intention to descend to 2000ft on the ILS, (little more than 300 feet above the runway altitude of 1688ft) but the first officer reminded him that 2500ft was minimum descent altitude. The crew levelled out at 2500ft, disengaged no. 2 autopilot, and with only no. 1 autopilot engaged, continued to fly the aircraft on the runway heading to the VOR. The crew’s intended break-off to the right from the ILS approach to fly the right downwind circuit was delayed because they had not become visual in the poor visibility. Meanwhile, the tower’s confirmation that an aircraft of a competing airline had just landed safely (albeit on the third attempt) put the captain under more pressure to complete his approach and landing. Almost immediately the aircraft broke out of cloud, and the tower instructed the crew to report when established on a left downwind for runway 12. Seconds later, passing over the VOR, 0.8km short of the runway 30 threshold, the crew turned the aircraft to the right on the autopilot, and very shortly afterwards lowered the selected altitude to 2300ft, presumably in an effort to remain visual in the poor conditions. The aircraft began descending again, violating the minimum descent altitude. The tower controller now suggested to the captain that he fly a bad weather circuit, but the captain ignored this transmission, commenting to the first officer: ‘Let him say whatever he wants to say’. It was evident that the captain had already decided to fly a ‘managed approach’, using waypoints unknown to Islamabad Air Traffic Control. Although the captain had said he would fly the circling approach in the navigation mode, the aircraft was still in the heading mode. The first officer pointed this out, saying: ‘OK sir, but are you visual?’ The captain replied, ‘Visual! OK’. While planning for his intended approach pattern, the captain told the first officer where in the circuit he was to extend the flaps. At 9.39am, when the aircraft was more than 3.5nm from the
Page 1 and 2:
87 July-August 2012 Unmanned aircra
Page 3 and 4:
CONTENTS Issue 87 | July-August 201
Page 5 and 6:
Flight Safety Australia Issue 87 Ju
Page 7 and 8:
Flight Safety Australia Issue 87 Ju
Page 9 and 10: Flight Safety Australia Issue 87 Ju
Page 11 and 12: ‘They’re being used now,’ she
Page 19 and 20: Check your flight notifications The
Page 21 and 22: Australian accidents/incidents 01 A
Page 55 and 56: If in doubt, don’t take-off ATSB
Page 57 and 58: Night flying-make sure you’re qua
Page 59: REPCON BRIEFS Australia’s volunta
Page 73 and 74: AUSTRALIAN Flight Safety Australia
Page 75 and 76: 2012 Have trouble finding aviation
show all

jul-aug2012

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?