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he has in his thoughts, at the same time, though often without being himself aware of it, a vigorous
affirmation and a no less vigorous if implicit denial of certain dogmas; that he holds at once a certain
Christian belief, and a certain worldly or political prejudice which is opposed to it. . . .
A discussion of each of the species of oppositions here pointed out would carry us beyond our
limits. We must be satisfied with a few general reflections. First, then, if external oppositions exist
(for so we may term the oppositions of tendencies between different beings or men), they are
rendered possible by the fact that internal oppositions (between different tendencies within the same
being or man) exist or may exist. This applies to oppositions of series and degrees as well as to
oppositions of sign, but more particularly to the latter. If certain men or groups of men are developing
in one direction, while other men or groups of men are developing in the contrary direction, it is
because each individual man can either develop or counterdevelop in this way; as, for example, in the
transition from naturalism to idealism, or from idealism to naturalism, in art, and from an aristocracy
to a democracy, or vice versa, in government, etc. If religious faith is on the increase among certain
races or classes, while among others it is on the decline, it is because the consciousness of each
individual man admits of either an increase or a diminution in the intensity of religious faith. Finally,
if there exist political parties and religious sects which affirm and desire what other parties and sects
deny and reject, it is because the mind and heart of each individual man is capable of containing both
the yes and the no, the pro and the con, with respect to any given concept or aim.
Nevertheless, I am far from wishing to identify external with internal contests. In one sense they
are incompatible; for it is only when the internal struggle is ended, when the individual, after having
been pulled hither and thither by contrary influences, has made his choice, and adopted a certain
opinion or resolution rather than some other—it is only when he has made peace with himself—that
war between himself and those who have made the opposite choice becomes possible. Nor is this of
itself sufficient to bring about such a war. The individual must know, in addition, that the others have
chosen the opposite of what he has himself chosen. Without this, any external opposition of contraries,
whether simultaneous or successive, would be practically non-existent, for it would present none of
those characteristics that render an external struggle really effective. To bring about religious war or
strife, it is essential for every adherent of one faith to know that the adherents of some other faith deny
exactly what he affirms; and this negation must be placed side by side in his consciousness with his
own affirmation, not as though adopted imitatively, but rather as being definitely rejected by him, and
hence redoubling the intensity of his own belief. To bring about industrial competition, as, for
instance, among the bidders at the sale of a house, each one must know that his desire to possess the
building is opposed by his competitors, who wish him not to get it; and he will desire all the more to
get possession of it if he knows that the rest do not wish him to do so. Without this, mere competition
would be fruitless, and political economists have erred here in not clearly distinguishing the special
case where there exists, in the minds of the competitors, no knowledge at all of the competition, from
the varying measure of that knowledge, as shown in the infinite number of degrees that separate
complete understanding from complete ignorance of the fact.
This was my ground for saying, as I did further back, that the fundamental social opposition must be
sought, not, as one might be tempted to think, at first sight, in the relation of two contrary or
contradictory individuals, but rather in those logical and teleological duals, those curious combats
between thesis and antithesis, between willing and nilling, whose stage is the consciousness of the
social individual. Of course the question may be asked: If this be true, how does this social
opposition differ from any purely psychological opposition? To this I reply: It differs in cause, and
still more in effect.