19.12.2012 Views

1 Chapter 1. Introduction: status and definition of compounding ...

1 Chapter 1. Introduction: status and definition of compounding ...

1 Chapter 1. Introduction: status and definition of compounding ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

c. he does not motivate the individual transformations used to derive a compound from<br />

a sentence.<br />

As an example <strong>of</strong> (8a), March<strong>and</strong> (1965a:59-60) contrasts the derivation <strong>of</strong> population growth in<br />

(3) with the derivation <strong>of</strong> wading bird from „the bird wades‟. Both deep structures have a subject<br />

<strong>and</strong> a verb, but they end up in different parts <strong>of</strong> the compound. Lees (1966) obviously struggles<br />

to underst<strong>and</strong> this objection. In the framework he works from, the choice <strong>of</strong> a particular<br />

derivational path in a particular context simply does not belong to the domain <strong>of</strong> linguistics. It<br />

would be tantamount to explaining why speakers decide to use an active or a passive version <strong>of</strong> a<br />

sentence, both <strong>of</strong> which are derived from the same deep structure. At the same time, the opposite<br />

derivations are equally possible for Lees, but they have different properties. Thus, growth<br />

population is countable like wading bird <strong>and</strong> bird wading is non-countable like population<br />

growth. March<strong>and</strong> (1965a:61-2) suggests treating this phenomenon by means <strong>of</strong> what would<br />

later be called „topicalization rules‟ <strong>and</strong> elaborated by Brekle (1970). Such rules determine which<br />

element <strong>of</strong> the underlying sentence is taken as which part <strong>of</strong> the resulting compound. It is worth<br />

noting that Kürschner (1977:134-5) considers such a mechanism superfluous.<br />

The problem in (8b) is mentioned by March<strong>and</strong> (1965b) in various places, but not in<br />

March<strong>and</strong> (1965a), so that Lees (1966) does not react to it. An example <strong>of</strong> the problem is<br />

whetstone, as discussed by March<strong>and</strong> (1965b:123-4). The derivation <strong>of</strong> this word is parallel to<br />

grindstone in (4). March<strong>and</strong> objects to Lees‟s derivation because it fails to represent the semantic<br />

element <strong>of</strong> „purpose‟, which he considers essential for such words. The issue is arguably at least<br />

in part a matter <strong>of</strong> the theoretical framework. Lees (1960) assumes a framework in which it is<br />

sufficient to generate a deep structure <strong>and</strong> derive a surface structure. As long as the notion <strong>of</strong><br />

„purpose‟ is represented in (4a), the semantic component will be able to deal with it<br />

94

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!