A Decade of NEPAD - Economic Commission for Africa - uneca

66 A Decade of NEPAD: Deepening African Private Sector and Civil Society Ownership and Partnership
by African governments for CSO and other stakeholder
contributions, and, unfortunately, this prerequisite varied
considerably across the continent.
In countries such as Benin, Botswana, Ghana, South Africa,
Malawi, Tunisia, Senegal, and Niger, CSOs were found
to have made meaningful contributions. In other states,
such as Ethiopia and Egypt, governmental constraints
and restrictions impacted active CSO participation in the
country’s development processes.
In reviewing the NEPAD process and the degree and types
of engagement that have been experienced with the African
CSO community to date, feedback from OSSA and UNECA
stakeholder fora and research reports have indicated that
the depth and consistency with which the AU has pursued
the establishment of CSO participation in its activities has
yet to be replicated within the NEPAD process.
And the findings of AGR II illustrate that in most likelihood
significant domestic and international donor support
and continued capacity building efforts will be required to
facilitate enhanced and effective engagement between the
Africa civil society community and NEPAD. Yet, AGR II
also shows that properly resourced and engaged, the African
civil society can play a critically important role in taking
NEPAD’s messages to the citizens of the continent and in
supporting the implementation of the NEPAD programme.
The AGR II findings in respect to the capacity needs of
Africa’s CSO community have not gone unnoticed by international
donor institutions and multilateral organizations
committed to Africa’s development. Thus, it is also of note
that since the beginning of the 21 st century there has been
a much more concerted effort to strengthen the capacity
of African CSOs and to establish wider continental, pan-
African, and international CSO networks. Key resource
institutions and catalysts in this regard have included the
UN Office of the Special Advisor on Africa, the European
Commission (particularly through the PROINVEST programme),
the Zimbabwe based Africa Capacity Development
Foundation, and multilateral initiatives such as the
Tanzania based Investment Climate Facility.
An analysis of the relationship between NEPAD and the
African CSO community today reveals that there is indeed
work toward improvement in progress. Although the level
of engagement is yet not where either side would like for it
to be, both sides would largely agree that the relationship
has positively progressed from where it was at the inception
of the NEPAD initiative.
Furthermore, from a policy standpoint, it is clear to African
CSOs that the principles of participatory development have
been captured in the NEPAD framework in the focus on
Democracy and Political and Economic Governance and
in the APRM programme.
African leaders also acknowledged in NEPAD’s framework
that “the New Partnership for Africa’s Development will
be successful only if it is owned by the African peoples –
united in their diversity”. In the Framework they have also
called on all African’s to mobilise in support of NEPAD:
“We are therefore, asking the African peoples to take up
the challenge of mobilising in support of the implementation
of this initiative by setting up, at all levels structures
for organisation, mobilisation and action 83 .”
To date, however, despite the lofty aims espoused in the
NEPAD framework, the precedent that exists for participatory
development on the continent, and the recent efforts
to develop a people centred African Union, NEPAD’s
leadership has been criticized over much of the past ten
years for not adequately engaging with the African CSO
community and giving it much of a voice in the implementation
of NEPAD.
In fact at the inception of NEPAD, because of these feelings
and perceptions of exclusion, many within the civil
society were very sceptical of the initiative, if not openly
antagonistic toward the programme. They asserted that
the initiative lacked legitimacy as it was developed in a
top down manner, and without significant CSO input.
In addition to lamenting the lack of consultation and
opportunity to contribute to the development of the NE-
PAD framework, others within the CSO community felt
strongly that the initiative’s ideological leanings were too
pro-business, anti-poor and western in orientation.
In the years subsequent to the launch of NEPAD, a number
of different focus groups met to assess how best to bridge
the initial chasm that existed between NEPAD and the
CSO community.
83 The African Union’s New Partnership for Africa’s Development,
African Union and United Nations, Africa Section, Department of
Public Information, 2007, p. 11