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The Autumn, 1942, Campaign in Russia Based on best information available at date of writing, this article is subject to later historical correction. By Col. Conrad H. Lanza 186
1943 THE AUTUMN, 1942, CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA 187 On 30 September, 1942, Hitler in his Stalingrad speech said in part, "We have prepared a very simple program: 1st—we must under all circumstances hold whatever must be held. That is to say, we must let the others attack as much as they wish, wherever we have no intention to advance. We must hold everything, and wait and see who tires the soonest. 2nd—we must attack under all circumstances where attack is necessary. "The occupation of Stalingrad . . . will become a gigantic success . . . no human being will push us away from that spot. . . "We are mainly interested in obtaining this great space [Russia] to render it usable for our war, also for the feeding of our people; together with the securing of raw materials for the maintenance of all Europe." When this speech was made it was commonly heralded as a sign of German exhaustion or approaching exhaustion. It was believed to be a definite abandonment of the offensive by the Axis, due to sheer inability to continue. Perhaps this was to some extent so, but it is probable that the Sportspalast speech had been carefully prepared in advance and indeed marked a change in the Axis strategical plan, although not exactly along the line which at the time was attributed to it. About the time of the speech, there was regroupment of Axis forces in Russia. It was similar to what had occurred in December, 1941, when the German offensive of that year was suspended for the coming winter. Experience at that time had indicated that when major changes in battle lines are initiated after winter commences, there are great losses of men, supplies, and materiel. The 1941-1942 season had been unusually severe; the freezing of motor transportation had in turn caused the abandonment of notable quantities of artillery and stores. So this year, the decision was to complete any required changes before winter started. Two minor exceptions were made: first, a limited offensive on a narrow front was continued against a part of Stalingrad still held by the Russians as a bridgehead on the west side of the Volga River; second, another limited offensive was pushed in Caucasia, in the vicinity of the Terek River, with the mission of gaining the Ordzhonikidze oil region and at the same time closing the north exit of the main pass over the Caucasus mountains leading to Tiflis. Elsewhere a general defensive, strategical and tactical, was to be maintained, though this did not exclude minor offensive operations to improve the line, to secure identifications, and to harass the enemy. Many divisions were withdrawn from line, which was comparatively lightly held. The front was prepared for defense as well as time and means permitted. Great dependence was placed on the Air Fleets which, held in reserve, were ready to furnish aid on an hour's notice to any sector which needed help. Hitler (and presumably also the Axis High Command) either wanted the Russians to attack or were indifferent to their doing so. They felt it would be more advantageous to let the Russians come to them than to go chasing after natives who could avoid combat by retiring indefinitely into their own country. The Sportspalast speech was an invitation to the Russians to come on and attack: the Axis hoped that this might result in the complete annihilation of the Russian armies during the winter of 1942-1943, on ground selected by the Axis. If this plan succeeded it would leave the Axis armies free to meet any Anglo- American invasion that might come, and which it was believed would not occur before the spring of 1943. THE RUSSIAN PLAN Russia accepted Hitler's challenge. It was willing and even anxious to assume the offensive, if given the time to prepare. Russia had the mission, ardently desired by all Russian peoples, to expel the invader from their territories at an early a date as practicable. The Russian armies were willing to fight regardless of winter or other conditions. Notwithstanding numerous previous defeats their morale was high. Due to materiel and supplies received from Great Britain and the United States the armies were well equipped. The leadership was entirely Russian. As far as is now known the proposed winter campaigns were planned by Russian staffs, without help from their Allies. It was decided to start major offensives in several sectors, as soon as possible. On 30 September (when Hitler's new policy was promulgated) the Russians had already in preparation a major offensive in the vicinity of Rzhev. This was to have started early in October, but was greatly delayed for reasons which will be discussed later. It was now decided to prepare offensives as follows: I. To relieve Moscow: (a) The foregoing offensive near Rzhev, extended westward to the vicinity of Velikie Luki, to advance southward to the line Smolensk-Vyazma. (b) A smaller offensive, east of Rzhev to Kalinin, to cover the left of (a) as it advanced and ultimately to establish connection with (c). (c) An offensive starting southwest from Moscow (from the vicinity of Maloyaroslavets) to advance westward toward Smolensk. If (a) and (c) succeeded the enemy could be expected to withdraw to the Dneiper River. II. To relieve Stalingrad, reopen the Volga River route, and free wheat lands much needed for food production in 1943: (d) An offensive to cross the Don River in the vicinity of Serafimovich would push south to the Chir River, where it turns eastward, and then follow along the railroad toward Stalingrad. (e) A smaller offensive starting from near Kachalino on the Don River, covering the left of (d). (f) An offensive starting south of the Volga, in the Kalmuck steppe, in the vicinity of Malo Derbety, and moving west through Abganerova. It would then turn north, its left swinging around to join the right of (e) along the Don River. It would join in reducing Stalingrad. (g) An offensive starting on the Don River about opposite Boguchar, and proceeding south down the Kalitva valley. This would protect the right of (d), free valuable farm lands, and (in cooperation with (d), especially if Stalingrad were reduced) might ultimately push the enemy back to the Donets River. According to Stalin's speech of 6 November, which presumably represents the Russian opinion at that date, it was believed that the principal Axis strength was on the Don River, between Boguchar and Kachalino. According
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