the field artillery journal - Fort Sill - U.S. Army

1943 THE AUTUMN, 1942, CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA 189
Russians, still fighting the same seven Axis divisions,
claim that at the end of this day these had lost
24,000 prisoners,
26,000 killed,
556 guns,
2,826 tanks,
with other booty in proportion, all exclusive of numerous
itemized accounts which are assumed to be included in the
above figures.
Analysis of the foregoing figures casts some doubt as to
what they represent. Even if liberal allowance is made for
corps and army tank units which may have intervened in
the battle on the Axis side, the number of tanks reported
captured or destroyed is several times the number which
seven divisions (only one being an armored division)
would normally have. The explanation may be that the
Russians counted in tanks of the original Axis front, not
part of mobile units, which were buried in the ground as
nuclei for strongpoints. There was a large number of these
disabled and condemned tanks, Russian and German, left
from wrecks of the summer's campaign, although there is
no available report as to just how many there may have
been. There is some evidence to indicate that on portions of
the front the Axis troops had as many as 80 dug-in tanks
per kilometer in the forward areas. Whether this was
general, and whether rear lines of defense were similarly
provided with abandoned tanks, is not known. However, if
this kind of tank is included it is quite possible that the
Russian figures, which cover a 70 kilometer front, may be
correct.
The same situation relates to the report of guns captured.
In addition to the organic artillery of the Axis troops, worn
guns which were too inaccurate for precision fire but were
good enough for short ranges and for direct fire against
tanks and other moving targets, were in the forward areas,
provided with ammunition but no transportation and only
minimum gun crews. These guns would of course be lost in
a withdrawal. Presumably the Russians counted these in as
captured.
In view of the unexpected Russian success near
Chernyshevsk the Axis High Command took immediate
action. They ordered the abandonment of the Don Loop, to
start immediately. Troops were to proceed eastward,
crossing the Don River south of Kachalino, and report for
duty with the Stalingrad garrison. The movement
commenced at dark and was pushed with great speed.
During the shift, avoidance of combat with large enemy
groups was sought until after junction had been made with
the Stalingrad troops.
The Russian force which had taken Abganerova failed to
turn north as had been expected; it received reports that
hostile elements were coming up east of the railroad,
threatening its line of communication. Consequently the
day was spent in building up a new line east of the railroad,
facing south, extending from Aksai to Tundotovo (both
inclusive). These Russians were accompanied by a sizeable
force of horse cavalry, which appears to have been used to
cover and protect rear areas, the Kalmuck Steppes—largely
barren, flat, and only thinly inhabited.
On 24 November the Russians near Chernyshevsk
completed the destruction of three infantry divisions,
apparently the three which had been in line when the
Russian offensive started. All three Division Headquarters,
including commanding generals and staffs, were captured.
The Panzer Division, unreported for this day, apparently
escaped.
The Germans in the Don Loop had during the night
made long marches to their new positions. Their
disappearance from the Don River was soon noted, and
Russian troops crossed over on the ice from Sirotinskaya to
Trekh Ostrovyanskaya. As they do not seem to have been
prepared to undertake an immediate pursuit, the Axis
troops made good progress.
The Russian force (f) still held Abganerova. The
detachment east of the railroad advanced southward and
reached without serious interference the line Nebikov
(exc.)—Sadovoe (inc.).
The Russians claim that they took this day
12,000 prisoners,
5,000 horses,
3,940 trucks, and
1,164 guns,
while the enemy lost another 14,000 killed in the main
battles west and south of Stalingrad.
Another minor attack was started by the Russians. The
Axis troops around Stalingrad seem to have detached
troops to move westward toward the Don, in rear of the
German barrier line which extended from near Kachalino
eastward to the Volga, in order to succor the troops retiring
from the Don Loop. Taking advantage of this situation, the
Russians in the north section of Stalingrad broke out close
to the Volga River and rapidly advanced northward.
Another Russian force similarly broke through the barrier
line, also close to the Volga, and pushed southward. The
two forces effected a junction in the vicinity of Dubovka.
This success enabled much-needed materiel and supplies to
be sent to the troops in Stalingrad.
The Russian troops of attack (d) did not stop after their
capture of the remnants of the three Axis divisions—they
started outward in all directions. Some went eastward after
the Axis withdrawing from the Loop, others south, while
still others went back north and northeast, after isolated
Axis troops who had been by-passed in the advance and
were still holding out. No serious fighting occurred, but the
troops moving south reached the railroad from Lobachev to
Surovikino (both inclusive).
By morning of the 25th the Russians seem to have
fairly well established the intentions of the enemy,
except that it was apparently believed that the Germans
and their allies withdrawing from the Loop would go
south. Consequently offensive (d) moved eastward along
the railroad as far as Maksomov and Richkov,