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PERIMETERS in PARAGRAPHS (Based upon latest information available at date of writing, and subject to correction as more complete reports are received.) By Col. Conrad H. Lanza The General Situation and Psychological War On December 27, 1942, General Hideki Tojo (Premier of Japan) addressed his parliament, reviewing the general situation after one year of war. He discussed Manchukuo, stating that in view of the constantly changing conditions in the world, Japan had strongly reinforced her army facing Siberia and was prepared to meet any hostile move which might appear in this direction. He was aware that the Allies had accumulated a large army in India, estimated by him as around 1,000,000 men with 600 planes. Obviously this was a threat against the Japanese in Burma, and appropriate measures had been taken to take care of this. He did not, however, believe that all these enemy troops in India could be made available against the Japanese, intimating that some of them were anti-British. The United States and China were jointly engaged in an air campaign in south China. He estimated this force as some 300 planes, which in six months had made 30 aid raids, or about one a week. He considered that the Chinese army amounted to 3,600,000 men. With a fraction of this force the Japanese could contain this enemy. He paid an indirect compliment to the efficiency of American operations in the southwest Pacific by acknowledging that it was exceedingly difficult for Japan to supply her troops in the Solomon Islands area. As for Kiska, the continuous attacks on that island by American planes based on Dutch Harbor had led to almost unbelievable privations to the garrison. As to the economic state of Japan, he was glad to report that 1,800,000 tons of raw materials had been brought into Japan from conquered areas. From this point of view Japan was now assured of all raw material she needed, and could continue the war (so far as supplies were concerned) indefinitely. Tojo was aware of plans of the democracies to attack Japan. He knew about the American desire to bomb Japanese cities and was taking measures to meet this eventuality. He was also prepared to act against attacks by ground or sea forces, wherever they might occur. On the whole he considered that the war had but just started, and was making his plans accordingly. 216 Four days after Tojo's speech, Hitler made a New Year's broadcast to the German people. He acknowledged that this winter might be hard. It could not, however, be worse than the preceding one. The German army had recovered from that, during the ensuing summer had made great gains, and its hour would arrive again after the current winter had passed and gone. He was aware of the American production campaign—but he had one of his own. He did not explain what it was, but claimed that in due time its achievements would be known to all. He expressed his determination to fight on to the end. Reviewing the statements made by the leaders of our enemies in Japan and in Europe, both are aware of the American program of production, to be followed by campaigns to crush Germany and Japan in turn. Both Hitler and Tojo realize the danger that confronts them, and both are taking measures to do what they can to prepare for our attack when it comes. Japan is preparing against attacks from Siberia, in China, against Burma, from the Solomon Islands, and from the Aleutian Islands. She does not know from which direction the attack will come. She has therefore had to strengthen her forces in widely separated places, on the circumference of an enormous circle, with the probability that she may find herself finally strong where there is no attack and weak where there is. This is the disadvantage of adopting a strategical defensive plan. Hitler is up against the same situation in Europe. He is aware that large forces are being accumulated in the British Isles. It is plain that these might be used against any part of west Europe, with its 1,800 miles of coast from the North Cape to the Pyrenees. He has had to detail troops to watch this coast for a long time, but it is now necessary to strengthen them. The arrival of Anglo-American forces in north Africa forces the Axis to detail more troops to cover the very extensive coasts of south Europe, another 1,200 miles exclusive of islands which will probably be defended and are in fact occupied. Without having opened any Second Front in Europe, the threat to do so has forced the detail of so many troops to watch such extensive conquests that the
1943 PERIMETERS IN PARAGRAPHS 217 Axis forces in Russia have been too weak to hold the attacking Russians. The psychological effect of growing American production and of the accumulation of troops near Europe, has helped Russia probably more than an actual invasion of Europe would have. This has been accentuated by continuous and well directed propaganda properly distributed or broadcast throughout Europe, to the effect that the troops of the United Nations are on the way in overwhelming strength. Constant information as to our intentions to reconstruct the freed countries (and Axis countries as well), as soon as our victory is complete, has led to the belief that it is but a question of time until the Allied troops will police the entire world. This psychological campaign, consisting of production advertised to the whole world, accumulation of troops at places where they are a positive threat to our enemies, and of adroitly disseminated propaganda, has resulted in the Axis being now on the strategic defensive everywhere, with all the disadvantages such a policy engenders. So far as the United States is concerned this situation has been brought about with extremely small loss of life. Our policy has encouraged the peoples of occupied countries to maintain a spirit of opposition to their temporary conquerors. The rapidity with which large French forces in north Africa joined the Allies once they had arrived, is an indication of what can be expected when landings are made on continental Europe. It is a warning to the Axis. Toward the end of January the general situation is for the Allies, probably the best it has been at any time. It would seem that the Russian successes have caused enormous losses to the German armies, so large that some believe the Germans will never be able to rally again. This is possible, but not proved. In 1941 the Russians sustained even larger losses, and they have been able to stage a decided come-back; it would be rash to assume that the Germans could not do the same. The truth is that there is no precise information as to Russian losses, and rather incomplete information as to German losses in the Russian war. Russian losses will determine the length of time their offensive can be continued before it becomes British troops have closed in on the Japanese forces along the coast of the Bay of Bengal. The present line is the Mayu River, which enters the sea just northwest of Akyab. This front is now fairly active, though without any major offensive being in progress. Main forces are at Rathedaung and south thereof. Minor raids and extensive patrol actions by both sides are frequent. British and American air forces are raiding Burma daily. Special attention is being given to attacking transportation. This includes not only bridges, an old target, but also SOUTHEAST ASIA exhausted, and the same may be said as to the Axis defense. Without knowing what the strengths of the opposing armies are, and what losses and replacements they are receiving, it is only possible to watch while avoiding prophecies. Information (not yet confirmed) is that the Germans, and presumably including their vassal states, are raising 2,000,000 new troops. It seems quite certain that the Axis is raising some new troops, and it is not impossible that the quoted figure may be correct. There is no reliable report as to when these new troops will be ready. From Hitler's broadcast it would seem that they are for use next summer, and that prior to this time Hitler will accept losses of terrain in Russia as he did a year earlier. From the economic standpoint the Axis army in south Russia appears to have been largely rationed off the country, which did not this year contribute any substantial amount of food or industrial products to Germany. The German plan does, however, provide for large receipts of both food and industrial products from the Ukraine during 1943. This is of course contingent upon the ability of the Axis to hold the Ukraine against the Russian advance. Germany appears to have been moving industrial plants from west Germany, where they are subject to being bombed, to eastern territories. German workmen who a year ago objected to following the machinery eastward, are reported now to be more than willing to move out of the Rhine lands. How much progress has been made by Germany in transferring its industries to locations not likely to be bombed is not known; it is probably substantial. The Axis submarine campaign is continuing, and is taking a large toll of Allied ships. Exact figures can not be published, but the enemy submarine still remains a serious pest of the seas. Besides the loss of ships, there is the loss of cargoes and some loss of trained seamen, who are becoming difficult to replace. The anti-submarine campaign is being pushed and submarines are being exterminated. Unfortunately, Axis replacements appear to be increasing, and the number of enemy submarines raiding in the shipping lanes of the Atlantic Ocean is reported to be larger than ever. locomotives, barges, sampans, small river craft, and in fact anything that can carry a cargo. This type of attack, which started in Europe, with similar forays in north France and the Low Countries, is becoming general as a major air activity. Japanese air attacks in India are increasing in number. Several raids have been made on Calcutta and others on Chittagong, a base for the troops now along the Mayu River. Although these attacks have caused casualties and some damage, they have not influenced the general situation.
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FIELD ARTILLERY GUIDE • Designed
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