the field artillery journal - Fort Sill - U.S. Army

224 THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL March
had been abandoned there was no longer any need for the
Stalingrad garrison to maintain an offensive. The Russian
Twenty-first Army, judging that the change indicated
approaching exhaustion, demanded surrender of the city on
January 8th. This being refused, the Russians promptly
commenced a series of attacks to capture the city as
quickly as possible. Stalingrad is an important railroad
center and, except in winter, a depot for supplies arriving
by water. Its retention in Axis hands, in addition to
requiring troops for a siege, so complicates supply matters
that early reduction of this place is desirable. Latest news is
that the German lines have been reduced by advances
mainly eastwardly from the Don River, and by a widening
of the wedge within Stalingrad. Present Axis lines are
about 20 miles to a side.
Net results of the series of Russian offensives around
Stalingrad are that
a. Large progress has been made in reducing Stalingrad.
b. von Mannstein's relief army has been driven back about 100
miles to the Manych River, and is now 200 miles away from
Stalingrad.
c. The Axis armies west of Stalingrad have been pushed back to
the vicinity of the Derku River, and are also now some 200 miles from
Stalingrad.
These results are the result of a series of coordinated
campaigns which started in mid-November. Taking an
average, the Russian advance has been just about 100 miles
a month.
THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE IN NORTH CAUCASIA
At mid-December, 1942, the Germans in north Caucasia
held a line Mozdok — Malgobek — Elkhotovo — Alagir,
all inclusive. This sector had been active, but not unduly
so. The Russians assembled an army under Lieut. Gen.
Maslenikov, with instructions to drive the enemy out of
Caucasia. If this could be done soon enough, and succeed
in passing beyond Tikhoretsk, it would cut the line of
supplies by rail to von Mannstein's army south of
Stalingrad. These supplies arrived by water at Novorossisk,
Yeisk, and Rostov. There was a rail cut-off north of
Tikhoretsk, but this place if captured would provide a base
for interrupting this line.
Maslenikov started with a series of attacks commencing
December 13th. The first heavy attack was delivered on the
16th. It was in two parts—on the north, up the Terek
valley; and in the south (separated from the north attack by
a range of hills), against the front Ardon-Alagir. The north
attack made some progress but the south one failed. Both
attacks were renewed on the 18th and 19th, and neither
succeeded. On the 22nd the Germans launched an attack in
the north sector: after an artillery preparation, armored
troops broke through the Russian lines and captured about
400 prisoners. The Germans made no effort to continue on,
their object having been to break up enemy offensive
intentions.
On December 24th the Russian south attack was
renewed. It captured the line Ardon-Alagir, and pushed
ahead. A Russian north attack failed again, the assaulting
troops being stopped by German artillery. In the south
sector the Russians moved on, and on the 28th captured
Elkhotovo in a hard battle. Once more in the north sector a
Russian attack broke down in front of the Mozdok-
Malgobek line.
About this date the situation of von Mannstein's army
was such that German GHQ foresaw its eventual
withdrawal to the south. Should this happen, it would be
impracticable to maintain the large area now held in
Caucasia, so orders were issued to withdraw from the
Mozdok-Malgobek front and south thereof; the Axis troops
commenced to withdraw westward at once. In the south
sector the Russians followed closely, and there was daily
fighting between Axis rear guards and the pursuing
Russians. In the north sector the Russians failed to note the
withdrawal, and after the battle of the 28th spent several
days reorganizing and preparing for a new offensive.
It was not until January 3d, 1943, that the Russians
discovered that the enemy in the north sector was weak—
only a covering force. Russians thereupon occupied the
entire Mozdok-Malgobek line. As it was now apparent that
the enemy's retreat was general, orders were given to the
troops in the south sector to intensify the pursuit. This
resulted in taking Nalchik, after a hard fight, by a night
attack on 4/5 January. This town was about 45 miles west
from the Ardon-Alagir line, giving about a 4-mile average
daily rate of advance for the 11 days. This part of the
country is much cut up with numerous stream lines (which
were not frozen over), swamps, and hills, and afforded
numerous excellent positions for rear-guard actions. On
January 5th the north and south offensives joined into a
single front by the occupation of Prokhladnaya, 30 miles
from Mozdok.
The Germans were now aware that the Russians knew
they were withdrawing. They commenced to burn all towns
and villages as they fell back, to demolish bridges, obstruct
roads, and plant thousands of land mines to prevent close
pursuit by armored troops. There was a series of continuing
rear-guard actions, during which the Russians claim they
killed thousands of Axis troops. By the 11th the Russians
had reached the Kuma River along the line Budenovsk—
Arkhangelskoe—Aleksandrisk—Georgievsk —
Mineralyne Vodi — Pyatigorsk — Kislovodsk. This was a
50-mile advance in 7 days. Both sides were extending their
north flanks—the Russians to turn the enemy's left and the
Germans to prevent this. The south flanks rested on the
Caucasus Mountains, where turning movements were
impracticable.
The Russians very promptly secured a bridgehead over
the Kuma on the 12th, near Yessentuki in the south sector,
and crossed at several places in the north sector. Resistance
was less in the north, and by the 14th this wing of the
Russians was on the line Novo Selitskoe—Sablinskoe—
Kumagorsky. This was a maximum advance of 30 miles
from the Kuma.
On January 17th the Russian main body was at Kursavka,