the field artillery journal - Fort Sill - U.S. Army

1943 THE AUTUMN, 1942, CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA 193
On 16 December the Germans completed the capture of
the remainder of a Russian force which had been encircled
southeast of Toropets about a week earlier. It appears to
have been the better part of a division protecting a large
park and dump of guns and ammunition. About 4,000
prisoners were taken.
In the following ten days considerable hard fighting
continued on this north front, in which both sides
undertook local offensives. Changes in the line did not
alter the general situation, which at the close of December
remained in a fluid condition.
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE ON THE MIDDLE DON
Due to the late date on which this started, only a brief
description can now be given. This offensive was a
modification of items (c) and (g) of the original plan. In
view of the success of the Stalingrad offensive, it was
decided to extend this to the west. Two new offensives
were prepared:
1st: Under General Batukhins, on a front of about 60 miles along
the Don, from west of V. Mamon to the vicinity of Kazansk. To
advance southwest to the railroad north of Millerovo.
2nd: Under General Philip Volkhov, on a front also of about 60
miles, based on the upper Chir valley. These troops were taken from
the same forces which had advanced south from Serafimovich in the
Stalingrad offensive. They were now to move generally west, with
their left directed on Millerovo.
The front to be attacked had been unusually active for
several weeks, with constant raids and minor attacks.
These had enabled the Russians to obtain considerable
information concerning the defenses the enemy had. On the
Don, where there had been time to organize in regular
positions, Axis troops had four lines of resistance in a
depth of 10 miles. This was lightly held, there being about
14 divisions in line in the 120-mile front selected for the
attack. In rear, but some distance away, were an
undetermined number of Panzer divisions in corps and
army reserve. All villages had been prepared for defense.
There was much wire. Some sections had mine fields in
their foreground. In rear of the Don was a novel obstacle:
instead of tank ditches, tank walls had been erected of
snow, ice, and earth which had frozen into a thick, solid
mass.
The weather favored the Russian preparations for their
offensive. Frequent snow falls and constant lowlying
clouds impeded air observation. As far as now known, the
Axis were not expecting an attack along the Don. They
probably were along the Chir valley.
On 16 December the Russians opened a terrific artillery
preparation which overwhelmed the Axis positions along
the Don. It was so heavy and accurate that the Russian OPs
saw the infantry evacuating their positions to escape the
artillery fire. Russian infantry thereupon crossed the Don
on the ice, while the artillery shifted its fire to the enemy's
next line of resistance. Engineer troops laid light pontoon
material on top of the ice, whereby artillery and armored
vehicles were soon able to follow the infantry across the
Don.
The enemy's second line also was abandoned under the
artillery fire. The Russian infantry were equipped with
scaling ladders by which they crossed the ice wall all along
its length. Engineers breached it, to allow the batteries and
tanks to go through. Tanks now took the lead, and got far
ahead of the infantry. The latter bypassed strong points and
pushed along after their tanks, but at the end of the day had
not caught up with them. The net result was that the Axis
line along the Don had been pierced on the whole 60-mile
front, less islands of resistance still holding out. Part of the
troops holding this sector were Italians.
Along the Chir valley the Russian attack made not quite
such great gains, but it got over the river and made a
substantial start. The temperature on this day was — 13°
F., the sky was clear, yet neither side mentions any special
air activity. The low temperature favored an attack by
armored troops, as the ground was so solidly frozen that
even the heaviest tanks could move across country in all
directions.
The German High Command ordered strong air forces to
the new theater of operations; they intervened on the 17th.
German ground forces were ordered assembled south and
southeast of Rossosh, with a view of taking the northern
Russian offensive from its rear. Other steps not yet known
were undoubtedly taken also.
The details of the next few days' battles can at this time
only be outlined. The Russian north attack made the
greatest advances: it maintained its front of about 60 miles,
and on 19 December was attacking south on an east-west
line through Kantemirovka, which had been an Axis depot;
this was an advance of 35 to 40 miles. The Chir valley
attack had been narrowed to a 12 mile front, and had
advanced about 20 miles in a generally westward direction.
This advance appears to have been due to a withdrawal of
the Axis troops, in view of the situation created by the
advance of the Russian north offensive. It also lost heavily,
German reports showing that on this day it had lost over
100 tanks while the Russian north offensive only lost 20.
As against their own losses the Russians report that to
include the 19th, the two offensives had met (and identified
in line) 13½ infantry and 1 Panzer divisions which together
had lost
84 tanks,
1,102 guns, and
2,720 trucks.
The relatively low Axis loss of tanks indicates that there
was not much armor behind the lines in this area.
On 20 December the Russian north offensive made
another formal attack, using the artillery which had now
come up for a strong preparation. This attack once again
broke through the German lines on nearly the whole front.
The main Russian force reached Chertkovo, with advanced
elements at Degteva. In view of this success the German
High Command ordered withdrawal of the 4 divisions facing
the Chir valley and of about 10 divisions north of Millerovo.