the field artillery journal - Fort Sill - U.S. Army

1943 PERIMETERS IN PARAGRAPHS 225
having made 40 miles in 7 days. The right wing,
continuously extending itself to the north, reached
Petrovskoe on the 19th. The Russians claim that in this
campaign they captured much booty, but there were no
large captures of prisoners. The Germans claim to have
shot down a considerable number of Russian armored
vehicles. At this date there is no confirmation of the
claims of either side.
VELIKIE LUKI
This German strong point has been under attack by the
Russians since November 25, 1942. It was part of a
general offensive which at the start covered the line from
Velikie Luki to as far east as Rzhev and Kalinin. With the
exception of the V. Luki sector, this offensive has been
stalled. V. Luki is a railroad town, surrounded by a ring
of fortifications. According to the Russian account, after
numerous attempts over a considerable period of time
they broke through the ring and entered the town on
January 1st. They offered terms of surrender to the
garrison, were refused, and thereupon exterminated the
garrison. The Germans at the time denied that V. Luki
had fallen, whereupon the Russians announced that all
Germans were liars and nothing they said should ever be
believed. The truth appears to be that the Russians did
capture the town, but did not at that time capture the
central work (which was near the town) and had not taken
all of the ring.
The Germans sent a relief expedition toward V. Luki to
recapture it. The initial approach was from the southwest,
and it made some progress before it was stopped. A
second approach was then made from the northwest, with
about the same results. The Germans then gave up the
attempt. Instead, on the night 15/16 January the garrison
of V. Luki evacuated their lines and broke out to the west,
regaining their main army. Russian armored troops
intervened to stop the escaping Germans. According to
the German reports the Russians were repulsed after
losing 47 tanks. However, the Russians secured V. Luki,
which will make an important strong point for them in
this sector.
LENINGRAD
Leningrad has been under attack since the autumn of
1941. It has at no time been entirely encircled. Across
Lake Ladoga water transportation in summer, and overthe-ice
transportation in winter, have been maintained.
This was not a satisfactory method, and the city suffered
greatly from lack of food, fuel, etc. It seems to have
always had ample ammunition (some of which was
manufactured locally) and to have received replacements
from time to time.
Several times the Russians have attempted to relieve
the situation by opening a land route into Leningrad. The
regular method was to attack south of Lake Ladoga, close
to the shore line. Facing Leningrad, the German line
started at Schluesselburg near Lake Ladoga on the east
bank of the Neva River, thence generally southward.
Facing in the opposite direction, that is toward the east,
was another German line along the west bank of the
Volkhov River, whose mission was to keep the Russians
on the outside from breaking into Leningrad. The two
German lines were back to back and roughly about 50
miles apart. The banks of the two rivers are rather high
and steep, and had been prepared for defense by
construction of usual trench and wire systems.
The Russians followed the same plan as on previous
occasions. The Russians on the outside would attack
across the Volkhov westwardly, while the Russians inside
Leningrad would attack eastwardly. The fronts of the two
attacks (which were to be delivered simultaneously) were
about 10 miles each. Although the general Russian plan
was the same as before, tactical details were materially
changed in view of the experience gained from previous
failures.
The Russians enormously increased the amount of
artillery. There appear to have been at least 200 guns to
the mile of front. The artillery preparation started at
daylight on January 12th. At the latitude of Leningrad,
this was after 0900. It is described as a tremendous fire,
which completely overcame and demoralized the German
defenders. The 10-mile fronts were each held by about 2
German divisions, had not over 2,000 men per mile of
front, and were comparatively weak in artillery, having
only about 45 guns per mile of front. The artillery
preparation ended at 1130. Initial assault troops were
engineers who crossed the river on the ice and established
bridgeheads within 10 minutes. Due to the steep heights
the engineers were defiladed from enemy fire, and under
cover of the artillery established paths up the banks over
which light artillery could be hauled by using ropes.
When everything was ready, light artillery crossed the
rivers on the ice ahead of the infantry, and with the help
of the engineers was hauled up into position on the far
banks while the main force of artillery maintained
protective barrages. When the light artillery was prepared
to give direct support to the infantry, the latter crossed the
rivers and the attack proceeded in the regular manner.
Neither side seems to have used armored troops in this
battle.
Details of the ensuing fighting are not yet at hand. The
two Russian attacks were coordinated by an advance
section of Russian GHQ, at which the two Russian
Marshals Zhukov and Voroshilov issued daily directives
to their two armies. The result was the accomplishment of
the mission on January 18th, when the two Russian
attacks met and thereby opened the road into Leningrad.
It was a great success, and well handled.