the field artillery journal - Fort Sill - U.S. Army

Landing operations differ considerably from normal land
warfare in that at the start of the operation our troops have
no prepared positions from which to launch their offensive.
They have no artillery emplaced which can support their
attack. The infantry can move up to the beach in small boats
and be ready to come out of them fighting upon arrival there,
but our artillery cannot sit out in the water and support their
attack. However, the guns of the Navy can and do sit out in
the water and deliver effective fire on shore targets.
In order that shore targets for naval guns be attacked
with as much speed and efficiency as possible, a "Naval
Shore Fire Control Party" has been developed. This party
consists of one Artillery officer, one Naval officer, and a
communications detail of army personnel. The artillery
officer is the observer or spotter, and the naval officer acts
as adviser to the infantry battalion commander. It has been
proposed that this naval liaison officer bring a spare radio
set ashore so that he can, if the need arises, act as spotter.
The functions of these two officers are practically the same
as those of the forward observers and liaison officers of the
Field Artillery.
During the early stages of an amphibious operation, as
during the early stages of any action, there is great need for
fire support. Since field artillery cannot be expected ashore
until long after the landing has begun, some other agency
must supply the initial support. Aviation could do it, if it
could get land bases near enough the beaches to be
attacked. If you look back to the Dieppe raid, you will note
that planes were sent in great numbers from British
airdromes to afford both support and overhead protection.
Lacking these bases, carrier based planes might operate,
but the number of aircraft carriers available would
probably eliminate this as a source of support, mainly
because these planes must provide protection against
hostile aircraft. This leaves the guns of the Navy to do the
job, and as with all other phases of amphibious training the
Navy has anticipated this need. They have been training
their personnel so that when the time comes the men of the
Navy will be fully able to cooperate with the soldiers who
must make the actual landing.
212
NAVAL
GUNFIRE
In Support of Landing
Operations
By Lt. Robert H. Bingham, FA and
Ensign Herbert C. Manning, U.S.N.R.
The problems of the shore fire by naval guns are readily
compared with some of those found in field artillery. First,
the relative position of ship and target must be known. This
is what the artillery's survey section is concerned with in
tieing in guns and target areas. Where we often use relative
positions of the guns and targets, as on a grid sheet survey,
the Navy uses the true positions of both ship and target.
The problem of locating the ship is solved on the
navigation bridge. Its exact position may be found at any
instant by taking bearings on prominent points along the
shore line. These points are accurately located on the
navigational charts which the ship uses, and by a method
similar to the artillery's "back azimuth," the position of the
ship can be plotted. Once the ship's position is known the
relative position of the ship and the shore is always known.
And since the fire control equipment on the ship can
constantly correct for the known movement of the ship, as
well as for currents, roll and pitch, and wind, we can forget
about this constant changing of position.
The normal target fired on by the Shore Fire Control
Party cannot be seen from the ship. In this respect, the
problem is exactly the same as an artillery forward
observation problem. The spotter must designate the target
to the ship.
GUNFIRE SPOTTER
Once the spotter is ashore he functions almost as does
an artillery forward observer. He looks for an observation
post, and as soon as he finds one his communications
detail gets radio contact with the supporting ship. Now he
is ready to support the action of the advancing infantry.
As previously mentioned, he designates his target by
means of coordinates. The reason for this is because the
ship keeps no firing chart comparable to the one kept by
the artillery fire direction center. Once a target is fired,
"plot" (as the fire direction center of the ship is called)
forgets all about it. For each problem, the ship must
recheck its position, consequently data from
concentrations fired previously would hardly be of