the field artillery journal - Fort Sill - U.S. Army

PERIMETERS
in
PARAGRAPHS
(Based upon latest information available at date of writing, and subject to correction as more complete reports are received.)
By Col. Conrad H. Lanza
The General Situation and Psychological War
On December 27, 1942, General Hideki Tojo (Premier
of Japan) addressed his parliament, reviewing the general
situation after one year of war. He discussed Manchukuo,
stating that in view of the constantly changing conditions
in the world, Japan had strongly reinforced her army
facing Siberia and was prepared to meet any hostile move
which might appear in this direction. He was aware that
the Allies had accumulated a large army in India,
estimated by him as around 1,000,000 men with 600
planes. Obviously this was a threat against the Japanese
in Burma, and appropriate measures had been taken to
take care of this. He did not, however, believe that all
these enemy troops in India could be made available
against the Japanese, intimating that some of them were
anti-British.
The United States and China were jointly engaged in an
air campaign in south China. He estimated this force as
some 300 planes, which in six months had made 30 aid
raids, or about one a week. He considered that the Chinese
army amounted to 3,600,000 men. With a fraction of this
force the Japanese could contain this enemy.
He paid an indirect compliment to the efficiency of
American operations in the southwest Pacific by
acknowledging that it was exceedingly difficult for Japan
to supply her troops in the Solomon Islands area. As for
Kiska, the continuous attacks on that island by American
planes based on Dutch Harbor had led to almost
unbelievable privations to the garrison. As to the economic
state of Japan, he was glad to report that 1,800,000 tons of
raw materials had been brought into Japan from conquered
areas. From this point of view Japan was now assured of
all raw material she needed, and could continue the war (so
far as supplies were concerned) indefinitely.
Tojo was aware of plans of the democracies to attack
Japan. He knew about the American desire to bomb
Japanese cities and was taking measures to meet this
eventuality. He was also prepared to act against attacks by
ground or sea forces, wherever they might occur. On the
whole he considered that the war had but just started, and
was making his plans accordingly.
216
Four days after Tojo's speech, Hitler made a New Year's
broadcast to the German people. He acknowledged that this
winter might be hard. It could not, however, be worse than
the preceding one. The German army had recovered from
that, during the ensuing summer had made great gains, and
its hour would arrive again after the current winter had
passed and gone. He was aware of the American
production campaign—but he had one of his own. He did
not explain what it was, but claimed that in due time its
achievements would be known to all. He expressed his
determination to fight on to the end.
Reviewing the statements made by the leaders of our
enemies in Japan and in Europe, both are aware of the
American program of production, to be followed by
campaigns to crush Germany and Japan in turn. Both Hitler
and Tojo realize the danger that confronts them, and both
are taking measures to do what they can to prepare for our
attack when it comes.
Japan is preparing against attacks from Siberia, in China,
against Burma, from the Solomon Islands, and from the
Aleutian Islands. She does not know from which direction
the attack will come. She has therefore had to strengthen
her forces in widely separated places, on the circumference
of an enormous circle, with the probability that she may
find herself finally strong where there is no attack and
weak where there is. This is the disadvantage of adopting a
strategical defensive plan.
Hitler is up against the same situation in Europe. He is
aware that large forces are being accumulated in the British
Isles. It is plain that these might be used against any part of
west Europe, with its 1,800 miles of coast from the North
Cape to the Pyrenees. He has had to detail troops to watch
this coast for a long time, but it is now necessary to
strengthen them. The arrival of Anglo-American forces in
north Africa forces the Axis to detail more troops to cover
the very extensive coasts of south Europe, another 1,200
miles exclusive of islands which will probably be defended
and are in fact occupied. Without having opened any Second
Front in Europe, the threat to do so has forced the detail of
so many troops to watch such extensive conquests that the