the field artillery journal - Fort Sill - U.S. Army

1943 THE AUTUMN, 1942, CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA 187
On 30 September, 1942, Hitler in his Stalingrad speech
said in part,
"We have prepared a very simple program:
1st—we must under all circumstances hold whatever must be
held. That is to say, we must let the others attack as much as they
wish, wherever we have no intention to advance. We must hold
everything, and wait and see who tires the soonest.
2nd—we must attack under all circumstances where attack is
necessary.
"The occupation of Stalingrad . . . will become a gigantic success . .
. no human being will push us away from that spot. . .
"We are mainly interested in obtaining this great space [Russia] to
render it usable for our war, also for the feeding of our people;
together with the securing of raw materials for the maintenance of all
Europe."
When this speech was made it was commonly heralded
as a sign of German exhaustion or approaching exhaustion.
It was believed to be a definite abandonment of the
offensive by the Axis, due to sheer inability to continue.
Perhaps this was to some extent so, but it is probable that
the Sportspalast speech had been carefully prepared in
advance and indeed marked a change in the Axis
strategical plan, although not exactly along the line which
at the time was attributed to it.
About the time of the speech, there was regroupment of
Axis forces in Russia. It was similar to what had occurred in
December, 1941, when the German offensive of that year
was suspended for the coming winter. Experience at that
time had indicated that when major changes in battle lines
are initiated after winter commences, there are great losses
of men, supplies, and materiel. The 1941-1942 season had
been unusually severe; the freezing of motor transportation
had in turn caused the abandonment of notable quantities of
artillery and stores. So this year, the decision was to
complete any required changes before winter started.
Two minor exceptions were made: first, a limited
offensive on a narrow front was continued against a part of
Stalingrad still held by the Russians as a bridgehead on the
west side of the Volga River; second, another limited
offensive was pushed in Caucasia, in the vicinity of the
Terek River, with the mission of gaining the
Ordzhonikidze oil region and at the same time closing the
north exit of the main pass over the Caucasus mountains
leading to Tiflis.
Elsewhere a general defensive, strategical and tactical,
was to be maintained, though this did not exclude minor
offensive operations to improve the line, to secure
identifications, and to harass the enemy. Many divisions
were withdrawn from line, which was comparatively
lightly held. The front was prepared for defense as well as
time and means permitted. Great dependence was placed
on the Air Fleets which, held in reserve, were ready to
furnish aid on an hour's notice to any sector which needed
help.
Hitler (and presumably also the Axis High Command)
either wanted the Russians to attack or were indifferent to
their doing so. They felt it would be more advantageous to
let the Russians come to them than to go chasing after
natives who could avoid combat by retiring indefinitely
into their own country. The Sportspalast speech was an
invitation to the Russians to come on and attack: the Axis
hoped that this might result in the complete annihilation of
the Russian armies during the winter of 1942-1943, on
ground selected by the Axis. If this plan succeeded it
would leave the Axis armies free to meet any Anglo-
American invasion that might come, and which it was
believed would not occur before the spring of 1943.
THE RUSSIAN PLAN
Russia accepted Hitler's challenge. It was willing and
even anxious to assume the offensive, if given the time to
prepare. Russia had the mission, ardently desired by all
Russian peoples, to expel the invader from their territories
at an early a date as practicable. The Russian armies were
willing to fight regardless of winter or other conditions.
Notwithstanding numerous previous defeats their morale
was high. Due to materiel and supplies received from Great
Britain and the United States the armies were well
equipped. The leadership was entirely Russian. As far as is
now known the proposed winter campaigns were planned
by Russian staffs, without help from their Allies. It was
decided to start major offensives in several sectors, as soon
as possible.
On 30 September (when Hitler's new policy was
promulgated) the Russians had already in preparation a
major offensive in the vicinity of Rzhev. This was to have
started early in October, but was greatly delayed for
reasons which will be discussed later. It was now decided
to prepare offensives as follows:
I. To relieve Moscow:
(a) The foregoing offensive near Rzhev, extended westward to
the vicinity of Velikie Luki, to advance southward to the line
Smolensk-Vyazma.
(b) A smaller offensive, east of Rzhev to Kalinin, to cover the
left of (a) as it advanced and ultimately to establish connection with
(c).
(c) An offensive starting southwest from Moscow (from the
vicinity of Maloyaroslavets) to advance westward toward Smolensk.
If (a) and (c) succeeded the enemy could be expected to withdraw
to the Dneiper River.
II. To relieve Stalingrad, reopen the Volga River route, and
free wheat lands much needed for food production in 1943:
(d) An offensive to cross the Don River in the vicinity of
Serafimovich would push south to the Chir River, where it turns
eastward, and then follow along the railroad toward Stalingrad.
(e) A smaller offensive starting from near Kachalino on the
Don River, covering the left of (d).
(f) An offensive starting south of the Volga, in the Kalmuck
steppe, in the vicinity of Malo Derbety, and moving west through
Abganerova. It would then turn north, its left swinging around to join
the right of (e) along the Don River. It would join in reducing
Stalingrad.
(g) An offensive starting on the Don River about opposite
Boguchar, and proceeding south down the Kalitva valley. This would
protect the right of (d), free valuable farm lands, and (in cooperation
with (d), especially if Stalingrad were reduced) might ultimately push
the enemy back to the Donets River.
According to Stalin's speech of 6 November, which
presumably represents the Russian opinion at that date, it
was believed that the principal Axis strength was on the
Don River, between Boguchar and Kachalino. According