Hvorfor vurderer erfarne klinikere så dårlig enda de - Universitetet i ...
Hvorfor vurderer erfarne klinikere så dårlig enda de - Universitetet i ...
Hvorfor vurderer erfarne klinikere så dårlig enda de - Universitetet i ...
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19<br />
positivisme å gjøre at man forsøker å finne måter å håndtere informasjon på som gir<br />
systematisk bedre resultater enn eget skjønn. Det dreier seg <strong>de</strong>rimot om skjebnen til <strong>de</strong>m<br />
man er satt til å vur<strong>de</strong>re og behandle, om etikk og profesjonell re<strong>de</strong>lighet.<br />
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