Hazar Raporu - Issue 01 - Fall 2012

secure 15% of the gas piped through
Nabucco or 4-8 bcm/y of the Azeri
gas to supply her domestic market was
considered as unacceptable. Ankara
found it exceedingly difficult to agree
to allow the passage of substantial
gas volumes across Turkish territory
without being able to access a portion
of these volumes for the Turkish
market.
For the first time Turkey will be a main
partner in a pipeline project and realize
her aim of becoming the fourth artery
of Europe in terms of natural gas. .
Whether the trans-Anatolia project also
involves gas storage in Turkey remains
an open question. Some remarks from
Azerbaijan at the signing ceremony
about marketing gas in Europe
together, may be read as implying some
storage in Turkey.
Implications for Georgia
Georgia enjoys a win-win position on
the transit route from Azerbaijan to
Turkey. The trans-Anatolia project,
at 16 bcm to 24 bcm annually,
presupposes at least doubling the
capacity of the pipeline through
Georgia, and at least trebling the gas
flow from the present level.
Fierce negotiations ahead
In the near future, Turkish-Azerbaijani
bilateral efforts will focus on working
out the details and mechanisms of the
TANAP agreements. This can give way
to lengthy negotiations. Commercial
considerations and pragmatic dealings
will prevail at the end of the day. The
continuation of the brother rhetoric in
this context carries the risk of blurring
the picture of each side’s own interest
and prerogatives which will become
irritating for both sides.
Importing low cost gas ranks high in
the list of BOTAŞ’s priority for Turkey’s
energy security. Noting Turkey’s
geographical location, BOTAŞ has been
opposed to paying the same price as
Central Europeans for gas produced
in the Caspian and Gulf regions and in
the Middle East. Turkish officials have
been insisting on purchasing the gas at
Turkey’s eastern border at a lower price.
On the contrary, Azerbaijan has an
interest in selling its gas at the highest
price.
Azerbaijan’s gas production will likely
reach 30 bcm/y by 2015 and 50 bcm/y
by 2025. The conditions of the transit
of the Azeri gas onwards the high value
European markets have to be clearly
settled. Turkey should be moving
towards formalizing a gas transit
regime. In the longer term, Turkey’s
aspiration to become an energy trading
hub as opposed to a merely physical
hub would imply the reselling of gas.
The negotiations ahead will take place
in a context where SOCAR will be
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