Barahin-e-Ahmadiyya-Parts1-2

92 Barahin-e-ahmadiyya
arises as to how and through which sure, perfect and easy means
can we arrive at such beliefs and discover arguments that will lead
us to absolute certainty? In answer, I would like to submit that the
certain, perfect and easy means of finding the true principles [of
salvation] and their supporting arguments with absolute certainty
which involves no toil or labour, nor admits of error, doubt, misgiving
or uncertainty, is the Holy Quran. There is no other book and no
other means through which we can achieve this great objective. ☆
☆ The statement that the holy Quran is the surest, easiest and most
perfect means of recognizing the true beliefs will be established with
conclusive evidence in due course, and the principles held by the followers
of other Books will also be shown to be false and misconceived.
But I would like to address the Brahmu Samajists here, who do not
believe in any revealed Book and consider their own reason sufficient
for ascertaining the truth. They may ask why reason should not be held
as the only sure and straightforward means for arriving at the truth.
Although I will deal with this misconception at greater length under
the discussion of divine revelation, I find it necessary to dispel this
misconception from the very start.
It is true that God has endowed man with the faculty of reason,
which, like a lamp, shows him the right path and dispels his doubts
and misconceptions. It is an extremely useful and essential faculty and
a great blessing. Nonetheless, it has one major flaw: it cannot, on its
own, take us to the level of absolute certainty with respect to the true
nature of things, for absolute certainty consists in knowing things as
they actually are. The best that reason can do is to postulate the need
for something to exist, but it cannot go further and confirm that it
does indeed exist. Perfect certainty, whereby we rise from the level of
‘should be’ to that of ‘is’ is only achieved when reason finds an ally
that is capable of confirming its speculative reasoning and bringing it
into the realm of perceptible facts; and where reason says, ‘it should
be,’ this ally is able to confirm, ‘it is.’ As I have already pointed out,
reason can only establish the need or requirement for something, and
not its actual existence, which are two separate things. Anyhow, reason
Footnote Number 4