The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville - Pot-pourri
The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville - Pot-pourri
The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville - Pot-pourri
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
72 II.ix.5–ix.18 <strong>Isidore</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Seville</strong><br />
(inductio) and inference (ratiocinatio). <strong>The</strong> parts <strong>of</strong><br />
induction are three: first the proposition (i.e. the major<br />
premise); second the ‘thing brought in’ (illatio, from<br />
inferre, “infer”), also called the ‘additional proposition’<br />
(assumptio,i.e. the minor premise); third the conclusion.<br />
5.Induction is that which in matters not liable to doubt<br />
demands assent when it is carried out, among philosophers<br />
or rhetoricians or people conversing. <strong>The</strong> major<br />
premise <strong>of</strong> an induction introduces (inducere) parallels,<br />
in one or more aspects, to the matter that must<br />
be granted. 6. <strong>The</strong>‘thing brought in’ <strong>of</strong> an induction,<br />
also called the minor premise, is that which introduces<br />
the matter in dispute for whose sake the parallels were<br />
used. <strong>The</strong> conclusion <strong>of</strong> an induction is that which either<br />
confirms what is granted in the minor premise, or states<br />
what may be deduced from it.<br />
Inference (ratiocinatio) isadiscourse by which what<br />
is in question is put to the test. 7.<strong>The</strong>reare two types <strong>of</strong><br />
inference. First is the enthymeme (enthymema), which<br />
is an incomplete syllogism, and used in rhetoric. <strong>The</strong><br />
second is the epichireme (epichirema), an unrhetorical,<br />
broader syllogism. 8. Hence‘enthymeme’ is translated<br />
into Latin ‘conception <strong>of</strong> the mind’ (conceptiomentis), 4<br />
and writers on the art usually call it an incomplete syllogism,<br />
because its form <strong>of</strong> argument consists <strong>of</strong> two<br />
parts, as it employs what aims to arouse conviction while<br />
bypassing the rule <strong>of</strong> syllogisms. For example: “If the<br />
storm is to be avoided, therefore one ought not sail.”<br />
Thus the argument is completed from the major premise<br />
and the conclusion alone, whence it is considered more<br />
appropriate for orators than logicians.<br />
9. <strong>The</strong>reare five branches <strong>of</strong> enthymeme: first the<br />
convincing, second the demonstrating, third the sententious,<br />
fourth the exemplifying, and fifth the collective<br />
(convincibilis, ostentabilis, sententialis, exemplabilis, collectivus).<br />
10. <strong>The</strong>convincing is that which convinces by<br />
manifest reason, as Cicero did in his Defense<strong>of</strong>Milo (79):<br />
“<strong>The</strong>refore you are sitting as avengers <strong>of</strong> the death <strong>of</strong> a<br />
man whose life you would not be willing to restore, even<br />
if you thought you could.” 11.<strong>The</strong>demonstrating is that<br />
which exerts control by means <strong>of</strong> an indisputable depiction<br />
(demonstratio) <strong>of</strong>the defendant, as Cicero in the<br />
Catiline Oration (1.2): “Still he lives; nay, he even comes<br />
into the senate.” <strong>The</strong> sententious is that which a general<br />
maxim (sententia)adduces, as in Terence (Andria 68):<br />
Flattery breeds friends; truth, hatred.<br />
12.<strong>The</strong> exemplifying is that which compares some other<br />
situation (exemplum), and by this means threatens that<br />
the outcome will be similar, as Cicero says in his Philippics<br />
(2.1): “I wonder, Antonius, that you do not tremble<br />
at the fates <strong>of</strong> those whose example you imitate.”<br />
13.<strong>The</strong>collectiveenthymeme collects (colligere,ppl. collectus)<br />
what has been argued into one, as Cicero says<br />
in his Defense <strong>of</strong> Milo(41): “Was he then willing to do,<br />
irritating some, what he was not willing to do with the<br />
gratitude <strong>of</strong> all? Did he have no hesitation in killing lawlessly,<br />
at an unpropitious place and time, risking his neck,<br />
a man he did not venture to kill with impunity, with the<br />
law, the place, and the time on his side?”<br />
14. Moreover there is another definition <strong>of</strong> the<br />
enthymeme, according to (Marius) Victorinus: from the<br />
major premise (propositio) alone, as has already been<br />
said, which is composed thus: “If the storm is to be<br />
avoided, one should not seek to sail.” 15. Orfromthe<br />
minor premise (assumptio) alone, as this: “If he is an<br />
enemy, he slays; moreover he [is] an enemy.” Because<br />
the conclusion is lacking here, it is called an enthymeme.<br />
16. Nextistheepichireme, deriving from inference as<br />
broader and more developed than rhetorical syllogisms,<br />
distinct in breadth and in length <strong>of</strong> utterance from logical<br />
syllogisms, for which reason it is given to the rhetoricians.<br />
This consists <strong>of</strong> three types: the first, <strong>of</strong> three parts;<br />
the second, <strong>of</strong> four parts; the third, <strong>of</strong> five parts.<br />
17.<strong>The</strong> three-part epichirematic syllogism consists <strong>of</strong><br />
three members: the major premise (propositio), minor<br />
premise (assumptio), and conclusion (conclusio). <strong>The</strong><br />
four-part type consists <strong>of</strong> four members: first the major<br />
premise, second the minor premise joined to the major<br />
premise or a minor premise, third the pro<strong>of</strong> (probatio),<br />
and the conclusion. 5 18. <strong>The</strong> five-part type accordingly<br />
has five members: first the major premise, second its<br />
pro<strong>of</strong>, third the minor premise, fourth its pro<strong>of</strong>, fifth the<br />
conclusion. Cicero putsitthusinhisart<strong>of</strong>rhetoric(On<br />
Invention 1.9): “If deliberation (deliberatio)anddemonstration<br />
(demonstratio) are kinds <strong>of</strong> arguments (causa),<br />
they cannot rightly be considered parts <strong>of</strong> any one kind<br />
<strong>of</strong> argument – for the same thing can be a kind <strong>of</strong> one<br />
thing and part <strong>of</strong> another, but not a kind and a part <strong>of</strong><br />
4 <strong>The</strong> term derives from the Greek + , ‘mind.’<br />
5 <strong>Isidore</strong>’s source here, Cassiodorus, makes sense in speaking <strong>of</strong><br />
the third part as the pro<strong>of</strong> joined to either the major or minor<br />
premise.