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Government of India Volume I: Analysis and Recommendations

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CHAPTER 7<br />

Resolution<br />

7.1. The problem<br />

The failure <strong>of</strong> large private financial firms can be highly disruptive for households that<br />

were customers <strong>of</strong> the failing firm, <strong>and</strong> for the economy as a whole. This might have been<br />

less important 20 years ago when the <strong>India</strong>n financial system was dominated by PSUs that<br />

rely on implicit financial support from the tax payer. As <strong>India</strong> has increasingly opened<br />

up entry into finance, <strong>and</strong> several large private financial firms have arisen, it becomes<br />

important to create mechanisms to deal with failing firms.<br />

Sound micro-prudential regulation will reduce the probability <strong>of</strong> firm failure. However,<br />

eliminating all failure is neither feasible nor desirable. Failure <strong>of</strong> financial firms is an<br />

integral part <strong>of</strong> the regenerative processes <strong>of</strong> the market economies: weak firms should<br />

fail <strong>and</strong> thus free up labour <strong>and</strong> capital that would then be utilised by better firms. However,<br />

it is important to ensure smooth functioning <strong>of</strong> the economy, <strong>and</strong> avoid disruptive<br />

firm failure.<br />

This requires a specialised ‘resolution mechanism’. A ‘resolution corporation’ would<br />

watch all financial firms that have made intense promises to households, <strong>and</strong> intervene<br />

when the net worth <strong>of</strong> the firm is near zero (but not yet negative). It would force the closure<br />

or sale <strong>of</strong> the financial firm, <strong>and</strong> protect small consumers either by transferring them to<br />

a solvent firm or by paying them. As an example, in <strong>India</strong>, customers <strong>of</strong> a failed bank are<br />

guaranteed the first Rs.1 lakh <strong>of</strong> their deposits as ‘deposit insurance’.<br />

At present, <strong>India</strong> has a deposit insurance corporation, the DICGC. However, the DICGC<br />

is not a resolution corporation; it deals only with banks; <strong>and</strong> is otherwise unable to play<br />

a role in the late days <strong>of</strong> a financial firm. This is a serious gap in the <strong>India</strong>n financial system.<br />

For all practical purposes, at present, an unceremonious failure by a large private<br />

financial firm is not politically feasible. Lacking a formal resolution corporation, in <strong>India</strong>,<br />

the problems <strong>of</strong> failing private financial firms will be placed upon customers, tax payers,<br />

<strong>and</strong> the shareholders <strong>of</strong> public sector financial firms. This is an unfair arrangement.<br />

Establishing a sophisticated resolution corporation is thus essential to strong responses<br />

to the possible failure <strong>of</strong> a large financial firm <strong>and</strong> its consequences for the <strong>India</strong>n<br />

economy. Drawing on international best practices, the Commission recommends a unified<br />

resolution corporation that will deal with an array <strong>of</strong> financial firms such as banks<br />

<strong>and</strong> insurance companies; it will not just be a bank deposit insurance corporation. The<br />

corporation will concern itself with all financial firms that make highly intense promises<br />

to consumers, such as banks, insurance companies, defined benefit pension funds, <strong>and</strong><br />

FINANCIAL SECTOR LEGISLATIVE REFORMS COMMISSION 69

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