Quantum Information Theory with Gaussian Systems
Quantum Information Theory with Gaussian Systems
Quantum Information Theory with Gaussian Systems
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5.3 Result and outlook<br />
5.3 Result and outlook<br />
The calculations of the previous sections culminate in the following proposition and<br />
provide its proof:<br />
Proposition 5.1:<br />
A private quantum channel <strong>with</strong> approximate security and discrete classical key<br />
can be realized for coherent states by randomization <strong>with</strong> isotropic, uncorrelated<br />
<strong>Gaussian</strong> noise. The protocol can be secured against all collective attacks, including<br />
coherent schemes, involving a finite number of output states by considering<br />
tensor products of input states. In particular, any two output states T(α), T(β) of<br />
the randomization T for tensor products |α〉〈α|, |β〉〈β| of N coherent states <strong>with</strong><br />
f modes each are nearly indistinguishable in the sense of arbitrarily small trace<br />
norm distance T(α) − T(β) 1 ≤ ǫ. This is accomplished by<br />
⊲ addition of <strong>Gaussian</strong> noise <strong>with</strong> uniform covariance g ≥ g(ǫ, Emax, Nf),<br />
⊲ restriction to a hypersphere of radius a ≥ a(g, Nf) in phase space and<br />
⊲ discretization to K = K(a, δ, Nf) hypercubes <strong>with</strong><br />
⊲ diagonal δ ≤ δ(a, g, Nf),<br />
where the exact values are established through Eqs.(5.18) and (5.20). The encryption<br />
scheme requires (log 2 K)/N classical bits of the discrete key per input state<br />
encrypted. Moreover, the phase space displacements determining the encryption<br />
operations are defined deterministically and implicitly. Hence no preparatory communication<br />
between sending and receiving parties is needed apart from exchange<br />
of the global parameters and the classical key.<br />
For the simplest case of single-mode coherent states <strong>with</strong>out consideration of correlations,<br />
the following corollary summarizes the more explicit results derived above:<br />
Corollary 5.2:<br />
For Nf = 1 the protocol guarantees security up to ǫ, i.e. T(α) − T(β) 1 ≤ ǫ,<br />
<strong>with</strong> the following parameter values:<br />
⊲ g ≥ 400 Emax/ǫ 2 ,<br />
⊲ a ≥ 40 √ 2Emax ǫ−1 log(20/ǫ) 1/2 ,<br />
⊲ δ ≤ ǫ<br />
√ <br />
3 2 −1,<br />
5 a /(4g ) + 2<br />
<br />
⊲ K = 16 log(20/ǫ) 2 √<br />
+ 80 Emax ǫ−1 log(20/ǫ) 1/2 2 .<br />
The above parameter values have been derived for a specific protocol and <strong>with</strong><br />
the help of several estimations; this leaves plenty of space for optimization. A few<br />
moretechnicalimprovements could be achieved by finding tighter estimations<br />
for the various steps of the computation or by optimizing the contributions of the<br />
terms in (5.18). A conceptual extension could include the application of correlated<br />
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