Competition Law in Italy The first 20 years of law and practice

Leniency Program, in December 2006 the Trombini Group formally applied for immunity.
During the investigation, the companies belonging to the Trombini Group were proactive
and provided additional documents and clarifications. Ultimately, the Competition Authority
decided to grant the Trombini Group a full immunity from fines. Moreover, the Competition
Authority granted a 30 percent reduction of the fines to the companies that cooperated
during the investigation “beyond their duty of cooperation under the existing law.” 145
Interestingly, when the Trombini Group first submitted evidence of the cartel activities,
the Italian Leniency Program had not yet been formally adopted.
44
146
Thus, by granting the
Trombini Group total immunity from fines, the Competition Authority has in substance
retroactively applied its Leniency Program, possibly with a view to quickly having a
precedent showing the benefits of such program.
(e) Penalties
(i) General
The Competition Authority closely follows the fining practice of the European
Commission, which is currently based on the 2006 Fining Guidelines. 147
The 2006 Fining Guidelines abandon the earlier classification of “minor,” “serious,”
and “very serious” infringements and the corresponding “likely fines” expressed in absolute
numbers. Indeed, through their reliance on the relevant turnover in the affected market, the
2006 Fining Guidelines potentially eliminate or at least significantly reduce the risk of
disproportionate fines for purely local cartels. It is still possible, however, that a fining
practice by the Competition Authority largely relying on the Commission’s 2006 Guidelines
would still result in significant fines. This is particularly true for hardcore infringements of a
longer duration. Under the new 2006 Fining Guidelines, the basic fine is increased by 100
148
percent for each year of duration of the infringement.
145 In relation to the reduction of the fines, the Competition Authority made no express reference to the
Leniency Notice but referred to a “mitigating circumstance.” Id. 265.
146 Before the adoption of the Leniency Notice, there was a sort of de facto leniency program in Italy.
For example, in Italesplosivi v. Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, 18 June 2004, n.
6760 (Trib. ammin. reg.), the TAR upheld the Competition Authority’s decision not to impose fines
on a cartel member that had materially contributed to the finding of the anticompetitive conduct.
147 Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines Imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No.
1/2003, 2006 O.J. (C 210) 2 [hereinafter 2006 Fining Guidelines].
148 2006 Fining Guidelines, § 24.