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Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary ... - Law Commission

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defendant may seek to maximise the size of any compensatory or restitutionary<br />

award. This would serve to maximise the part of a total award that is covered by<br />

insurance. In direct conflict with the interests of the defendant on this issue,<br />

however, are the interests of the insurers. This is because their interests would lie<br />

in minimising the size of any non-punitive award, the risk of which they must<br />

meet, <strong>and</strong> in maximising the size of any punitive award, the risk of which they need<br />

not meet. Undesirable consequences, in particular the need for three sets of legal<br />

representation (for defendant, plaintiff <strong>and</strong> insurers), might ensue. 800<br />

(c) The reasons for rejecting option 2: a public policy bar in the case of<br />

particularly outrageous conduct<br />

1.249 Option 2 was raised in one possible form before the Court of Appeal in Lancashire<br />

County Council v Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd. 801<br />

The defendant’s counsel<br />

argued that there should be a bar on insurance where the conduct which gave rise<br />

to the award of exemplary damages was criminal in nature. The Court of Appeal<br />

left open what should be the proper approach to cases involving the personal<br />

liability of defendants, but it rejected an option 2 approach, <strong>and</strong> adopted an option<br />

1 approach, in relation to vicarious liability. 802<br />

1.250 We consider, however, that option 1, <strong>and</strong> not option 2, is the correct approach to<br />

adopt in relation to both personal <strong>and</strong> vicarious liability. This is so whether the<br />

appropriate characterisation of the cases in which a public policy bar applies is, for<br />

example, ‘especially outrageous conduct’ or ‘conduct constituting a criminal<br />

offence’. In addition to the five positive reasons given above for favouring option<br />

1, we consider that there are three specific reasons for rejecting option 2.<br />

(i) The greater need to preserve a financial reason for plaintiffs to claim punitive<br />

damages in the case of particularly outrageous conduct<br />

1.251 First, <strong>and</strong> most importantly, the need for plaintiffs to have a financial reason to<br />

claim punitive damages has even greater force in the case of the particularly<br />

outrageous conduct which would be made the subject of a bar on insurance under<br />

option 2. Perversely, a bar on insurance in the case of particularly outrageous<br />

conduct would reduce, rather than increase, the prospect of punitive damages<br />

being claimed. This would not be in the public interest of securing the<br />

punishment of serious wrongdoers.<br />

800 We recognise that permitting insurance will not remove this problem: it could arise in any<br />

case where defendants did not insure or could not insure, either because the premiums<br />

dem<strong>and</strong>ed were too high, or because the insurers excluded punitive awards from the scope<br />

of their policies. Nevertheless, if insurance is permitted, the conflict is at the very least not<br />

inevitable.<br />

801 [1996] 3 WLR 493. See also Chitty on Contracts (27th ed, 1994) 16-005 (“[o]bviously a<br />

doctrine of public policy is somewhat open-textured <strong>and</strong> flexible, <strong>and</strong> this flexibility has<br />

been the cause of judicial censure of the doctrine”); Janson v Driefontein Consolidated Mines<br />

Ltd [1902] AC 484, 500, per Lord Davey (“[p]ublic policy is always an unsafe <strong>and</strong><br />

treacherous ground for legal decision”); <strong>and</strong> Printing & Numerical Registering Co v Sampson<br />

(1875) LR 19 Eq 462, 465, per Jessel MR (above, para 5.242).<br />

802 [1996] 3 WLR 493, 501H-503A. See paras 4.108-4.112 above.<br />

170

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