Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary ... - Law Commission
Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary ... - Law Commission
Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary ... - Law Commission
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Thus it has been suggested that the legitimacy of any limitation on the right to<br />
freedom of expression under English domestic law is governed by principles which<br />
closely resemble those which are expressed in Article 10(2) of the Convention. In<br />
Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) 431<br />
Lord Goff stated that:<br />
I conceive it to be my duty, when I am free to do so, to interpret the<br />
law in accordance with the obligations of the Crown under this treaty.<br />
The exercise of the right to freedom of expression under article 10<br />
may be subject to restrictions (as are prescribed by law <strong>and</strong> are<br />
necessary in a democratic society) in relation to certain prescribed<br />
matters, which include ‘the interests of national security’ <strong>and</strong><br />
‘preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence’. It is<br />
established in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human<br />
Rights that the word ‘necessary’ in this context implies the existence of<br />
a pressing social need, <strong>and</strong> that interference with freedom of<br />
expression should be no more than is proportionate to the legitimate<br />
aim pursued. I have no reason to believe that English law, as applied in the<br />
courts, leads to any different conclusions. 432<br />
1.147 Accordingly, in two recent cases the Court of Appeal has considered the particular<br />
implications of these ‘constraints’ on legitimate derogations from the right to<br />
freedom of expression for jury-assessed damages awards in defamation actions.<br />
The “almost limitless discretion” of the jury when it assesses damages in<br />
defamation cases, 433<br />
as well as the excessive size of the awards which often result,<br />
have given rise to substantial judicial concern about how far this is consistent with<br />
due regard for the right to freedom of expression, <strong>and</strong> for the various constraints<br />
on legitimate derogations therefrom. As a direct result, in both cases the Court of<br />
Appeal found it necessary to modify previous approaches to jury-assessed damages<br />
awards.<br />
1.148 In Rantzen v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd 434<br />
the Court of Appeal said:<br />
[I]t seems to us that the grant of an almost limitless discretion to a jury<br />
fails to provide a satisfactory measurement for deciding what is<br />
‘necessary in a democratic society’ or ‘justified by a pressing social<br />
need’. 435<br />
Accordingly, in order to ensure that the restriction on freedom of expression<br />
constituted by defamation damages was ‘legitimate’, courts had to subject large<br />
awards of damages to “more searching scrutiny than [had] been customary in the<br />
past”, <strong>and</strong> the barrier against appellate intervention in jury awards should be<br />
Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2); R v Wells Street Stipendiary Magistrate, ex p Deakin [1980]<br />
AC 477.<br />
431 [1990] 1 AC 109.<br />
432 [1990] 1 AC 109, 283G-284A (emphasis added).<br />
433 Rantzen v MGN Ltd [1994] QB 670, 692G, per Neill LJ.<br />
434 [1994] QB 670.<br />
435 [1994] QB 670, 690G.<br />
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