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Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary ... - Law Commission

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attracted high levels of award. One reason may be that juries are not involved;<br />

another is that jurisdictional limits have until recently prevented county courts<br />

from making a total award in excess of £5,000. 333<br />

1.100 An important issue for the purposes of this paper is the difference between<br />

exemplary damages under category 2 <strong>and</strong> restitutionary damages: how far, if at all,<br />

are category 2 exemplary damages essentially restitutionary damages? There are<br />

at least three major differences which lead us to the view that the two forms of<br />

damages cannot be equated.<br />

1.101 The first difference is that the focus of category 2 is on the wrongdoer’s improper<br />

motive: the calculation that he or she would profit from the wrong. In contrast, the<br />

focus of restitutionary damages is on the actual making of a profit. Thus, there is<br />

no objection in principle to an award of exemplary damages where the tortious<br />

conduct was calculated to yield a profit in excess of any likely compensation, but<br />

did not in fact produce any or any such profit. 334<br />

This means that exemplary damages<br />

may be awarded even though restitutionary damages are unavailable.<br />

1.102 The second difference is that exemplary damages may be awarded even though<br />

they exceed the amount of the gain made by the tortfeasor. The effective pursuit<br />

of punishment may require awards of exemplary damages to exceed the<br />

restitutionary measure: they are concerned with punishment <strong>and</strong> not simply with<br />

stripping away the fruits of the defendant’s wrongdoing. As Lord Diplock said in<br />

Broome v Cassell,<br />

[T]o restrict the damages recoverable to the actual gain made by the<br />

defendant if it exceeded the loss caused to the plaintiff, would leave a<br />

defendant contemplating an unlawful act with the certainty that he had<br />

nothing to lose to balance against the chance that the plaintiff might<br />

never sue him or, if he did, might fail in the hazards of litigation. It is<br />

only if there is a prospect that the damages may exceed the defendant’s<br />

gain that the social purpose of this category is achieved - to teach a<br />

wrong-doer that tort does not pay. 335<br />

Even so it is not easy to identify actual cases where the quantum of exemplary<br />

damages clearly exceeded the measure of the defendant’s unjust enrichment. This<br />

may be because the quantification of exemplary damages is rarely a precise<br />

exercise: awards are often assessed by a jury; it is very rare for evidence of the<br />

tortfeasor’s profit to be adduced in court; <strong>and</strong> such profit may in any case be<br />

impossible to quantify.<br />

1.103 A final difference is that many of the overriding principles which structure the<br />

discretion to award exemplary damages, <strong>and</strong> which govern their assessment, seem<br />

333 See the County Courts Jurisdiction Order 1981, SI 1981 No 1123.<br />

334 In Archer v Brown [1985] 1 QB 401, 423F-G, Peter Pain J said that the fact that the<br />

defendant could not have profited from his wrong did not take him outside category 2,<br />

provided that he had weighed the risk of loss against the chance of getting away with his<br />

wrongdoing.<br />

335 [1972] AC 1027, 1130C-D.<br />

58

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